Building Cooperation Among Groups in Conflict:
An Experiment on Intersectarian Cooperation in Lebanon

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Abstract: Societies divided along ethnic or religious lines suffer from persistent conflict and under-provision of public goods. Scholarly understanding of the means by which intergroup cooperation can be strengthened remains very limited. In this study, we set out to test the effectiveness of two interventions on intergroup cooperation: cross-group expert appeal and participation in a cross-group discussion. The laboratory-in-the-field experiment is set in Lebanon's capital Beirut and involves interactions between 180 Shia and 180 Sunni Muslim participants. We find that the expert appeal increases intersectarian cooperation in settings that do not entail reciprocal exchange. The effect of group discussion is heterogeneous: on average, group discussion has no effect, but a deep substantive engagement with the other sect increases cooperation. Neither intervention diminishes the effectiveness of sectarian clientelistic appeals. The policy implication of our study is that intergroup cooperation can be strengthened even in regions as bitterly divided as the Middle East.

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1. Introduction

Societies that are home to multiple ethnic or religious groups are known to have lower levels of public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) and higher levels of conflict (Horowitz 1985). That is because cooperation is generally lower across group boundaries than within groups, and prevalence of ingroup favoritism impedes outcomes that are beneficial to society as a whole (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Difficulty of cooperation across group boundaries is a common problem globally, but in recent decades this problem has been particularly acute in the Middle East. There, sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims and doctrinal divisions within sects have brought about spirals of civil conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and waves of protests in Pakistan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. In this project, we test the various means of encouraging cooperation across sectarian lines between Shia and Sunni Muslims.

There is a consensus in the literature on intergroup cooperation that differences in group identity undermine cooperation by inhibiting altruistic behavior toward 'the other' (Allport 1954; Tajfel et al. 1971; Chen and Li 2009) and by making sanctioning more difficult because of limited information about the other group (Habyarimana et al. 2007). We advance the literature by exploring how intergroup cooperation can be fostered. Much work in the social sciences has explored the determinants of cooperation *within* groups; ours is among the few studies in political science to examine how to build cooperation *across* group boundaries (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 1996; Miguel 2004; Cederman et al. 2011).

Our starting point is the insight from the common ingroup identity theory (Gaertner et al. 1993) that intergroup cooperation can be increased through activation of a common overarching identity (for empirical illustration see Miguel 2004). One obvious way to build consensus and construct overarching identity is by facilitating a discussion aimed at establishing cross-group commonality between members of competing groups. Studies on the causes of intergroup cooperation (e.g. Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994) and also the related literature on deliberative democracy (e.g. Fishkin 1997) have considered the effectiveness of group discussions. A major limitation of experimental work in this vein is that the theoretical expectations have been tested mostly in settings where group identities are either arbitrarily assigned or where tensions between competing groups are low (for a review see Thompson 2008; Balliet 2010). In this project, we explore the effectiveness of a discussion intervention in a setting with highly salient real-world religious identities. We also test the effectiveness of a completely novel intervention—an appeal by experts—on intergroup cooperation. Experts are commonly believed to influence public opinion either by providing new information or legitimating certain points of view (Zaller 1992; Heinrich and Gil-White 2001).

We distinguish between two different types of cooperation: *non-strategic cooperation* that does not entail considerations about the other group's response and *strategic cooperation* that makes cooperation conditional on one's expectations about the behavior of members of the opposite group. Non-strategic cooperation is a form of altruistic behavior and signals a high regard toward the outgroup and a lower level of ingroup favoritism. Altruism is not commonly thought of as a type of cooperation in economics,

where cooperation ordinarily entails reciprocity in everyday exchanges. However, studies on evolution of cooperation suggest that pro-social altruistic behavior is a form of cooperation at the level of communities (Axelrod 2006; Boyd and Richerson 2009). In the world of politics, voting for a candidate from the opposite ethnic or religious group out of support for their policy proposals can be an example of non-strategic cooperation.

In a laboratory in the field experiment involving 180 Shia and 180 Sunni Muslims in Beirut,[1] Lebanon, we test what effect watching a short pre-recorded *expert appeal* to cooperate and, separately, participation in a *cross-sectarian discussion* have on the level of intersectarian cooperation. The first intervention—the expert appeal—is modeled after a televised political talk show. In an unscripted conversation, four prominent journalists—two Shias and two Sunnis—discuss Lebanon's problems caused by sectarianism and conclude that the country would benefit substantially from greater cooperation across the sectarian lines. In the second intervention, after watching the expert appeal participants in mixed six-person Sunni-Shia groups engage in face-to-face discussions about issues relating to intersectarian cooperation. In this set up, the content of the expert appeal catalyzes subsequent group discussions in the same way that reading materials provide a prompt for discussions in most studies on deliberation and in the way

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[1] Lebanon is home to a large Christian population. We exclude Christians from this study for several reasons. Substantively, the problem of Sunni-Shia relations is of broad relevance across the region, including in countries with small Christian minorities. Logistically, inclusion of a third group would have made the study more difficult to execute and more costly.

that all real life discussions follow on from some stimulus. We back out the effect of group discussion by comparing that intervention against the baseline of the expert appeal.

The effect of the two interventions on the levels of intergroup cooperation is tested in a series of games. The games capture the non-strategic and strategic aspects of cooperation. We measure non-strategic cooperation by observing participants' vote for sectarian candidates in simulated elections with a plurality rule and, separately, by recording how much of a certain fixed financial resource participants allocate between anonymous members of their own and the opposite sect in a standard other-other allocation game. Strategic cooperation is measured by observing the level of contributions in a standard public goods game.

The study also exposes a random sample of participants to a clientelistic exchange, where some randomly selected participants are offered a financial incentive to vote for their co-sectarian in the election game. We introduce this manipulation out of a concern that clientelism in the form of one-shot payments in exchange for votes is common in Lebanon and across much of the Middle East (Lust 2009; Corstange 2016). The presence of this intervention allows us to test whether expert appeal and group discussions reduce the effectiveness of clientelism. Ours is the first study to consider how interventions designed to increase intergroup cooperation interact with clientelism.

We find that watching experts discuss the benefits of intersectarian cooperation increases non-strategic cooperation, but there is no effect on strategic cooperation. Using self-

reported scores of cross-sectarian trust we explore the relationship between the treatments and strategic cooperation. We find that the expert appeal intervention fails to increase cross-group trust. This suggests that willingness to cooperate in non-strategic exchanges is more easily altered than predisposition toward cooperation with the outgroup in settings that involve strategic considerations. Participation in a cross-sectarian group discussion about cooperation appears to have no effect either on non-strategic or strategic cooperation. However, the effectiveness of group discussion turns out to be highly heterogeneous as a product of substantive discussion depth. A deep and substantive exchange that touches on many topics relating to intergroup cooperation appears to increase both non-strategic and strategic cooperation. We also illustrate how clientelism impedes intergroup cooperation in divided societies. Neither intervention succeeds in diminishing the effectiveness of clientelism.

Our research suggests that intergroup cooperation can be strengthened under certain conditions even in places as bitterly divided on issues as fundamental as religious differences as the Middle East. The primary policy implication of this study is that dissemination of consensual cross-sectarian expert calls to cooperate may in fact bring about greater cooperation across group lines in non-strategic exchanges. Cooperation in strategic settings is likely to improve only once intergroup trust levels increase. Our findings also indicate that intersectarian cooperation in divided societies is unlikely to take root as long as clientelistic vote buying remains a common practice.

2. Context

This project entailed interactions between residents of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. Lebanon is the most fractured country in the Middle East. Fissures run along the lines of religious sectarian identities and are deeply historically rooted (Makdisi 2000). Sectarianism is institutionalized, although moves have been made to abandon sectarian quotas in parliamentary elections for the first time in 2018. The 1943 National Pact heralding Lebanon's independence from France and the 1989 National Reconciliation Accord (the Taif Agreement) that concluded the intersectarian civil war (1975-1990) organize the system of government around sectarian differences.

The very question of the relative size of the three largest sects is extremely sensitive, and the only national population census in Lebanon's fraught history took place in 1932. Estimates suggest that Christians comprise about 40% of the population, while Sunni and Shia Muslims are 27% and 26% respectively (Faour 2007). Under the sectarian accords, Maronite Christians are guaranteed the office of the presidency, Sunni Muslims the office of the prime minister, and Shia Muslims the office of the parliamentary speaker. Until the 2018 election, should it take place, the three sects have quotas in parliament: 64 seats are assigned to Christians, 27 each to Shia and Sunni Muslims, and the remaining 10 seats to other Muslim minorities. Basic services are commonly provided along sectarian lines, and the population is highly segregated regionally within the country and by neighborhood in the capital of Beirut. Marital practices are regulated independently by separate confessional courts, and most high school students attend schools dominated by a single confession (Baytiyeh 2016). In addition, external actors exert pressure on behalf

of the competing sects: Iran supports Lebanon's Shias, whereas Saudi Arabia supports the Sunnis.

This environment of institutionalized sectarianism gives rise to clientelism. Most commonly, clientelism takes the form of vote buying on the polling day (Corstange 2012, 2016), although longer-term clientelistic arrangements that entail selective service provision are also present (Cammett and Isaar 2010). About 55% of the Lebanese sold their votes in the 2009 parliamentary election according to Corstange (2012).

3. Hypotheses

We hypothesize that both interventions—expert appeal and participant discussion— should increase non-strategic and strategic intersectarian cooperation. Expert appeals are likely to be effective because experts, like any high-status individuals, are commonly emulated according to the prestige-bias theory of cultural learning in evolutionary psychology (Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Chudek et al. 2012). If experts endorse an overarching national Lebanese group identity that exists above sectarian identities, precisely as experts in this experiment do, then it is seems reasonable to expect that these appeals will bring about corresponding changes in behavior among study participants. As a matter of empirics, there is strong support for the claim that experts influence political attitudes and behavior in consequential ways (e.g. Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee 1954; Zaller 1992). We expect both the regard for and trust in the outgroup to increase as a result of exposure to an expert appeal, which is why we hypothesize that this intervention will increase both non-strategic and strategic cooperation.

H1: Participants randomized into the *expert appeal intervention* will be more likely to cooperate with members of the opposite sect in both non-strategic and strategic exchanges.

The effectiveness of the group discussion intervention has been tested in multiple studies, but there is still disagreement over the empirical effects of discussion on cooperation and over the theoretical mechanisms by which discussion is supposed to be effective (for a review see Thompson 2008; Balliet 2010). In the setting of this study, we are working with groups that are at conflict. Therefore, we hypothesize that a discussion involving both groups is likely to help build common ground across the sectarian divide by highlighting that both groups face identical problems and share common overarching identities as citizens of Lebanon and Arabs. Common ingroup identity theory has modeled how activation of an overarching group identity might decrease bias among members of smaller constituent groups that make up the larger whole (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). We hypothesize that participation in a group discussion will both increase the regard for the opposite sect and trust in members of that sect thus improving cooperation in non-strategic and strategic settings.

H2: Participants randomized into the *group discussion intervention* will be more likely to cooperate with members of the opposite sect in both non-strategic and strategic exchanges.

The study also contains a vote buying intervention. Clientelism is ordinarily effective because financial incentives offered by brokers override individuals' personal preferences. Given that the expert appeal and group discussion interventions strengthen the overarching group identity, we expect these interventions to also strengthen intrinsic motivations such as positive attitudes toward a member of the opposite religious or ethnic

group. The activation of these intrinsic motivations is likely to fortify against the effectiveness of financial incentives.

> H3: Participants assigned to expert appeal and group discussion interventions will be *less likely* to vote for a co-sectarian candidate in simulated elections after being offered a financial incentive to do so.

4. Research Design

This laboratory-in-the-field experiment is built around two interventions:

(1) Viewing of a pre-recorded expert appeal about the benefits of intersectarian cooperation, and

(2) Participation in a small-group discussion about intersectarianism after seeing the expert appeal.

All tasks, from watching the expert discussion to playing the games, are undertaken within six-person groups in a series of face-to-face interactions. Each group is made up of three Shia and three Sunni participants; membership in these groups remains fixed over the course of the study.

4.1 Study population

Participants in this experiment are drawn from across Lebanon's capital Beirut with a view of assembling a representative sample of Shia and Sunni residents of the capital. Participants' characteristics are described in Table 1. Two-thirds are from neighborhoods dominated by a single sect, and the remainder are from mixed neighborhoods. This is a fair approximation of how Muslims are distributed across Beirut neighborhoods (Salamey and Tabar 2008). The average age of participants is 37, and they range in age from 18 to

64.[2] On average, participants have 12 years of schooling. They come from households with monthly incomes of around $2,100. Men and women, and Shia and Sunni Muslims, are all equally represented. In Appendix A, we compare the demographic characteristics of our population to Arab Barometer data on Muslim residents of Beirut and of Lebanon more broadly. The comparison suggests that participants in this study are generally representative of the reference populations with regards to age, education level, and income. The Shia and Sunni communities are similar in size in Lebanon; this is also the case by design in our study. Participants self-reported having well understood the instructions for the study's tasks.

Table 1. Description of Participants: Summary Statistics.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Shia/Sunni, %	0.50	0.50	0	1
Female/Male, %	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age, years	37	13	18	64
Education level[+]	3.56	1.50	0	6
Monthly household income level[++]	1.06	1.24	0	6
Predominately Shia neighborhood, %	0.35	0.48	0	1
Predominately Sunni neighborhood, %	0.30	0.46	0	1
Level of understanding of tasks[+++]	2.64	0.60	0	3

[+] Education levels: 0-none; 1-elementary; 2-prepartory; 3-secondary; 4-technical; 5-college; 6-postgraduate.
[++] Income: 0-under 1,000,000LBP; 1-between 1,000,001 and 3,000,000LBP; 2-between 3,000,001 and 5,000,000LBP; 3-between 5,000,001 and 7,000,000LBP; 4-between 7,000,001 and 9,000,000LBP; 5-between 9,000,001 and 11,000,000LBP; 6-over 11,000,001LBP.
[+++] Level of understanding: 0-did not understand the instructions; 1-understood instructions poorly; 2-understood instructions quite well; 3-understood instructions fully.
Note: Age, education level, household income, and level of understanding are measured via survey questions. A few participants did not respond to these questions and some observations are therefore missing. Survey question wording in Appendix K.

4.2 Setting

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[2] On advice of our implementing partner we capped participant age at 64 in order increase the likelihood that participants were literate and able to follow instructions.

The study was administered on the premises of a Lebanese public opinion firm. On arrival, individuals were randomly assigned to six-member groups. Each group was balanced with regard to sect (three Shia and three Sunni), gender (three men and three women), and age (three participants aged 18-40 and three aged 41-64) in order to minimize possible social pressure on women and younger participants and to control for heterogeneity in the nature of social pressure across groups. None of the group participants had met beforehand, and we asked participants not to speak with one another until instructed to do so. They were asked to keep their names secret throughout the study because names can be a marker of sectarian affiliation.

Our assistants acted as group moderators: they informed the members of their group that there are three Shia and three Sunni Muslims in the group without revealing which specific participants belonged to which sect or introducing them, read out instructions for every task in Arabic, and moderated the group discussion. Assistants followed written scripts and were trained not to deviate from pre-agreed instructions. Assistants were randomly assigned to groups, but, nevertheless, in the analyses that follow we include a control for group moderator effects.

The experiment took place in November 2016 over the course of twelve separate sessions that were completed in eight days. Five six-person groups were recruited for every session. Participants were randomly assigned to sessions subject to the constraints of sect, gender, and age requirements. All those attending a specific session were subject to the same experimental manipulation. There was no communication across groups.

4.3 Interventions

Table 2. Experimental conditions.

	Baseline	Expert Appeal	Expert Appeal + Participant Discussion
No Clientelism	*Experimental condition 1*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)	*Experimental condition 2*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)	*Experimental condition 3*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)
Clientelism	*Experimental condition 4*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)	*Experimental condition 5*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)	*Experimental condition 6*: 60 Participants 2 sessions (10 groups)

The experimental conditions are summarized in Table 2. There are three of them: baseline, expert appeal, and expert appeal + participant discussion. This structure is replicated twice—once in the absence of a clientelistic intervention (conditions 1-3) and once in the presence of clientelism (conditions 4-6). The total number of participants in the study is 360 for the total of 60 six-member teams. Ten groups, i.e. 60 individuals, are randomly assigned to each intervention. This is a relatively small number of participants per intervention, which naturally raises a concern about the study's statistical power. In designing the experiment, we faced a trade off between internal validity (increasing the number of participants per intervention) and external validity (including a clientelism intervention). Constrained by limited resources and eager to make the experiment realistic and relevant, we opted for including a clientelism intervention over increasing the number of subjects in each intervention.

The expert appeal intervention is set up to maximally resemble a political talk show. In the video, four experts—two Shia and two Sunni male journalists in their 50s—discuss pressing problems in contemporary Lebanese politics and the promise of intersectarian

cooperation in solving these. The discussion is moderated by a female Christian

journalist, recorded in a formal setting, and unscripted. The four experts and the

moderator are all prominent in Lebanese media, contributing opinion pieces to major

newspapers and appearing on national television. In their public appearances, all the

experts consistently advocate for intersectarian cooperation. About a quarter of the

respondents remembered encountering at least one of the experts' names either on

television or in print.[3]

The expert appeal is 15 minutes in duration. The discussion opens with all the experts

agreeing that sectarianism is the main problem in Lebanese politics. The nature of the

problem is then illustrated in a series of remarks: sectarianism is linked to corruption and

nepotism, lack of a unifying Lebanese national identity, infrequent social mixing across

sects, and institutional sclerosis and poor quality of basic governmental services. The

discussion closes with participants appealing for intersectarian cooperation in the interest

of subsequent generations. The transcript of the video (in English) and the video itself (in

Arabic) are available in Appendices B and C.

The participant discussion intervention is designed to follow on from experts' appeal in

order to ensure that participants talk specifically about intersectarian cooperation. In

real-world interactions, political appeals are often followed by conversations in a group

setting. Our treatment takes on the form of precisely such a group discussion where

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[3] There is no difference in the rate of expert recognition among participants assigned to

the expert appeal and group discussion conditions.

participants have a chance to react to the message that they had just been exposed to. Experiments on deliberation commonly provide a stimulus—usually a written text—prior to discussion. In this instance, a written prompt is replaced by a pre-recorded message from experts.

Group discussions lasted 30 minutes on average. They were relatively freewheeling; group moderators were asked to pose a series of questions only in order to direct the conversation (see Appendix D). While all the participants agreed in principle with the message that intersectarian cooperation is good, there was variation on the depth of engagement. Participants in some groups provided multiple examples of the harms of sectarianism, while, in other groups, discussion remained shallow and did not get much beyond superficial agreement with the experts. Group discussion transcripts (in English) are available in Appendix E.[4]

In designing the study we tried to approximate Lebanon's actual political environment. One obvious challenge to studying the effectiveness of expert appeals or deliberative discussions on political behavior and attitudes is that actual political behavior in Lebanon, just like in many developing democracies, is not simply a product of personal political preferences but is subject to pressure from vote-buying intermediaries. The question then is not just whether our interventions can sway members of different sects to

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[4] These transcripts are generated from audio recordings of group discussions. One participant objected to being recorded, and therefore transcripts are available for 19 out of 20 group discussions.

cooperate across the sectarian divide but, more realistically, whether these interventions can be effective in the presence of widespread clientelism. To test this proposition we assigned 180 participants in their six-person groups to a clientelism intervention within which the three experimental conditions are replicated.

The clientelistic appeal was delivered as follows: Before proceeding to the games, every participant in the experiment was asked to meet with an employee of the implementing firm to confirm their contact details. The employees in question—one Shia and one Sunni, both male, and in their mid-20s—were our confederates. Participants always met with the confederate who was their co-sectarian. All the meetings were one-on-one and held in private rooms with the door closed. The confederates checked the subject's contact details against a list and then briefly described the first game, a simulated election with multiple rounds where participants would be asked to vote for a Shia or Sunni candidate proposing to divide a fixed amount of money in different ways across different sects. As a result, all participants were informed that allocation of financial rewards was at stake in the simulated elections before being offered a clientelistic payment to support a specific candidate.

Those not assigned to the clientelism treatment were then instructed to return to their six-member group. Those subject to the clientelism intervention heard the clientelistic offer at this time. In it, the "election broker" explained that unbeknownst to researchers a good friend and co-sectarian of the broker (and therefore also of the subject) was running in the simulated elections as a candidate, and that winning candidates would receive a higher

salary from the research team. The broker then offered the subject $10 "in secret" to vote for the candidate of their sect across all the elections irrespective of the candidate's policy platform.[5] The script of what was said by election brokers is available in Appendix F. Subjects were free to accept or reject the money. Seventy-six percent of the participants accepted the offer; those who rejected it mostly did so stating explicitly that they wanted to hear the candidates' proposals about how the financial rewards were to be divided.

4.4 Outcomes

The first game, designed to measure non-strategic cooperation, was a simulated election and took place over the course of four separate rounds. In each round, two candidates— one Shia, one Sunni; both besuited men in their late 50s of similar physical appearance— appeared in person before the six-person group to deliver competing policy proposals with regards to how to divide a certain amount of money between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the group. Prior to this, all participants were endowed with 40 tokens each (a single token is equivalent to $0.5), and 20 tokens were collected from every participant by way of what was described to participants as a tax. The resultant 120 tokens ($60) were placed at the center of the table; this amount was to be divided according to the proposal made by the winning candidate.

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[5] US dollars are used commonly alongside the national currency (Lebanese pounds), and all the transactions in this study took place in USD. Ten dollars is equivalent to about two hours of work on an average wage in Beirut.

Over the course of four elections the candidates delivered competing proposals for how to divide "the tax" between the two sects. Votes were cast in writing by secret ballot. Election winners were determined at the very end of the study.[6] Instructions read out to participants by group moderators for this and all other games are available in Appendix G. Templates of decision sheets that participants had to complete in each game are in Appendix H.

The proposals delivered by election candidates are summarized in Table 3. The order of elections was fixed to facilitate the implementation of the study, and the two candidates alternated in delivering speeches. In every election, one of the candidates proposed equal distribution of tokens—20 per person—to both Shia and Sunni participants. The other candidate then proposed some form of unequal distribution favoring his own sect by suggesting that either all or most of the tokens should go to his co-sectarians. The script of statements delivered from memory by the two candidates is available in Appendix I. We define sectarian voters as those who vote for a candidate from their sect across all four elections *irrespective of the candidate's policy proposal*.

Table 3: Candidates' messages in the election game.

	Shia candidate	*Sunni candidate*
Election 1	Sectarian distribution: Shia only (40/0)	Egalitarian distribution: (20/20)
Election 2	Egalitarian distribution (20/20)	Sectarian distribution: Sunni only (0/40)
Election 3	Sectarian distribution: Shia and Sunni (30/10)	Egalitarian distribution: (20/20)
Election 4	Egalitarian distribution (20/20)	Sectarian distribution: Shia and Sunni (10/30)

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[6] In the event of a tie, election winner was determined by a coin toss.

The second game is the other-other allocation game, which is commonly used as a measure of other-regarding preferences and therefore of non-strategic cooperation. In this game, participants were given 10 tokens that they must spend and were asked to distribute these between an anonymous co-ethnic and an anonymous person from the opposite group. Participants did not know which specific individuals in the group were affected. The allocation decision had to be recorded secretly in writing, and all allocation decisions were tallied at the conclusion of the study.

The third and final game was the standard public goods game, which was used to measure the strength of strategic cooperation within groups.[7] In this task, participants had to decide how many of 10 tokens to keep for themselves and how many to surrender into the common pool. At the end of every round, all tokens in the common pool were multiplied by two, and the resultant sum was shared equally across all group members.

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[7] Games were played in the sequence outlined above: simulated election first, then the other-other allocation game, and finally the public goods game. In addition, the sequence of elections in the first game was also fixed. This gives rise to concerns about order effects. In this instance, we were not overly concerned about order effects because outcomes were not revealed until the very end of the study. Generally, fixed order of games is commonly used in experimental research where tasks are complex and a fixed sequence facilitates implementation (e.g. Chen and Li 2009; Tomoni et al. 2010; Gilligan et al. 2014).

Higher contributions to the common pool are reflective of a higher willingness to cooperate with others. A classical free-riding problem arises where participants benefit from not contributing to the common pool while hoping that others will contribute. This game was repeated for five rounds. Before playing the game, participants had a chance to practice three hypothetical scenarios in order to learn about the free-riding incentive.[8] During the game every group member recorded their contribution in writing secretly, and the group moderator wrote out the individual contributions and resultant distributions on a whiteboard at the end of every round without linking individuals to specific contributions.

4.5 Compensation and Ethics

With the three games finished, participants were asked to complete a brief survey, and then earnings were tallied. One election of four and a single round of the public goods game were picked at random for the purposes of calculating the winnings from games one and three. Allocations from game two were added to these. In addition, every participant received a show-up fee of $18. Participants earned $48 on average, a little more than a day's average wage in Beirut. Those who had been assigned to the clientelism treatment and accepted the $10 reward kept that too. We purposefully kept remuneration high in order to motivate participants to think carefully through their decisions and to try and imitate the high stakes of regular political interactions. This study involved deception for those assigned to the clientelism intervention. All those in

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[8] Group moderators walked the participants through scenarios with contribution vectors (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10), and (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10).

the clientelism intervention were debriefed on the nature of deception; there were no adverse reactions in the debriefing.

5. Results

5.1. Balance

By design, there is the same number of women and men (50%) and Shia and Sunni participants (50%) across the six treatment conditions. The groups are also identical with regards to age, wealth, and participants' ability to understand group moderator's instructions. There is some mild heterogeneity on education levels and what types of neighborhoods participants are from. This is not unusual in experimental studies with small population sizes. Full results of a randomization check are available in Appendix J.

In the analyses that follow, we include the following variables as controls: gender, sect, age, education, wealth, ability to understand instructions, and type of residential neighborhood. All of the control variables are summarized in Table 1. In the analyses, we also cluster standard errors at the level of six-person groups to control for the possible confounding effect of group dynamics and include controls for group moderator effects and clientelism where appropriate. Groups are nested within sessions. In order to capture this dynamic, we replicate the main analyses using multilevel modeling. Results from multilevel models are reported in appendices, which are referenced in the text; these results are consistent with ones reported in the body of the paper.

5.2. Non-strategic cooperation

Table 4: Treatment effects by manipulation in the election game.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (Logistic)				B. Participant Discussion (Logistic)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Expert Appeal	-0.82*	-0.86*	-0.90**	-1.04**				
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.34)				
Participant Discussion					0.41	0.43	0.45	0.38
					(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Constant	-0.17	-0.62*	-0.10	3.77*	-0.99**	-1.61**	-1.37**	2.84
	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.47)	(1.73)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.52)	(1.58)
Clientelism	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Control variables	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	238	238	238	212	238	238	238	205
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.14	0.01	0.06	0.10	0.13

Note: Models 1-4 examine treatment effects in experimental conditions 2 & 5 against the baseline of conditions 1 & 4. Models 5-8 look at treatment effects in experimental conditions 3 & 6 against the baseline of 2 & 5; standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

The effects of expert appeal (Panel A) and participant discussion (Panel B) in the

simulated elections are explored in Table 4.[9] [10] The dependent variable takes on the value

of 1 if a participant votes for a co-sectarian across all four elections irrespective of how

the candidate proposed to divide the funds between Shia and Sunni participants.[11] The

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[9] Results from multilevel model analyses in Appendix L.

[10] Some participants made ambiguous markings on the decision sheets; that is why the

number of observations in these and subsequent models is short of 240. There is also

missingness in analyses that include controls from survey questions.

[11] Distribution of votes by treatment group across elections is reported in Appendix M.

What seems to matter in these elections is whether candidates' platforms are sectarian;

models are logistic regressions; the coefficients are non-exponentiated. For a substantive interpretation of the coefficients we compute marginal effects of varying the treatment variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at their means. We expect both interventions to *decrease* the likelihood of voting for a co-sectarian candidate.

The results indicate that exposure to the expert appeal decreases sectarian voting thus increasing non-strategic cooperation. Computing the marginal effects for the expert appeal intervention we find that those randomly assigned to the expert appeal treatment are less likely to vote along sectarian lines by about 19-23% (models 1 and 4 respectively). These effects are statistically significant. In contrast, participant discussion does not appear to diminish sectarian voting. If anything, the likelihood of voting for a co-sectarian after participating in a group discussion *increases* by 7-9% (models 8 and 5 respectively), although this effect is not statistically significant.

Treatment effects in the other-other allocation game are explored in Table 5.[12] Here, the dependent variable is the average number of tokens (of 10) allocated to an anonymous co-sectarian. The model is ordinary least squares (OLS). We expect the number of tokens given to co-sectarians to *decrease* as a result of both interventions.

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the degree to which the platforms are sectarian (whether co-sectarians receive 30 or 40 tokens of the total of 40 available for distribution) does not make much of a difference.

[12] Results from multilevel model analyses in Appendix L.

Table 5: Treatment effects by manipulation in the other-other allocation game.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (OLS)				B. Participant Discussion (OLS)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Expert Appeal	-1.03*	-1.03*	-1.03**	-1.11**				
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.39)				
Participant Discussion					0.41	0.41	0.40	0.49
					(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Constant	7.01**	6.60**	6.73**	10.88**	5.98**	5.77**	5.83**	7.98**
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.63)	(1.68)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.38)	(1.46)
Clientelism	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Control variables	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	238	238	238	212	239	239	239	206
R^2	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.14

*Note: Models 1-4 examine treatment effects in experimental conditions 2 & 5 against the baseline of conditions 1 & 4. Models 5-8 look at treatment effects in experimental conditions 3 & 6 against the baseline of 2 & 5; standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Consistent with the findings in the election game, we find that exposure to the expert appeal diminishes the number of tokens allocated to co-sectarians by approximately one token from 7 to 6. This effect is statistically significant. As in the previous task, participation in a group discussion appears to *increase* allocation of tokens to co-sectarians by about 0.4 of a token, although, once again, this effect falls short of statistical significance. All in all, we find that exposure to an expert appeal seems to increase intersectarian cooperation in non-strategic exchanges, while participation in a group discussion has no effect on this type of cooperation and, if anything, undermines it.

5.3. Strategic cooperation

To explore whether exposure to an expert appeal and participation in a group discussion might affect intersectarian cooperation in a setting involving strategic decisions we had

the participants play a public goods game within their mixed-sect groups. Average

contributions to the common pool remained stable across rounds at about 6 tokens (of

10); the pattern of average contributions by experimental group is reported in Appendix

N.   We hypothesized that contributions to the common pool and therefore the level of

strategic cooperation will *increase* in both treatment conditions.

Table 6: Treatment effects by manipulation in the public goods game.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (OLS)				B. Participant Discussion (OLS)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Expert Appeal	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.39				
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.42)				
Participant Discussion					0.07	0.07	0.10	0.19
					(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Lagged group contribution	0.07**	0.07**	0.05**	0.05*	0.09**	0.09**	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.35**	3.51**	4.42**	-0.80	2.94**	3.05**	3.50**	-1.09
	(0.77)	(0.87)	(0.88)	(2.12)	(0.66)	(0.73)	(0.65)	(1.51)
Clientelism	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Control variables	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	960	960	960	856	960	960	960	828
R^2	0.30	0.30	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.31

Note: Models 1-4 examine treatment effects in experimental conditions 2 & 5 against the baseline

of conditions 1 & 4. Models 5-8 look at treatment effects in experimental conditions 3 & 6

*against the baseline of 2 & 5; standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses; * p<0.05,*

*** p<0.01.*

The impact of the two interventions on strategic cooperation is explored in Table 6.[13]

The models are OLS; *Lagged group contribution* is a control for average group

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[13] Results from multilevel model analyses in Appendix L.

contribution in the preceding round of the game. Both interventions increase the amount that participants contribute, but these effects are not statistically significant across any specification. Contrary to expectations, our hypothesis about the treatments increasing strategic cooperation is not supported by the data. In the discussion section, we explore why the interventions failed to increase strategic cooperation.

5.4. Clientelism

We hypothesized that the interventions would diminish the effectiveness of clientelism. We now test this hypothesis in the context of the simulated elections. The clientelism intervention incentivizes participants to vote for co-sectarians irrespective of the content of the candidates' policy proposals. However, 24% of those offered the financial incentive declined to accept it.[14] Therefore, in testing the effectiveness of vote buying we use two different measures of the treatment: whether the participant was randomly assigned into the treatment (*Clientelism*) and, separately, whether they accepted the financial incentive (*Accepted Clientelistic Offer*). It might be useful to think of this difference as that between the average treatment effect (ATE) and the complier average causal effect (CACE), i.e. the difference in treatment effects between everyone assigned to the treatment and only those who took it up.

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[14] Refusals to accept the incentive were as follows: 14/60 in the Clientelism only condition (experimental condition 4), 12/60 in the Expert Appeal+Clientelism condition (5), and 17/60 in the Participant Discussion+Clientelism condition (6).

Table 7: Effects of clientelism on the likelihood of sectarian voting.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (Logistic)				B. Participant Discussion (Logistic)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Clientelism	0.94*	0.90			1.07**	1.06*		
	(0.38)	(0.53)			(0.36)	(0.52)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer			1.53**	1.77**			1.80**	1.27*
			(0.42)	(0.62)			(0.40)	(0.56)
Expert Appeal	-1.04**	-1.10*	-1.15**	-0.92				
	(0.34)	(0.53)	(0.33)	(0.50)				
Clientelism × Expert Appeal		0.11						
		(0.74)						
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Expert Appeal				-0.51				
				(0.87)				
Participant Discussion					0.38	0.38	0.58	0.09
					(0.37)	(0.56)	(0.36)	(0.52)
Clientelism × Participant Discussion						0.00		
						(0.74)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Participant Discussion								1.11
								(0.86)
Constant	3.77*	3.81*	2.96	2.69	2.84	2.85	2.85	3.31
	(1.73)	(1.79)	(1.88)	(1.96)	(1.58)	(1.60)	(1.74)	(1.73)
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	212	212	212	212	205	205	205	205
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.19	0.20

Note: Accepted Clientelistic Offer *is coded as 0 for participants in experimental conditions without clientelism (1-3) and for those in clientelism conditions (4-6) who did not accept the incentive; models 1-4 use data from conditions 1-2 and 4-5; models 5-8 use data from conditions 2-3 and 5-6; standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

The effectiveness of the clientelism manipulation in encouraging sectarian voting

and the impact of expert appeal and group discussion on clientelism are explored in

Table 7.[15] As before, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating sectarian voting.

The models are logistic, and the coefficients are non-exponentiated. We calculate

marginal effects for each of the treatments to get at substantive effects.

Consistent with expectations, we find that clientelism is highly effective at getting

participants to vote along sectarian lines. Those subject to the clientelistic appeal are

21% more likely to vote for a co-sectarian (marginal effects from models 1 and 5).

Among those who accept the clientelistic offer, the predicted probability of voting

for a co-sectarian increases by 34% (models 3 and 7).   These are substantial effects

given that there were no sanctions for not following through.

Whether the interventions mitigate the positive effect of clientelism on sectarian voting is

tested using interaction terms between *Clientelism/Accepted Clientelistic Offer* and each

of the treatments in models 2 and 4 for the expert appeal and models 6 and 8 for

participant discussion. Neither of the interventions appears to diminish the effectiveness

of clientelism. The interaction term coefficients are consistently not statistically

significant. Contrary to what we hypothesized, the results suggest that the treatments are

unable to overcome the effects of clientelism.

6. Discussion

The results of the experiment give rise to two important questions. First, why does

the expert appeal intervention fail to increase cooperation in strategic exchanges that

involve calculations about reciprocal action? Second, given the extensive literature

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[15] Results from multilevel model analyses are in Appendix O.

on the importance of discussion for consensus building, why do we find that participant discussion has failed to increase cooperation? We address both of these questions in this section. To do this we use observational data from a post-experimental survey and participant discussion transcripts; therefore, the answers we provide are different in kind from experimental results reported above and are only suggestive.

6.1. Why no effect of interventions on strategic cooperation?

Cooperation in strategic settings involves calculations about the likelihood of a member of the opposite group reciprocating in response to a benevolent action. It seems reasonable to conjecture that inter-group trust might be a prerequisite for a positive expectation that a member of the competing group will reciprocate. We have measures of cross-sectarian trust from the survey that was administered after all the games had been completed. Using survey data we constructed measures of absolute and relative trust in the opposite sect. The absolute cross-sectarian trust measure reflects a participant's trust in the opposite sect on a four-point scale, where 1 is "no trust at all" and 4 is "complete trust" (for question wording see Appendix K). The relative cross-sectarian trust measure captures how much a participant trusts the other group *relative* to her own group. The relative trust measure is on a seven-point scale and is calculated by subtracting a participant's trust in her own sect from her trust in the opposite sect.

Table 8. Treatment effects on cross-sectarian trust (models 1-4), and effect of trust on contributions in a public goods game (models 5-6).

	A. Absolute cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		B. Relative cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		C. Contribution to public goods (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Expert Appeal	0.19 (0.31)		0.45 (0.28)			
Participant Discussion		0.42 (0.24)		0.15 (0.24)		
Absolute cross-sectarian trust					0.69** (0.23)	
Relative cross-sectarian trust						0.46** (0.18)
Lagged group contribution					0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant					-2.52 (1.48)	-1.12 (1.58)
/cut1	-1.23 (1.60)	0.24 (1.36)	-1.50 (1.50)	-2.08 (1.45)		
/cut2	1.18 (1.57)	2.82 (1.31)	-0.18 (1.50)	-0.65 (1.41)		
/cut3	2.55 (1.58)	4.33 (1.31)	0.92 (1.52)	0.44 (1.40)		
/cut4			4.12 (1.58)	4.04 (1.48)		
/cut5			5.26 (1.76)	5.05 (1.63)		
/cut6			5.67 (1.83)	5.46 (1.69)		
Observations	176	179	173	178	1060	1044
R^2	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.32	0.31

Note: Regressions in Panels A & B are ordinal logistic regressions. OLS is used in Panel C. Models 1 and 3 use observations from experimental conditions 1-2 and 4-5; models 2 and 4 use observations from experimental conditions 2-3 and 5-6; models 5 and 6 use observations from all experimental conditions. Standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses; $* p<0.05, ** p<0.01$.

First, we need to establish whether the two interventions increased cross-sectarian trust. We explore this in panels A and B of Table 8.[16] We analyze the effect of treatments on trust using the ordinal logistic regression. For ease of comparison, the regression in panel B is also ordinal logistic.[17] The coefficients are non-exponentiated. Exposure to the expert appeal and participation in a group discussion both appear to somewhat increase cross-sectarian trust. However, this effect is not statistically significant. All in all, the results suggest that the interventions failed to increase cross-sectarian trust.

But does there exist a relationship between cross-sectarian trust and strategic cooperation? We test for existence of this relationship in Panel C of Table 8 where we regress cross-sectarian trust (absolute and relative in models 5 and 6 respectively) on the number of tokens that participants contributed to the common pool in the public goods game. The results are from an OLS regression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a one-unit increase in absolute trust (on a four-point scale) is associated with an additional contribution of 0.7 of a token (of 10). The magnitude of the effect for relative cross-sectarian trust is similar. Both effects are statistically significant. In short, higher levels of cross-sectarian trust do indeed tend to correlate with increased strategic cooperation across sectarian lines. Because the

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[16] Results from multilevel model analyses are in Appendix P.

[17] The relative trust measure is on a seven-point scale, and therefore OLS is preferable to ordinal logit. Results from an OLS regression are reported in Appendix Q; they are consistent with results from ordinal logit.

treatments seem to fail to increase cross-sectarian trust, they also fail to increase strategic cooperation.

6.2. Heterogeneous effects of discussion quality

Results reported thus far suggest that participation in a group discussion has no effect either or non-strategic or strategic cooperation. This is contrary to our initial expectations. One possibility that occurred to us as we engaged with the data is that group discussions varied substantially as to their quality.

To test for possible heterogeneity in group discussion effects we constructed an index that measures their substantive depth. Substantive depth might matter insofar as discussions that lack it might fail to alter participants' preferences. To construct the index we first made note of all substantive issues brought up over the course of discussions. There were 25 such issues divided across three areas: types of negative effects of sectarianism (three subcategories), causes of sectarianism (eight subcategories), and possible ways to encourage intersectarian cooperation (14 subcategories). We then calculated a *discussion depth* score for each participant. [18] Every time a participant talked about an issue touching on one of the 25 subcategories, she received a score of 1 if she agreed that the subcategory was relevant to cooperation or of -1 if she thought it was irrelevant. There was no double counting of similar statements within subcategories, and 519 statements were

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[18] Coding rules for group discussions are in Appendix R.

counted in total.[19] If the participant had nothing to say about an issue, then they

received a score of 0 against the relevant subcategory. Group scores are compiled by

adding the individual scores of the six participants and are then rescaled to run from

0 to 1, where 1 is the highest *actual* discussion depth score for a group in our data

and 0 the lowest.[20]

Table 9: Effect of discussion depth on sectarian voting (task 1), average contribution in the other-other allocation game (task 2), and average contribution in a public goods game (task 3).

	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-2.26**	-3.44**	-3.34**	-3.60**	2.28**	2.33*
	(0.81)	(1.06)	(0.68)	(0.85)	(0.65)	(0.96)
Female participation	-1.24**	-1.06**	-0.39*	-0.36	0.50	0.86*
	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.43)
Youth participation	0.40	-0.62	0.48*	0.58*	-1.00*	-1.23**
	(0.44)	(0.68)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.41)	(0.44)
Lagged group contribution					0.08**	0.07**
					(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	1.50	9.81*	7.98**	8.15**	3.55**	-0.77
	(1.03)	(4.36)	(0.39)	(1.75)	(1.10)	(1.83)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380

[19] Five of 20 instances of a -1 score are participants disagreeing that protests are a good

way to strengthen intersectarian cooperation. Dropping all the disagreement scores (-1s)

has no substantive impact on the results, as shown in Appendix S.

[20] Prior to rescaling, discussion depth scores for six-member groups range from the

lowest of 15 to the highest of 41.

R^2	0.25	0.38	0.16	0.23	0.27	0.33

Note: All models use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6; standard errors, clustered at group level, are in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

The results of the analyses examining the effect of discussion depth on the outcomes of the three games are presented in Table 9.[21] The outcomes are a dummy for voting for a co-sectarian across four elections (Panel A), the number of tokens allocated to a co-sectarian in the other-other allocation game (Panel B), and the size of contribution in the public goods game (Panel C). Panel A reports non-exponentiated coefficients from a logistic regression; OLS is used in panels B and C. We add two additional control variables that measure how active women and those under 40 were in the discussion, as existing studies suggest that women and young people might participate at lower rates (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).[22]

The results suggest that discussion quality might matter quite a bit in determining the outcomes.[23] Going from a shallow discussion that contains little substance to a deep

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[21] Results from multilevel model analyses are in Appendix T.

[22] These measures are constructed based on the moderators' evaluations of the dynamics of each group discussion.

[23] The discussion depth index was compiled manually, which might introduce bias. In addition, the tone of group discussion might make a difference to the outcomes. To address both of these concerns we created an automated measure of discussion tone by calculating positive and negative sentiment scores for each group discussion using automated sentiment analysis and then subtracting negative sentiment score from positive sentiment score to create the relative "tone" score. We replicate the analyses in Table 9

one that touches on many aspects of intersectarian cooperation (i.e. moving from 0 to 1 along the index) reduces the probability of sectarian voting by 54% in the election game (model 2), decreases the allocation to a co-sectarian in the other-other allocation game by 3.6 tokens (model 4), and increases the contribution in the public goods game by 2.3 tokens (model 6). This result suggests that the overall ineffectiveness of the group discussion intervention in bringing about greater intersectarian cooperation masks a great deal of heterogeneity. Furthermore, depth of discussion was not varied experimentally. In Appendix V, we examine factors that might affect discussion depth and find that more educated and older people are more likely to make substantive contributions. A word of caution is in order: our results are based on the analyses of 19 group discussions. Therefore, additional work is necessary to confirm the validity of these intriguing findings.

7. Conclusion

In a laboratory-in-the-field experiment among the residents of Beirut, Lebanon, we set out to examine how to increase cooperation between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Our results indicate that exposure to a cross-sectarian consensual message calling for greater cooperation and delivered by experts can effectively increase intersectarian cooperation in non-strategic exchanges, i.e. exchanges that require no calculations about reciprocal action. Pro-cooperation appeal by experts has no effect in strategic exchanges involving

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and include the tone score alongside discussion depth score. The results are reported in Appendix U. The magnitude and significance of discussion depth coefficients remains unchanged when discussion tone is added to the analyses.

reciprocity because the appeal seems to fail to increase cross-sectarian trust. Participation in a group discussion with members of the opposite sect does not appear to increase cooperation. Yet, the effect of group discussion seems to be highly heterogeneous. A substantive discussion touching on many aspects of intersectarian relations increases cooperation by a substantial margin. The set of findings on the effectiveness of group discussion suggests that the mechanism by which group exchanges impact cooperation is one of substantive engagement on issues and not of mere physical interaction between members of conflicting groups. Finally, we find that neither intervention succeeds in diminishing the effectiveness of clientelism.

These findings give rise to two important questions for follow-up research. Our findings indicate that cross-sectarian trust might be an important prerequisite for strategic cooperation across sectarian lines. More research is needed to establish how to augment cross-sectarian trust. The finding on the heterogeneous effect of group discussion suggests that substantive discussions are important, and additional research is needed to establish how discussion partners might be incentivized to engage in a more substantive exchange (e.g. Humphreys, Masters, and Sambu 2006; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012).

As with any experiment, a few words of caution are in order. First, with only sixty participants per intervention, this study has relatively low power and some of our conclusions must therefore be tentative. Given that most of the non-statistically significant treatment coefficients are small and associated standard errors are large we

acknowledge the problem of low power but are not extremely concerned about it. In settling on a study with relatively few participants per intervention we prioritized external over internal validity by including clientelistic appeals instead of having fewer interventions with more subjects per treatment. These types of trade offs are inevitable in an environment of limited funds. On a different note, there are important issues of external validity to consider. In Lebanon, Shia and Sunni Muslims are close to being numerically balanced. In contrast, in many Middle Eastern countries, one group dominates the other numerically (e.g. Sunnis in Pakistan or Afghanistan) or politically (e.g. Shias in Syria). In future research, it would be important to explore whether the treatments have the same effect in societies where the two groups are highly unequal either in terms of relative numbers or political influence.

The primary policy implication of this project is that dissemination of a cross-sectarian appeal by experts to cooperate across group boundaries is likely to increase intersectarian cooperation in nonstrategic exchanges. Our findings also suggest that a reduction in the incidence of clientelism is likely to result in greater intersectarian cooperation.

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**Building Cooperation Among Groups in Conflict:
An Experiment on Intersectarian Cooperation in Lebanon**

ONLINE APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS AND REFERENCE POPULATIONS (MUSLIM RESIDENTS OF BEIRUT AND MUSLIM CITIZENS OF LEBANON).

Note: Demographic measures come from responses to the third (monthly household income) and fourth (age and education) waves of ArabBarometer by Muslim residents of Beirut and Lebanon; monthly household income and education levels are recoded for comparison purposes; numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations.

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APPENDIX B: EXPERT VIDEO TRANSCRIPT (English)

Josephine Zoughaib (moderator): We have now reached the end of 2016. We have a lot of big problems in the country. Lebanon has become one of the most corrupt countries. I imagine we have a lot of big problems, so I don't know Mr. Radwan if you have reached a conclusion that there is a problem bigger than the others, which have gotten us here. Can you give us a little bit…[of what you think]

Radwan Mortada (Shia): The main idea is that the biggest problem, which is bigger than all the rest, which if we solve we can reach a better country, in principle is the crisis of sectarianism and the sectarianism that exists in Lebanon and the parties' leaders who are accordingly dividing the country and transforming Lebanon to…

JZ: So the sectarianism is leading to the quota system? Everyone is taking their own share and that's why we got here?

RM: Everyone is taking their own share and in the same time when they are corrupt and from a certain sect, the other sects cannot reach them (hold them accountable) unless their own sect lifts the political cover (political immunity) over them.

JZ: What is the reason to why we got to this system, which has become a corrupt system and all countries acknowledge this issue, we have ranked the 3rd most corrupt country in the world?

Nabil Moukaddem (Sunni): I think the main problem we have is the sectarian distribution. Our main and first problem is our election system. I want to talk a little bit about our election system. I think if we make a new and modern electoral system and we get rid of sectarianism, we are able to solve a big part of the problem. I think, today, the question asked is, after a couple of months we will be having parliamentary elections if everything goes smoothly supposedly. We are still today prisoners of laws and legislations that are so far from…

JZ: The 60's Law [*Election Law*] is being discussed today.

NM: Yes true…that are so far from the spirit and progress. The question that we want to ask is: Until when are we going to keep digging out worn out and silly laws and until when is Lebanon going to keep perpetuating this sectarian system. I want to tell you something. The process of dismantling sectarianism, just so we are not very hopeful, doesn't come from changing only the electoral text. It is a long-term educational process. It starts from history books, starts from the way we raise our kids, a number of things, but an electoral law is one of the examples. Lebanon today is susceptible to explode at any second. [*unclear*] That is why if we do not have an established national unity, we are susceptible to things escalating at any second as a result to certain regional factors. These guys know it better than I do.

JZ: But the Lebanese society is finding the problem elsewhere. It is finding that if there is no cooperation currently between 2 very big sects, which are the Sunni and the Shia, I can't imagine that we can agree on an electoral law or a transparent judiciary system.

Mohammad Abdullah (Sunni): After we called it the Cedar Revolution in 2005, the big phenomenon that we witnessed in Martyr's Square, we saw that the hunkering down came back over a certain political period. Until there was a major crisis in Lebanon that unified all of Lebanon, that is the garbage crisis that generated another phenomenon: everyone, the Sunni, the Shiaa, the Christian, and other religions went

down to the streets for a certain cause. But we know that regardless of the size of movement in Lebanon, we know that sectarianism leads to no results. When the garbage crisis happened and what we call the civic movement, which I participated in, sectarianism came in to break down this collective. You are going today to the streets because you saw that the garbage is at your doorstep, but when it became such that my leader or your leader or his leader are supposed to take action and responsibility, there was a smart political move, if you may, from the leaders of the sects to dismantle this gathering…

JZ: You are confirming that the citizen is unable to abandon sectarianism for the sake of his leader even over a very important issue such as the garbage crisis.

MA: The citizen did abandon it, and he protested in the streets. However, afterwards, there was work done to dismantle this movement because they united, then they became factions again and politics entered with its divisional, confessional, and sectarian methodology and led to a division and inability to arrive at a conclusion.

Radwan Aqil (Shia): Starting from what my colleagues have talked about, we don't live in a normal country. For example, if Lebanon were to play a soccer game with any foreign country, we wouldn't find all the Lebanese people. While we find the Iranian people all as one, in a soccer game for example, the same with Egypt, we live in a state of sectarianism, as soon we mention the name of the street, we know the political affiliation of the street and the area. Let's admit it, if today we want to go buy a house from a person from another sect, it hasn't been that easy to do it and its very well known. Today there is a percentage, but this doesn't mean…

JZ: It has to be 10% Sunni in a certain building…

RA: But this doesn't mean that the relationships in the country between people is really that bad. No! On the contrary, we still have communities in universities and institutions etc. But I, as a journalist, I say we do not live normally in a normal country. To go back to the Sunni/Shia conversations, which has been brought up a lot. I don't want to say it's a disagreement; it's a contrast that goes back 1400 years and unfortunately is still until today used to bring up a conflict. Let's also admit that in the last 10 years the marriage between the Sunni and Shia has decreased, before it hasn't been this bad. I want to talk a little bit about the Shia movement. In the civil war, the Shia movement was a container for the National Movement led by Kamal Jounblat. It wasn't lead by a Shia leader although there were a lot of Shia leaders. Lately there has been a lot of talk about the conflict, I just want to say, today, there is a Sunni in Tripoli who doesn't know Tyre, and there is a Shia in Tyre who doesn't know Tarii Ljdideh and doesn't know Tripoli.

JZ: They don't know or they're not letting them know?

RA: We all take responsibility as press, as political powers, as parties, and sects. And because they are scared. Imagine this happens in this small country. Lets go back to the problem, which is that once someone is born, his confession follows him from birth to the grave. And today, let us admit it, Wasta is killing us. Wherever it is: in getting a degree, a job, etc. The Sunni-Shia conflict also made us think about the region with the Gulf countries and the Arab countries and how it affects this region. Otherwise, we as Sunni and Shia in this country, we lived together. Shia, still until today, Jamal Abdel Naser pictures are put up in Shia houses. Our sectarian system, the quota system, and sectarianism are pushing for continuation of this conflict. Also in

this country, there is no nationality. For example, why are the quotas calculated for the biggest sects: Maronites, Otrthodox, Shia, Sunna, and the Druze have no right to be represented. If Einstein were Druze he wouldn't be allowed to run the ministry of foreign affairs. Kamal Jounblat ran the Ministry of interior and he was amongst the best ministers. Prince Majeed Erslen ran the Ministry of Defense. Today everything is constrained and there is injustice even within the same sect.

RM: So we have the option: we either agree to rebuild the country on the right fundamentals and I agree that we cannot do this before we transcend sectarianism in our Electoral Law, because the big figures with the influence to change things, are benefiting from the current situation.

JZ: we are talking about benefits between the sects today.

RM: True because and there is another issue in the sectarian realm if we can say. When the youth want to apply for the military, or the judiciary school, or any job, they first need to go to the alleged leader of their sect so he can work it out for them. And they can't make him angry because he controls what they do for a living. He is the one who guarantees whether they are accepted or not.

JZ: Where is the Lebanese society going and if there is an opportunity to fix this sectarian system or the elections, how far can we go as you see it as Lebanese citizens, not as journalists? As a Lebanese citizen Radwan, where are we headed?

RM: When someone knows what his or her problem is, that is half of the treatment. At least we know that we have a problem, and we know that sectarianism is a problem, and we know that if we don't agree to sit together and actually sit together to discuss and plan a common future that is good for everyone, we won't be able to succeed. And it seems that in all the sects, all the Lebanese people, educated or not, know that this is the problem.

NM: I want to stress on one thing about the word "peoples". We are one unified peoples with unified goals and benefits, there are political and sectarian disagreements, yes, but it can be fixed even if it's very difficult at times. There is still in inter-religious marriage in Lebanon, this also a very important thing. Even the Lebanese people, in their nature, are peaceful not violent. Of course in the Civil war there were people from all sects that held weapons and fought, but the majority was expressing their opinion verbally, the percentage that held weapons and killed people depending on religion is small relative to the rest of the Lebanese people. Even the people who forced the migration of others, they are minority in their sects. If you are thorough in checking, you will see that in every sect the majority refuses these actions and practices and the evidence is that after the war the harmony, more or less, resurfaced again.

JZ: So we are confirming that the Lebanese people are not sectarian in nature.

NM: The Lebanese people are not sectarian. They are creative people who love life but the only problem is that they are constrained by sectarian laws after the false independence in 1943. The Lebanese people need to look after their benefits. As my colleagues were saying, if you want to put your child in schools or get a job, you need to go back to your sect's political reference and leader. I, as a Lebanese person today, they are saying they are forming a government, why do I care if it is all Muslims or all Christians if the members are qualified and are able to perform their tasks, why do I

care if they are 30 Muslims and 30 Christians as long as they are providing me good service and look after me. If they are all Orthodox, why do I care?

RA: It is your right to be with a political leader and you have the right to support him/her, but regardless, this leader today can deprive you from [*unclear word*]. Be open to the other and marry whomever you want. Hopefully, that with the new generation we are able to reach real nationalism that Hussein Fadl-Allāh and Gregoire Haddad used to talk about, and hopefully we think about what we are leaving our children and grandchildren in this country.

JZ: Thank you. I want to conclude now about how much we are connected to this country, which is why we are staying and I imagine that the Lebanese youth who is participating in the streets and in university elections is insisting to stay with good values. I think we started the conversation with Sunni-Shia conflict and ended with Gregoire Haddad and Sir Fadl-Allāh, we arrived at the conclusion that we are sitting together on one table with one hope that hopefully hopefully hopefully in a new era or an era in the future because I have hope in the youth as you said Radwan, the coming generations that are raised on these values and that what we witness over the past 40 years isn't going to get us anywhere.

APPENDIX C: EXPERT VIDEO FILE (Arabic)

https://www.dropbox.com/s/xl5pimnqhxzdqhj/FINAL%20VIDEO.avi?dl=0

APPENDIX D: GUIDANCE QUESTIONS FOR MODERATORS FOR GROUP DISCUSSIONS (English)

Introduction:
With regards to the general direction and tenor of the discussion, it is very important that the message that comes out strongly and consistently is that intersectarian cooperation is good and desirable. It is also vital that by way of illustrating their arguments participants use plenty of examples. Abstract arguments can be difficult to grasp, and our aim is to ensure that participants understand how the lack of intersectarian cooperation makes the lives of ordinary people worse and how their lives could be made better if there was a greater amount of intersectarian cooperation. The issues that could be used as examples of why intersectarian cooperation is bad for everyday life include (but are not limited to): garbage collection in Beirut in August 2015, political corruption, institutional sclerosis, insecurity and inefficiency facilitated by the rigid quota system, lack of political accountability among politicians because of the widespread practice of vote buying. In other words, one of the key messages of this discussion should be that lack of intersectarian cooperation is not just some abstract issue that affects only the political elites, but that this issue has direct bearing on ordinary people's daily lives. Likewise, if possible, we would like participants to stress that problems of sectarianism begin with ordinary people (segregationist behavior, petty hatreds, etc.) and is not something that exists only at elite level. Thus, the change in attitudes and behavior must start in one daily's life and not just be initiated at the apex of society. Finally, because there are no Christians in the study, we would like the experts to focus as much as possible on intersectarian relations between the Shi'a and Sunni (of course, it is important to also mention the Christians, but we would prefer the bulk of the discussion to focus on Sunni-Shi'a relations).

In short, the most important guidelines are as follows:
- Use plenty of examples to illustrate arguments. Try to stay away from complex abstract concepts.
- Try to make the arguments relatable to everyday lives of ordinary people instead of focusing exclusively on political elites and dynamics in parliament and government.
- Insofar as possible, focus specifically on Sunni-Shi'a relations.

Some Draft Questions for Discussion Moderator:
1. What are the biggest problems in Lebanese political life at this time?
2. Would you say that there is sufficient cooperation across the sectarian lines among the political elites in parliament and elsewhere?
3. In your opinion, what are the reasons why the situation is currently as it is?
4. Many people feel that lack of cross-sectarian cooperation among the Sunni and Shia'a specifically is one of the biggest problems in contemporary Lebanon. Would you agree or not?
5. Specifically, and thinking very practically about our daily lives and provision of basic services, what types of problems arise as a result of this lack of inter-sectarian cooperation?

6. Thinking about Lebanon's long-term future, what are our country's prospects if the various religious sects, but especially the Sunni and the Shia'a, do not learn how to cooperate?
7. Do you think Lebanon as a whole would benefit if there was more cooperation between the Sunni and the Shia'a? What would be the benefits of such increased cooperation?
8. In your opinion, what would it take to increase the level of cooperation across the sectarian lines? Can ordinary people help change the situation for the better or does this have to be an elite project?

Session 11, Table D
*- This discussion group has the **highest** discussion score among the 19 groups.*
- Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as "unidentified".

Moderator: We are Session 11 Table D. Welcome. After we saw the 30 min video, there were a lot of topics discussed: How can there be cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects? They talked about this problem as a historical problem. Some talked about the judiciary system and the problems with this system. Someone also traced back the problems in Lebanon to the electoral law. The political parties and sectarian parties were also mentioned in details. Was the video clear to everyone? And first, do you agree with everything that was said in the video?

73: Not everything.

Moderator: You do not agree on everything.

Unidentified: Same.

Unidentified: Me too.

Moderator: Ok. What are the specific things said that are beneficial in your opinion? Or the ideas that you support in this discussion.

72: I support one of the ideas someone suggested about the necessity of cooperation between sects. In principle, they are mostly talking about Sunni-Shia. As he said it is necessary to have cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects, but some people suggested ways of cooperation that are rejected. It doesn't mean that if we have civil marriage then we've cooperated. Some religions forbid civil marriage from a religious point of view not legislative one. But we support what they said about the issue of renting houses and the issue of education and the necessity to raise our kids from a young age that the Sunni is their brother and the Shia is their brother and the Christian is their brother and that they are all the same. We shouldn't be raising them that certain areas have certain sectarian affiliations. We were also raised on this perspective. We'd be in the car with our parents and we get to a specific area…

Unidentified: "oh this is Tariq Jdide"

72: Tariq Jdide for example, we'd directly ask, "oh dad, whose is this area?" "This area is not with us, they are all against us." That is wrong.

72: We should teach them that this is all Lebanon.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Sir, what did you object about?

73: I objected about the Parliamentary elections and about the idea that the delegates can be anyone. They are saying if the delegates are all Sunni or all Christians…

Moderator: But as long as they are good, if they are all Christian then where is the problem?

Unidentified: If they all serve the country, where is the problem?

73: No this is wrong.

Moderator: It's wrong. They need to be divided.

73: They need to be divided. Because as we all know, the country is divided.

Moderator: He talked about the sectarian politics and the quotas system. Sometimes the wrong or bad person fills a position just because they need to fill it with someone from a certain sect.

73: Yes but the country is divided, and this is known.

Moderator: So it is still better to divide it over all the sects.

73: Yes, of course.

Moderator: Who among the speakers was the most convincing in your opinion?

71: The one who was talking about the elections and how the candidates should be from all sects not limited to one sect. He even talked with respect to Druze, Muslims, and Christians. And regarding whether or not the country is divided, after it was divided in 1970's and 1980's, it honestly never went back to how it was and it has just been worsening. As the guy here said that every generation is teaching its children that these people are X and these follow X and those follow Y. So it was divided and it has only been in decline.

Unidentified: To the worse.

71: We want to work against this flow that the rising youth is following. And it is very unfortunate that the ministers and rulers support everyone who supports their sects and follow them. Although, we want leaders and rulers to work with all sects and solve the problem from the roots.

73: Why are they focused on Sunni-Shia only?

69: The study is just about Sunni-Shia.

71: Because it is the most intense.

Unidentified: Sunni-Shia is the more prevalent.

Moderator: Sir, after watching the video and in your opinion, is the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia the reason behind all these problems?

69: No, its reason is the lack of love for the country and citizenship as they say because that is fundamental. The Sunni is Sunni and the Shia is Shia, to each his/her own personal life, but they should talk about patriotism. Patriotism is fundamental to raise a good society that doesn't think about its sects but rather about Lebanon, the country, and the civic society. This is the basis. Three quarters of what they were saying was about sects. They didn't talk about the country and patriotism.

Moderator: So if we switch the rhetoric to talk about how this cooperation can serve the national interest, do you think this cooperation will affect the political, economical, and societal situation as a whole?

69: Of course. Everything changes. The citizen will be psychologically relived.

73: Why can't the country be for all sects and not necessarily the Sunni and Shia sects? We are a diverse country and we have many sects.

Moderator: So your opinion is that it is not just about limiting the cooperation between the Sunni and Shia?

73: Yes, cooperate with everyone. It doesn't have to become Sunni-Shia. In the end of the day, both Sunni and Shia are Muslims. The same Qur'an.

Unidentified: Same Qur'an.

72: But we need to pay attention that when she addressed the questions, she addressed them based on a Sunni-Shia rhetoric because the aim of the study is explore the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

Moderator: Yes that is the aim of the study but his opinion is that the problem is not just a Sunni-Shia one.

72: Oh ok.

73: Yes as a whole. Lebanon as a whole, we want to live together.

71: We want to live together.

Moderator: In your opinion and from what you saw in the video, what are the barriers that stand in the way of the cooperation between sects and specifically between Sunni and Shia sects?

74: Just like she said that we raise our kids on how this area is ours and that area is not ours and this is Sunni and that is Shia. Please repeat the question, I forget.

Moderator: So in your opinion, are these reasons that prevent the cooperation between these two sects?

74: Yes of course. And the leaders who give incitement speeches and that religion and politics should not mix in the government. Even as someone here said, they go on podiums during Friday prayers and they talk about politics. You are here to talk about religion, what does politics have anything to do with this?

Moderator: So clerics…

74: Should stick to religion.

Moderator: affect this cooperation negatively?

74: Yes, yes.

71: Yes.

73: There needs to be a separation between clerics and politics. It is necessary.

71: Yes.

74: If I go to the mosque to pray, I want to hear a religious talk that I can understand. I can watch the news to know about politics.

Moderator: Go ahead.

70: I want to say something. Why don't we unite like we united once for the garbage crisis and at some point they managed to break us apart?

Moderator: Why?

70: They started sending infiltrators to vandalize and beat people. In the end, we are all Muslims, whether Sunni or Shia, we cannot abandon each other. It is absolutely impossible for these two sects to abandon each other because there are a lot of Sunni married to Shia and vice versa.

Unidentified: Me.

70: What are the sects of the children of mixed parents then? Sunni or Shia? His mom is Shia and his dad is Sunni. We need to get rid of these things and distinctions between Sunni and Shia. I liked the idea of eliminating the sect from the ID cards.

73: Yes the sect.

70: So that the person taking your ID card at a checkpoint, he might be Shia and sees you are Sunni, so he might start showing off and act superior to you. The first step in order to fix the country, we need to get rid of the…

73: sect.

74: sect.

70: the sect from ID cards. When that happens, no one will know who is what.

74: True.

Moderator: The sect is also on the Personal Status Record.

70: The sect should be taken off the ID cards and the Personal Status Records. We need to get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

74: You can tell from the names though.

70: I am from the south and I live in the middle Tariq Jdide. If I am sitting in a group of people and I say my last name they get surprised and they start winking at each other. Why would you do that? You've known me for a while now! I live with you and I have Sunni kids. Why are you discriminating? If I discriminate I wouldn't have married one of you and my husband wouldn't have married me. And I speak Beiruti more than they do. Why do they discriminate? There is discrimination from my sect and from the Sunni sect as well, I am not saying one or the other.

73: Both sects the same.

70: We need to get rid of this idea of labeling Sunni or Shia. Eliminate it on the ID cards as well. It starts with the ID cards and once your sect is erased, everything gets erased.

71: We wish.

70: It will unite all the Muslims and we won't have this Sunni-Shia issue.

Moderator: The madam gave a reason on why she thinks there is a lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia in the society. Can you give us another example that proves the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia? From your daily life.

71: I'm going to tell you a story about something that happened with a friend of mine. Her daughter went to apply somewhere. Her last name is not very clear to what her sect is and whether she is Sunni or Shia. They accepted her and everything and told her to bring her ID card. After showing them her ID he asked her if she was from X city. His face turned yellow and told her that we will contact you later after he had confirmed with her and everything. These stories about the hatred between Sunni and Shia in general, of course there are a lot of people from both sects who love each other, have become serious and the problem is so complicated and it is very difficult to be resolved. From what I see there is a Sunni-Shia problem and it is just as prevalent among the youth as it is among the elders. It has become a very difficult problem, but we hope that it gets resolved somehow.

70: By the way, the new rising generation will eliminate the idea of Sunni-Shia because while our grandparents still hold grudges and hatred from the civil war, the new generation is going to be more aware. It will not care about the Sunni and Shia labels because the Lebanese economy is on decline and we are the reason behind that due to our backwards mentality. It shouldn't be about Sunni or Shia. We are all Muslims and we all have the Qur'an. Why don't we say that? Why do we discriminate between Sunni and Shia when half of our children are Sunni and the other half is Shia? Why? For example if someone from Tariq Jdide went to Barboor *(Predominantly Shia)* they start winking to let each other know that he's from Tariq Jdide. And it the same thing the other way around. Why?

74: They'd beat him.

70: Why? You are his friend! Why are you acting like this? The main reason is that the big important figures squeezed this idea into the regular people's heads. I hope that

any mother and any father would take this idea of Sunni-Shia out of their heads and the head of any child.

73: This has to be done through clerics.

Unidentified: Clerics and leaders.

73: No just clerics.

72: We also need to shed light that clerics and political leaders are not the only ones to blame. I will give an example from both sects. First, the Sunni religion prohibits cursing any faith and they say that our without Ali, prophet Omar would've perished *(Ali being Shia and Omar being Sunni)*. In the same time, the big religious Shia references such as Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and Sayyed Ali Khamenei, they absolutely prohibit cursing any *(unclear word)*.

70: Yes.

74: It still happens though.

72: Any ignorant Sunni or Shia guy, not an educated one, curses X or Y to their friends. By that, he is provoking the other side. As a Sunni or Shia guy, if I hear someone cursing Imam Ali or Omar, I will inevitably react.

73: True.

70: You will feel something.

74: Yes.

72: So the youth's ignorance is what got us here not the politicians at all.

73: I was just saying that.

72: Because we cannot just blame clerics and politicians.

73: On the contrary, this is the cleric's business.

74: No as he said, it is these ignorant people on the streets.

73: Clerics need to raise awareness among the youth.

Moderator: He said in the video that in the internal circles, the clerics' speeches are going to be sectarian.

70: Yes exactly, sectarian.

73: Why can't it be unifying? All the clerics need to unite…

Moderator: So you think there is a responsibility on clerics?

73: Of course.

70: Any cleric that goes on TV needs to promote love between Muslims and not use the Sunni and Shia labels but instead use Muslims.

73: Sayyed Mohammad Hussein used to talk about the Islamic unity.

Moderator: I want to hear your opinion on this, the absence of cooperation and its reasons, and how we can solve it.

69: The main reasons lies in the civic society. We were divided because of our clerics and because of our leaders. They constructed their own schools like Al Maqased or *(unclear)*.

74: Al Masharee'.

69: And that was the beginning of the Sunni-Shia division in this country. On this principle, they started teaching religion in their own ways. Whether Sunni or Shia, they founded sectarianism. And sectarianism, as I told you, does not end except if with our love and commitment to the country. That is fundamental because if we keep thinking Sunni-Shia or Christian-Druze we will not be able to make it.

74: I swear; before they used to all marry each other.

69: They need to unify the schoolbooks and not allow schools to teach its own thing so that they can feed into sectarianism.

Moderator: Do you think that someone ordinary like you can contribute in enhancing this cooperation?

69: He can contribute through his family. He can contribute through his neighbor if he trusts them. He can make a change but very slightly. The main contribution needs to come form the leaders and clerics. They are the ones who need to make a change.

74: For example, I am Sunni and you are Sunni and you are Shia and we are really good friends. But if my Shia neighbor or Sunni neighbor interferes, my friend turns against me.

70: Yes.

Moderator: This happens?

74: Yes, I hear them. We would be sitting together and all is well but when someone from her sect joins, she just becomes aggressive.

70: That's our problem. We become sectarian.

74: I have been married twice: one was Sunni and one was Shia. I have Sunni and Shia kids.

73: Nice.

74: Both of them are with me and they do not know he is Sunni or he is Shia, they just know that they are Muslims.

70: I lived in an area where no one knew where I was from. And everyone loved me. When they knew where I was from they said, "We wish they are all like you." I do not involve myself in politics. I tell them if either of you, Shia or Sunni, wants to talk politics you have to respect each other. They ask me where I'm from; I say I'm Muslim. It is not your business.

74: I have a Shia neighbor whom I didn't know was Shia. We used to laugh and joke about things and even Sunni and Shia tease each other. In the end I learned that she was Shia and she never showed it.

Moderator: The video discussed that the judiciary is a problem and the electoral law is a problem. And someone considered the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party are actual political parties because they include people from different sects while other parties are sectarian parties because they are not represented by all the sects.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Which topic convinced you most? The one about the judiciary, the electoral law, or the talk about political and sectarian parties?

74: The political parties and sectarianism. Because these are the ones who ruined the country.

70: True, same. A whole sect follows certain parties.

71: Yes, political parties and sectarianism. If we resolve the sectarianism problem, everything will be resolved.

70: If they get rid of all parties, Lebanon will become a great country again.

Moderator: Get rid of sectarian parties?

70: Yes sectarian ones.

71: Yes.

Moderator: So you agree that in Lebanon there are political parties represented by different sects and there are sectarian parties?

70: Yes of course.

Unidentified: They should make a shared party.

70: They should found parties to unite all the Muslims together. Why does the Lebanese Army indulge in sectarianism? Because it is part of their training and teachings not to be sectarian.

Moderator: I asked a question: if we achieve this cooperation, does it affect the economy and political and social situations? Give me examples.

74: Yes, they start to like each other.

71: Of course!

70: The Shia will start employing the Sunni and the Sunni will start employing the Shia.

74: True.

70: You'll stop needing a Wasta to find an opportunity or employment. And the same goes for the Sunni.

73: the regions mix.

70: Finding a job then just becomes about competency and degrees not about Wasta.

Moderator: On the societal level, you think that will create some sort of familiarity between the citizens?

73: Of course. Someone from Tripoli wouldn't go to Dahyeh.

70: True.

71: That's what I wanted to say.

73: Or take someone from Dahyeh to Tripoli… last time there were fights and people beat each other.

71: That's too bad, Lebanon is for everyone not for certain sects.

73: The whole country would just freshen up. Dahyeh freshens up, Beirut freshens up, Tripoli freshens up…There'd be communication between the citizens.

Moderator: How would the cooperation affect the political situation?

70: The politicians will start liking each other.

69: You witness how that helped the political atmosphere.

Moderator: how they recently were all in agreement?

73: Yes.

69: In agreement but it is all about personal interests. When the parliamentary system is changed and when the electoral law is changed, then you'll have a hope to build something for the future. But while they are sticking with these outdated laws, nothing is going to change.

Moderator: So you are focusing on the electoral as the basis?

69: Of course.

Moderator: Do you consider that it is part of solving the problem and it is not just about the text because there are a lot of reasons that can lead to the absence of cooperation?

69: But the majority of it is about the electoral law. Three quarters of our problems are because of the law. When the law enforces that only Sunni can occupy this position and only Shia can occupy that position, then it is dividing between Sunni and Shia.

72: I just want to say that legislatively, the president shouldn't be Christian. They made it this way based on customs.

71: It was imposed on us.

73: That is the Lebanese constitution.

72: Legally, the Prime Minister, or the Chairman of the House of Representatives, or the President of the Republic is not limited to one sect. Legally that is.

73: Our constitution says that.

72: No, legally it is not. That is just customs.

71: This law was set by the French colonialists.

Moderator: But what is the origin of these customs? Al Taif Agreement.

72: Yes.

Moderator: Al Taif Agreement is the constitution of this country.

72: But I am saying that the Lebanese law does not specify sectarian requirements for certain positions. If our politicians follow the Lebanese Law properly, we'd get rid of sectarianism in politics.

73: Yes you mean eliminating sectarian politics.

72: But everyone has their own law tailored to fit their needs. If the politicians follow the proper Lebanese law, it is a good law. But each of them wants to customize their own laws. They were the ones to specify that the Prime Minister is Shia and Chairman of the House of Representatives is Sunni…But legally, this law doesn't exist.

Moderator: Now I want you to think about what kind of societies your children will live in 20-30 years from today. Will they live in a society that actually has cooperation or is it going to be the same society we live in today? How do you imagine their society would look like?

70: Same society. Let me tell you something. The Sunni-Shia issue might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years it will spark again.

74: True.

71: In my opinion, it is not going to disappear to start with.

70: No matter how much it disappears, a day will come when one of the leaders will need something and will need to exploit this country and its weakest point, which is the Sunni-Shia conflict, so he will incite the people and walk away.

72: I'm going to say it again: if the politicians start eliminating sectarianism from the top, and treating everyone equally where all of Lebanon is for us regardless of which area, and get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric even on the ID cards, I think we can improve bit by bit and this issue will be over.

73: I have hope that things will change.

Moderator: Is there hope?

73: Yes.

Moderator: Is there something that we should do for our children so that such change can happen in the future?

73: Of course! We need to put in a big effort, and there should be civic activities mainly to distance clerics from politics.

74: Yes.

69: There is no change.

Moderator: You think it will stay like this?

69: As it is.

70: It might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years but one day a leader will want something and will create a conflict, which is the easiest thing to do in Lebanon because we have

birds-brains. If someone curses Omar go beat him and if someone curses the Hussein go beat him. That's how it works here.

73: That is wrong.

70: Just so that the leaders can exploit his position so that they can benefit on our children's sake.

74: We need a leader whose mom is Shia and dad is Sunni or otherwise so that they wouldn't dare marginalize either group.

73: We are still doing the same mistakes and our clerics are wrong. The speeches are wrong, Friday speeches are wrong, everything is wrong whether in this sect or that one.

70: Who told you though that Shia don't love the Sunni or the Sunni don't love the Shia.

Moderator: there is love.

70: There is love.

74: But it is subtle.

71: We are talking in general. Of course there are some who love each other, but generally, the conflict is there.

74: I love my husband and my children.

70: No there is love. There is love.

Moderator: Ok we are end the discussion about the video now.

Session 6, Table D
  *- This discussion group has the **lowest** discussion score among the 19 groups.*
  - Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as "unidentified".

Moderator: Welcome to Table D Session 6. After listening to the video and the topics that were discussed, I would like to start with those topics. First, do you agree with everything that was said in the video? Who would like to start?

73: What is being said is all about the situation we are living in. They are not adding anything more to what is really going on: sectarianism, quota system, job opportunities, ministers, House of Representatives…This is what is actually happening. Nothing is changing, whether it is in the Sunni sect or Shia sect or Christian sect or Druze sect, they all have a quota system. And the people are the ones paying. For example, X leader or minister has his own group and says, "No I'll serve my group so that they can back me up in the elections, why would I serve the other sect?"

Moderator: His benefit is only in his sect.

73: his benefit is more important than anything. More important than the country to be honest. His priority is in his personal benefits more than it is in the benefits of the country. If the country meant anything to him, he wouldn't have created this group around him so that it backs him with its votes. They'd say "I have nothing to do with the Mountain region or South region. I am from Beirut or the North or Biqaa. Every leader is controlling his sect and even if they approve of him or not, he says to them "who else are you going to vote for? To the Sunni or the Shia or the Christian?" That is what is happening.

69: The theory he is talking about is true. But also, you cannot say that the country is following this path. For example, you get a representative who you vote for but you don't see him. This is called the complete lists where you just vote for everyone on the list.

73: True.

69: There are a lot of representatives who come and do not serve anyone, not even themselves. He sits in an office for a short while then he's out.

74: Yes.

73: 100%.

73: This depends on the cluster and the person because I might want the people on this list to all make it. You don't look at the individuals you just like the title of the group so you vote for all of them. That's the wrong thing to do.

69: 100%.

71: Sometimes the names change. Sometimes someone from a sect other than your own serves you better than someone from your own sect.

72: True.

Moderator: And that was said in the video that sometimes better service comes from outside your sect. Is that happening?

71: Yes of course.

74: Yes.

72: What I liked about the video most is that we all united over the garbage crisis and we all protested: Sunni, Shia, and Christians. That was what united us. Other than that, unfortunately, everyone follows his or her own leader.

71: But generally, sectarianism was not as deeply rooted.

69: True true. We used to live as one, we didn't use to think X is Shia, Y is Sunni, Z is Christian. You might find a better friend from another sect than your own.

74: They also even said that if someone is Shia he couldn't go to Tripoli, why not?

71: yea why not?

74: That he fears that he'd be killed because they are not from the same sect as him. All of this also…

71: This recently started happening.

74: Yes.

69: But if you look back at the wars in 1975 and 1981 and the elimination war, there wasn't this Sunni-Shia rhetoric. Yes sure we passed through a Muslim-Christian period during the elimination war, but the Sunni-Shia thing only started after the 1996.

74: True.

71: Absolutely true.

69: That we only witness after 1996. If you want to look at us, the people present in this room, we lived half of our lives 1996, 1997, 1998 and we still live normally, then someone introduced this conflict. Of course nothing happens out of nothing, as they say "there is no smoke without a fire."

74: Of course.

69: They introduced this conflict for political and divisional reasons.

74: True.

71: It serves their purposes.

Moderator: And sectarianism furthered this.

69: Of course.

Moderator: It is a tool.

69: Exactly.

72: And since they assassinated the martyr Rafic Al Hariri, these things started happening.

74: That's true.

71: True.

72: They got what they wanted.

Moderator: By assassinating the martyr Rafic Al Hariri?

72: Yes.

74: Yes, this never used to show before.

71: Yes.

Moderator: I want to hear your voice now. Do you agree about most things said in the video? First I want to ask you, are we one people or multiple peoples? So are we just sects or do we truly belong to one Lebanese people.

74: Sects

Unidentified: Sects, and very much so.

71: No but our belonging is to Lebanon if you want the truth.

73: The truth is that we are 18 sects.

71: Even if 20 sects, but who do we belong to?

73: To our leaders.

Moderator: In their opinion, we are more sectarian than we are nationalistic.

71: True, but in the end our belonging is to our country.

73: They only agree with each other when they are abroad and they love Lebanon.

71: No here too.

72: Yes.

74: True.

73: You see a Lebanese abroad, you love him but when you're in Lebanon…

71: True.

73: you got into a hospital for example, you see someone and you start thinking, "they are from my sect so they will do me more favors than someone from another sect."

Unidentified: In hospitals, they are all the same.

74: We are saying that even sometimes people in our own sect don't help us, so we have to go to another sect to get help.

71: True.

73: There is something we need to pay attention to is that, true we have sects but for example, if you are not affiliated with a specific leader or political party you find that you won't get as much help. That is the idea. Even religious figures do not cooperate to unite a certain sect.

74: True.

72: True.

71: True.

73: They've done this so that they can create this sort of an army. The Lebanese people are people who love life and fun in life. They made them poor.

Moderator: So you stress that the people in Lebanon are not sectarian but they love life.

73: 100%. But they are exploiting that you are poor.

74: True.

69: Take for example the events that happened on the 7th of May and other events; it was all about money. Who sent protesters to the streets other than those who have money? They paid them $500.

73: They are after the poor people. There are no jobs so they pushed you to follow political parties. The day I get a job I won't care about weapons. If I cannot support myself, I have to follow them so that I can survive. That's the point.

74: True.

69: From 2000 until the end of 2004, it was the best 4 years ever. After 2005…

73: Because people were busy with work. Now you sit at home and you bring it out on your family because there is nothing that is distracting you.

69: Yes, true. Before 2005 everyone was working and no one had time for anything. Now you find yourself without work, you go to your relative's place and you start fighting. Unemployment makes problems.

74: True.

71: And generally, one person cannot support the family.

74: Of course, one hand doesn't clap.

73: Even if you notice, in every house the dad is married to either a Sunni or Shia women. There is no mixing. There are slogans and things they say in schools that are wrong. The government wants this disorder.

69: You've seen the extremists that we've been hearing about. Where do these people come from? From the education.

73: That is wrong education and wrong mentality.

69: Someone is teaching them to be like that. They're not born like that.

74: Someone is paying for them to become like that.

73: Lebanon is small and has 18 sects not like the countries around us that have 2 or 3 sects.

70*:* They plant the doctrine.

73: She is right.

69: Even words like doctrine, funding…These are words that the media started using only recently.

70: Yes these are new.

72: The media also plays a big role.

69: The media war is more important even than the actual war and influences a lot.

72: Even if there is nothing happening they start exaggerating things.

Moderator: In your opinion these problems that we have in Lebanon are the result of the lack of cooperation between sects specifically, Sunni-Shia?

70: Yes of course. If they were united we wouldn't have gotten here.

Moderator: Is it possible that if this cooperation happens, it can improve the social, political, and economical situation? And how can this cooperation be translated in your opinion?

70: When the big shots agree with each other, the ones below them follow.

72: True.

71: True.

72: Unfortunately, we are talking about people above and people below.

73: The big shots are agreeing not for the people, but for their own benefits.

74: Of course.

73: They are just playing roles like in a play.

69: If we go back a couple of months, it was chaos. The people who were shooting each other are now fine but those who died, it is now over for them.

72: Yes.

74: Yes.

69: Their worth has become nothing.

71: they can make us love each other and they can make us hate each other.

69: Any leader of any sect goes on TV and starts threatening. The country goes into chaos.

73: But why? If you are working and have money you wouldn't follow a leader, you can support yourself. But they have made the people poor so they keep following them.

74: Where can you find jobs anyway? There are no jobs.

73: Even if you find the ministers and leaders fighting with each other, it is not for us, it is because of their benefits. I'm sorry but we keep saying Lebanon was united over the garbage crisis, no it wasn't united. There was just portions to be divided between the Druze and Sunni sect.

74: They united over the garbage crisis. Why don't we actually become all one hand in everything without caring about Druze sect or Sunni sect or Shia sect.

73: I mean we united to get rid of the garbage and smell that is surrounding us. But if you actually listen to them speak, because…before 2005 or even now as they make the new quotas, the Druze sect was the most benefited because there was someone from the Sunni sect who was also involved and made a huge deal about it *(negatively)*. Because the people of X or not the people of Y are going to benefit, they agitate the citizens whenever they want. Just like in the civic movement. There were a lot of people who had a benefit in it. When they found that it was getting risky they sent their forces to beat people up.

74: True.

71: True.

73: Even there were officers who talked. The government is the base. For example, I as Shia, or Sunni or Druze and you as Shia you want to take 4 officers, Sunni 4 officers, Druze 2 officers and Christians 3 officers. This is our law. Even first class officers are Christians. They force it on you.

69: True that is what is requested.

Moderator: So sectarianism is rooted in the law even.

74: Yes.

73: Exactly, they are forcing it on you.

69: You are talking about the 60's law.

Moderator: Election Law then.

69 *(12:50 – 13:08)***:** Yes, we are talking about a law that has been followed for a while. When they were done with all the benefits, they created sectarianism.

73: True true.

69: And if we manage to get rid of sectarianism, they'll create something else.

71: They'll distract us with something else, true.

72: They enforced this system. House of Representatives is for Shia, the head of government is for Sunni's, president for Christians.

73: True.

Moderator: is this something wrong in your opinion?

72: In my opinion, if there is someone Sunni and he is qualified, I do not mind if he becomes president.

74: But it is important that he provides us with what we want.

71: This is an old law; they didn't set it up recently. It is since we got our independence. Because they were all united back then, so they divided and it's been like that since then.

73: Yes, but they took away the authority from the president. In another words, he has no role, just a chair to be filled.

Moderator *(13:5***:** So the parliament is for the Shia sect and the government is for the Sunni sect, which was since Al Taif in 1990 until today.

71: True.

69: Yes from 1975 until the 1990s we didn't have a country. After the 90's they set up Al Taif and we've been following it since.

71: Yes that's it. It's a wrong law and we haven't changed it.

Moderator: Ok. In your opinion, what should be done to reinforce this cooperation? We talked about a lot of problems and the reasons behind this absence of cooperation. Now what should we do so that we create this cooperation? And let's try to be realistic in our answers.

71: If the people all come to an agreement…

73: But the people cannot come to an agreement if the big leaders don't resolve these issues. What is supposed to happen is…

69: Are we talking about predictions? Or something on the ground?

Moderator: No not predictions. On the ground, yes.

69: It is impossible.

73: Everything can be fixed in Lebanon today, but how? For example, there wasn't going to be a president. A couple of days before, they pushed for it and we got one. Everything will work if you want it to happen.

71: True.

Moderator: Ok. People like you, do you think you are capable of making a changing that can lead to more cooperation? You as ordinary people, you don't think you play a role?

74: No no.

73: No we don't have an influence.

71: Of course not.

69: No. In dreams maybe.

73: When the civic movement happened, we supported them thinking that they were doing something for the better. Turned out people involved in it were politicized and political parties pushed them to talk in certain ways. It was revealed in the end. This one is affiliated with X and that one is affiliated with Y. They identified them in pictures and names. You need to eliminate or fix the law of political parties in Lebanon. When this is resolved and we'll stop having political parties, you become just a Lebanese citizen without affiliations.

69: This is very difficult.

73: No we can get rid of political parties.

69: It is impossible.

69: Why did someone become a leader? Because of his group. Take away his support and he becomes just like anyone one of us.

73: My friend, yes but they'll become leaders because of their popularity not his political group. When you say "movement" or whatever, take out the word "parties" in the Lebanese law, you'll become just citizens…

69: Let me just give you this example. They told Wiaam Wahaab that they wanted to dismantle his United Party, so he made it the United Movement.

73: No just dismantle all parties in the law. You can still love your leader but not under a specific party.

69: It won't work.

73: Why not!

Moderator: In your opinion, if we want to think about our children and as youth, in our future. Do you think we're going to be living in a similar society as the one we are living in today or maybe it'll be better?

69: 100%. It will not change.

72: Of course. It'll be the same.

74: Depends on our optimism.

73: If you want Ziad El Rahbani plays *(satirical plays that discussed the political and social problems in Lebanon)* they are still the same reality. What our parents watched and laughed about, we can still relate to and laugh about as well.

71: No hopefully everything changes. Nothing stays the same.

74: We just need to be hopeful.

69: The lady here. You've witnessed so many governments and ministries and it is still the same.

71: We used to live a more luxurious life. Older people know how it was. A man used to get 300,000 LBP and live like a king, now if he gets a million it's not enough.

74: yes true.

73: The economical situation is like that globally.

71: Yes, I'm telling you, it just might change again.

74: because back then you didn't pay TVA. They drown you. No you pay 10% of your salary, on the food you buy, on everything. In the end up of the day you find that you've paid 30-40% of your salary. There are policies that me and you don't know about.

71: I'm telling you everything changed. And you never know, maybe it'll change again one day.

Moderator: I want to thank you for this effective discussion.

APPENDIX F: ELECTION BROKERS SCRIPTS (English)

E-1. Sunni Broker

No clientelism:
> *"Hi, my name is Rabih. I want to check your records: name, age, phone number, and region. These records and confidential and no one other than us sees it. Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.*
> > *[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]*
> *Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time."*

Clientelism:
> *"But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor because the Sunni candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you $10 just to go in and vote for him. And this topic is a secret. No one can know about it. Thank you. You can go back to your table."*

E-2. Shia Broker

No clientelism:
> *"Hi, my name is Akram. I want to check your records: Name, age, telephone, and address. These records are secret, no one know other than us sees it. Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.*
> > *[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]*
> *Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time."*

Clientelism:
> *"But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor. The Shia candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you $10 just to go in and vote for him. This is only between us. Thank you. You can go back to your table."*

APPENDIX G: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL THE GAMES (English)

1. DECISION TASK 1: SIMULATED ELECTIONS
We are now ready to begin the decision tasks. In the first task, you will have a chance to vote in simulated elections to decide how to divide some resources held in common. First, I will distribute 40 tokens to each of you. Then, 20 out of these 40 tokens will be taken away—think of it as a tax—and the resultant amount of 120 tokens will be placed in the center of the table. You will have a chance to decide how the 120 tokens in the common pool should be divided between the participants around your table. Specifically, we will ask you to vote in four simulated elections. Prior to each election two candidates will address your group and propose different ways to divide the 120 tokens. You will then have a chance to vote for a candidate whom you liked best by secretly recording your vote in writing. Remember that your decision affects how much money you will receive at the conclusion of the study. Your vote, just like all the decisions that you make later, must be completely confidential. Please cover your sheet and when you mark your choice make sure that no one sees it.   After all the decision tasks are completed we will examine the results of just one of the four elections, for ease of calculation, and will implement the winning policy proposal to determine how many tokens each participant around our table will receive. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is $10 and the maximum is $30.

2. DECISION TASK 2: OTHER-OTHER ALLOCATION GAME
In this next task, you have to decide how to divide 10 tokens between two members of your group—one Sunni and one Shi'a. Only the organizers know which two members of your group will be affected by your decision, and you, yourself, are not one of the people affected. Your decision will not be made public. Please turn to the decision sheet for the second task in your packet. Out of 10 tokens, how many will you give to a Sunni at this table? And how many to a Shi'a? The table on the decision sheet details all the different ways of dividing 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shi'a. Please circle just one option that corresponds to your preference (in complete secret; shielding your decision sheet from others) and hand the decision sheet back to me. Somebody else's decision at this table will determine how much money you will receive; your compensation will be between $0 and $5.   You will receive the payment once all the decision tasks are completed.

3. DECISION TASK 3: PUBLIC GOODS GAME
In this next task, you also receive 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 tokens to put into a common pool to be divided among all the participants.   Once everyone has made their decision, the money in the common pool will be multiplied by two and divided equally among all the group members. Whatever tokens you do not put in the common pool are yours to keep. Your earnings then are whatever tokens you do not contribute to the common pool and the tokens that you receive once the common pool is divided among all members of the group.

Let us try this to see how the decision task works; these practice rounds do not count towards your earnings. [The table manager distributes ten tokens to every participant.]

Imagine that no one contributes to the common pool; then everyone is left with their 10 tokens in earnings. Now, imagine that everyone contributes their whole amount to the common pool. [Table manager ensures that all participants put 10 tokens in the middle, adds another 60 tokens to the common pool, and returns 20 tokens to every participant.] Everyone receives 20 tokens back. In this final round, imagine that people around the table contribute 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 tokens. [The table manager ensures that these are the contributions made by participants; multiplies 30 by 2 [=60], adds 30 tokens to the common pool, and distributes 10 tokens back to every participant.]

Now we are ready to do this task properly. We will play the decision game for five rounds. At the beginning of every round you will start with just 10 tokens. We are not going to use actual tokens though; we would like you to write down how many of the 10 tokens you contribute towards the common pool in every round. You will write down your contributions towards the common pool for every round secretly, shielding your decision sheet from others, on a decision sheet that is in your packet. At the end of every round I will announce how many tokens every participant contributed without revealing anyone's identity; what the total contribution was; and how much every participant would receive from the common pool. After all the tasks are completed, we will calculate your actual earnings by picking one of the five rounds at random. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is $2 and the maximum is $13.

APPENDIX H: DECISION SHEETS (English)

I. Decision Task 1: simulated elections

Election #

Vote for your preferred candidate by placing a checkmark against his name (example: ☑ Candidate XXXXXXX). You may only vote for ONE candidate.

☐ Candidate XXXXXXXXX   ☐ Candidate YYYYYYYYY

II. Decision Task 2: other-other allocation game

You have 10 tokens to distribute. You must distribute all 10 tokens. You cannot know whom specifically the tokens will go to, and you yourself are not a recipient.

Each row in the table below shows a different way to divide 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shia. From the options below please decide how many tokens you will give to another member of YOUR OWN RELIGIOUS SECT at this table and how many will go to the member of the different religious sect at the table. Circle your ONE preferred option in the last row.

Option	Token allocation										
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)
TO A SUNNI	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
TO A SHIA	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
CIRCLE <u>ONE</u> PREFERRED OPTION	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(c)**	**(d)**	**(e)**	**(f)**	**(g)**	**(h)**	**(i)**	**(j)**	**(k)**

III. Decision Task 3: Public Goods Game

You have 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 to put in the common pool and how many to keep for yourself. All tokens in the common pool will be multiplied by two and shared EQUALLY among everyone at this table. The tokens that you do not put in the common pool you can keep for yourself as earnings.

Of the 10 tokens, how many will you put in the common pool? (The remainder will automatically be set aside for you as earnings).

	FOR THE COMMON POOL ONLY (enter a number of tokens between 0 and 10)
ROUND XX:	

APPENDIX I: SCRIPT DELIVERED BY ELECTION CANDIDATES (English)

Election 1:
Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.
Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, only the Shi'a at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Shi'a, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 2:
Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, only the Sunni at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Sunni, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.
Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 3:
Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.
Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, the Shi'a and Sunni at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Shi'a will receive 30 tokens and each Sunni will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 4:
Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, the Sunni and Shi'a at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Sunni will receive 30 tokens and each Shi'a will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.
Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

APPENDIX J: RANDOMIZATION CHECK

Understanding of the task

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 2.70	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 56 Observations; mean 2.68	0.20	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 55 Observations; mean 2.62	0.74	0.53	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 58 Observations; mean 2.66	0.42	0.21	-0.32	×	×	×
Condition 5 57 Observations; mean 2.63	0.63	0.42	-0.11	0.21	×	×
Condition 6 57 Observations; mean 2.56	1.26	1.03	0.48	0.81	0.60	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Age

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 37.17	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 38.60	-0.57	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 35.42	0.77	1.31	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 37.95	-0.33	0.26	-1.11	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 37.02	0.06	0.63	-0.70	0.40	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 36.57	0.25	0.79	-0.49	0.57	0.19	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Education

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 58 Observations; mean 3.79	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 59 Observations; mean 3.51	1.09	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 58 Observations; mean 3.50	1.11	0.03	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 58 Observations; mean 3.26	2.09*	0.92	0.87	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 3.47	1.18	0.14	0.11	-0.72	×	×
Condition 6 58 Observations; mean 3.83	-0.13	-1.15	-1.17	-2.08*	-1.24	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Monthly Household Income

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 55 Observations; mean 1.02	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 57 Observations; mean 1.02	0.00	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 56 Observations; mean 1.00	0.09	0.09	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 56 Observations; mean 1.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.16	×	×	×
Condition 5 53 Observations; mean 1.06	-0.15	-0.16	-0.22	-0.08	×	×
Condition 6 53 Observations; mean 1.25	-0.96	-1.00	-1.04	-0.86	-0.67	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Predominately Shia neighborhood

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 0.27	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 0.30	-0.40	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 0.38	-1.36	-0.96	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 0.38	-1.36	-0.96	0.00	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 0.25	0.21	0.61	1.57	1.57	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 0.22	0.64	1.04	2.01*	2.01*	0.43	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

Predominately Sunni neighborhood

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6
Condition 1 60 Observations; mean 0.37	×	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 2 60 Observations; mean 0.37	0.00	×	×	×	×	×
Condition 3 60 Observations; mean 0.33	0.38	0.38	×	×	×	×
Condition 4 60 Observations; mean 0.30	0.77	0.77	0.39	×	×	×
Condition 5 60 Observations; mean 0.43	-0.74	-0.74	-1.12	-1.52	×	×
Condition 6 60 Observations; mean 0.30	0.77	0.77	0.39	0.00	1.52	×

*Numbers in cells are t-statistics for two-sided t-test scores; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

APPENDIX K: SURVEY QUESTIONS

Understanding of the task: "How well were you able to understand the instructions for what you were supposed to do as part of this study? (0) Did not understand the instructions at all; (1) Understood instructions quite poorly; (2) Understood instructions quietly well; (3) Understood instructions fully."

Age: "How old are you? Please write your age in the space provided." Open question.

Education: "What is your education level? (0) Illiterate/ No formal education; (1) Elementary; (2) Preparatory/ Basic; (3) Secondary; (4) Mid-level diploma/ Professional or technical; (5) BA; (6) MA or above."

Household income: "What is your HOUSEHOLD'S monthly income? (0) Under 1,000,000 LBP; (1) 1,000,001 – 3,000,000 LBP; (2) 3,000,001 – 5,000,000 LBP; (3) 5,000,001 – 7,000,000 LBP; (4) 7,000,001 – 9,000,000 LBP; (5) 9,000,001 – 11,000,000 LBP; (6) Over 11,000,001 LBP"

Trust in Sunni and Shia groups: How much do you trust the members of each of the following groups? Shia Muslim/ Sunni Muslim. (0) Do not trust at all; (1) Mostly don't trust; (2) Mostly trust; (3) Trust completely."

APPENDIX L. EFFECTS OF EXPERT APPEAL AND PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION ESTIMATED USING MULTILEVEL MODELING.

Model	Task 1 (Logistic) Expert Appeal 1	Task 1 (Logistic) Participant Discussion 2	Task 2 (OLS) Expert Appeal 3	Task 2 (OLS) Participant Discussion 4	Task 3 (OLS) Expert Appeal 5	Task 3 (OLS) Participant Discussion 6
Expert Appeal	-1.11* (0.44)		-1.10** (0.42)		0.24 (0.22)	
Participant Discussion		0.36 (0.51)		0.45 (0.42)		0.03 (0.21)
Lagged group contribution					0.14** (0.01)	0.15** (0.01)
Constant	3.46* (1.66)	2.28 (1.62)	10.35** (1.42)	7.81** (1.43)	-3.50** (1.05)	-3.00** (0.99)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control Variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.04 (0.20)	0.20 (0.27)	0.00 (0.00)	0.13 (0.19)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.55 (0.50)	0.41 (0.48)	0.90 (0.41)	0.20 (0.31)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
sd (Residual)			4.46 (0.48)	4.69 (0.52)	3.17 (0.08)	3.04 (0.07)
Observations	212	205	212	206	856	828

Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 correspond to Models 4 and 8 in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively, in the body. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

*Note: Groups are coded on the x-axis: 1 = Control, 2 = Expert Video, 3 = Participant
Discussion, 4 = Clientelism, 5 = Expert Video + Clientelism, and 6 = Participant
Discussion + Clientelism.*

APPENDIX N: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME

Figure: Average contribution levels in the public goods game across the experimental conditions.

Note: Dots correspond to average contributions; vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Model	A. Expert Appeal (Logistic)				B. Participant Discussion (Logistic)			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Clientelism	1.02*	0.97			1.15*	1.13		
	(0.44)	(0.59)			(0.52)	(0.74)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer			1.77**	2.14**			2.00**	1.35*
			(0.48)	(0.69)			(0.51)	(0.65)
Expert Appeal	-1.11*	-1.18	-1.21**	-0.90				
	(0.44)	(0.64)	(0.47)	(0.61)				
Clientelism × Expert Appeal		0.13						
		(0.87)						
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Expert Appeal				-0.73				
				(0.91)				
Participant Discussion					0.33	0.31	0.52	-0.05
					(0.52)	(0.76)	(0.51)	(0.65)
Clientelism × Participant Discussion						0.03		
						(1.03)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Participant Discussion								1.36
								(0.96)
Constant	4.11*	4.15	3.18	2.84	2.86	2.87	2.71	3.12
	(1.73)	(1.75)	(1.81)	(1.85)	(1.64)	(1.68)	(1.72)	(1.77)
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Random-effects Parameters								
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.29	0.29	0.24	0.23
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.34	0.34	0.37	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Observations	212	212	212	212	205	205	205	205

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 8 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 8 in Table 7 in the body. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.*

APPENDIX P. TREATMENT EFFECTS ON CROSS-SECTARIAN TRUST (MODELS 1-4) AND EFFECT OF TRUST ON CONTRIBUTIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME (MODELS 5-6) ESTIMATED USING MULTILEVEL MODELING

	A. Absolute cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		B. Relative cross-sectarian trust (Ordinal logistic)		C. Contribution to public goods (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Expert Appeal	0.19		0.49			
	(0.30)		(0.29)			
Participant Discussion		0.42		0.16		
		(0.29)		(0.29)		
Absolute cross-sectarian trust					0.63**	
					(0.11)	
Relative cross-sectarian trust						0.40**
						(0.10)
Lagged group contribution					0.15**	0.15**
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant					-4.68	-3.57
					(0.91)	(0.93)
/cut1	-0.71	0.25	-1.46	-1.94		
	(1.39)	(1.28)	(1.43)	(1.35)		
/cut2	1.62	2.75	-0.16	-0.51		
	(1.40)	(1.29)	(1.42)	(1.32)		
/cut3	2.95	4.24	0.92	0.56		
	(1.42)	(1.31)	(1.42)	(1.32)		
/cut4			4.09	4.13		
			(1.46)	(1.38)		
/cut5			5.22	5.14		
			(1.54)	(1.45)		
/cut6			5.64	5.55		
			(1.59)	(1.50)		
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.25
	(0.20)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.57)	(0.35)
sd (Residual)					3.13	3.13
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	176	179	173	178	1060	1044

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 6 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 6 in Table 8 in the body; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

APPENDIX Q: RELATIVE CROSS-SECTARIAN TRUST REGRESSION FROM TABLE 6 (OLS)

	Relative cross-sectarian trust	
	Model 1	Model 2
Expert Video	0.29	
	(0.15)	
Participant Discussion		0.05
		(0.13)
Constant	-1.40	-1.11
	(0.81)	(0.66)
Clientelism	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y
Observations	173	178
R^2	0.10	0.05

Note: Model 1 uses observations from experimental conditions 1-2 and 4-5, whereas Model 2 uses observations from experimental conditions 2-3 and 5-6; Standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses;* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

APPENDIX R: DISCUSSION CODING RULES

N-1. Coding rules
 (1) There are three broad substantive rubrics: negative effects of sectarianism, causes of
     sectarianism, and solutions to sectarianism. A discussion participant's statement is
     coded every time he or she makes a statement relevant to any of these three broad
     categories (statements in each of the rubrics are coded separately). Identical
     statements made at different times within each of the three rubrics are counted as
     one single statement (i.e. there is no double counting within rubrics).
 (2) Participants might make statements that are inconsistent across the three substantive
     rubrics. Coding must reflect participants' statements; coders cannot impose
     consistency in the coding.
 (3) Participants often express their opinions by making brief affirmative or negative
     remarks (e.g., "True", "Right", or "No, I disagree") following substantive remarks
     by others. Such affirmative or negative utterances are counted as valid statements.
 (4) Agreement and disagreement are coded as 1 and -1, respectively. If a participant
     does not make a statement against a category then they are not assigned a score for
     that category.

N-2. Three rubrics and the 25 constituent subcategories.

Rubrics	Subcategories	Examples
Negative effects of sectarianism	Inter-sectarian conflict, tension, or threat	
	Inter-sectarian friendship or marriage/ family issues	
	Job, hospital, or school admission (*Wasta*)	
Causes of sectarianism	Political leadership or institutions	Quota system, sectarian assignment of governmental offices, or hereditary political power
	Lack of personal concern with sectarianism	
	Foreign influence	Neighboring Muslim countries, Israel, or USA
	Mass media	
	Sectarian education at school	
	Lack of nationalism or patriotism	
	Religious leadership	
	Syrian refugees	
Solutions to sectarianism	Reform of the political system	Reform of the electoral system, direct presidential elections.
	Civic education	
	Parental influence	
	Independence from foreign	

	influence	
	Control over mass media	
	Non-sectarian education at school	Intersectarian textbooks
	Remove sect information from personal status records or ID card	
	Nationalism or patriotism	
	Participation in protest or social movement	
	Separation between church and state	Prohibition on political involvement by religious leaders
	Pensions	
	Military coup/military involvement in government	
	Mixing residential areas	
	Intersectarian marriage	

APPENDIX S. RESULTS FROM DISCUSSION DEPTH RECODING (ALL NEGATIVE STATEMENTS CODED AS 0)

Model	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-2.08*	-3.21**	-3.35**	-3.70**	2.28**	2.33*
	(0.82)	(1.04)	(0.70)	(0.80)	(0.67)	(0.98)
Female participation	-1.27**	-1.12**	-0.41*	-0.37	0.51	0.88*
	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.43)
Youth participation	0.43	-0.56	0.51**	0.62*	-1.02*	-1.25**
	(0.46)	(0.69)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.42)	(0.45)
Lagged group contribution					0.08**	0.07**
					(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	1.66	10.06*	8.26**	8.54**	3.35**	-1.01
	(1.08)	(4.40)	(0.39)	(1.75)	(1.09)	(1.81)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380
R^2	0.24	0.37	0.16	0.23	0.27	0.33

Note: All models use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.

APPENDIX T. EFFECT OF DISCUSSION DEPTH ON SECTARIAN VOTING (TASK 1), AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION IN THE OTHER-OTHER ALLOCATION GAME (TASK 2), AND AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME (TASK 3), ESTIMATED USING MULTILEVEL MODELING

	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-2.70*	-3.99**	-3.30**	-3.52**	0.90	0.22
	(1.19)	(1.44)	(0.91)	(1.02)	(0.64)	(0.73)
Female participation	-0.93*	-0.82	-0.17	0.23	0.08	0.39
	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.26)	(0.29)
Youth participation	0.98*	0.89	0.67	0.73	-0.14	-0.41
	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Lagged group contribution					0.15**	0.15**
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.83	4.14	6.28**	7.23**	0.74	-2.21
	(0.83)	(2.76)	(0.81)	(2.19)	(0.82)	(1.59)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Random-effects Parameters						
Session: sd (table-specific constant)	0.01	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.22)	(0.46)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Table: sd (session-specific constant)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sd (Residual)			5.26	5.03	3.20	3.14
			(0.70)	(0.73)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380

*Note: Multilevel models (random intercepts for sessions and groups) used; Models 1 to 6 respectively correspond to Models 1 to 6 in Table 9 in the body. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

APPENDIX U: TABLE 9 REPLICATED WITH ADDITION OF AUTOMATED DISCUSSION TONE SCORE ALONGSIDE DISCUSSION DEPTH SCORE.

Effect of discussion depth on sectarian voting (task 1), ingroup favoritism (task 2), and average contribution in a public goods game (task 3).

	A. Sectarian voting (Logistic)		B. Contribution in other-other allocation game (OLS)		C. Contribution in the public goods game (OLS)	
Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	-2.76**	-4.26**	-3.39**	-3.55**	1.88**	1.97*
	(0.82)	(1.41)	(0.72)	(0.89)	(0.68)	(0.89)
Discussion tone	1.75*	2.18	0.24	-0.27	2.58**	2.58**
	(0.86)	(1.48)	(1.20)	(1.28)	(0.61)	(0.85)
Female participation	-0.71	-0.40	-0.34	-0.41	1.07*	1.42**
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.49)
Youth participation	-0.18	-1.52	0.43	0.64*	-1.60**	-1.85**
	(0.60)	(1.02)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.46)	(0.63)
Lagged group contribution					0.07**	0.07**
					(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	0.72	5.34	7.86**	8.70**	2.62**	0.70
	(1.14)	(4.20)	(0.86)	(2.14)	(0.86)	(1.73)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	95	114	95	456	380
R^2	0.26	0.39	0.16	0.24	0.28	0.33

*Note: All models use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6; standard errors, clustered at group level, are in parentheses; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.*

APPENDIX V: DETERMINANTS OF THE EXTENT OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSION

	Model 1
Shia	0.07
	(0.91)
Understanding of instructions	-0.26
	(0.38)
Female	0.53
	(0.58)
Age	0.07**
	(0.02)
Education	0.36*
	(0.20)
Household wealth	0.29
	(0.26)
Shia residential neighborhood	-0.64
	(0.73)
Sunni residential neighborhood	-0.20
	(0.98)
Constant	-1.00
	(1.88)
Clientelism	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y
Observation	95
R^2	0.20

*Note: Model 1 analyzes observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6 using OLS regression; participation in discussion is measured as a participant's individual score; standard errors, clustered at group level, are reported in parentheses; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.*