

The Political Economy of Democracy

Master in Social Sciences

Juan March - Carlos III Institute

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Objectives

The main goal of this seminar is to discuss the origins and effects of the institutional architecture of modern democracy. We will begin by analyzing the characteristics and historical evolution of the institutions and reforms that marked the transition from representative government to representative democracy, such as the adoption of male universal suffrage, secret vote, and minority representation in electoral systems. We will then examine the intellectual legacy of this evolution in the predominant, electoral concept of democracy used in comparative political science.

In a second part we will analyze alternative explanations of democratization, in particular economic, political, and institutional perspectives. We will pay particular attention to the problem of how democracies emerged at different points in history and how certain dimensions of an existing democratic regime can be deepened. One central point of debate will be the relative impact that distributive conflicts and mass mobilizations, on the one hand, and elite strategies and political institutions, on the other, had on these processes. We will also analyze whether these factors complement each other, whether different cases fit different explanations across time, and whether early processes of democratization should be studied with a different theoretical framework from late ones.

The third part will focus on the working of democratic institutions. We start by analyzing the question of whether free and fair elections, the key institution in contemporary democracies, can be used as an instrument of popular control over the behavior and decisions of representatives. We will then discuss how democratic outcomes can vary under different institutional configurations of electoral and decision-making rules. In particular, we want to examine how alternative electoral systems and executive-legislative relations models enable or constrain electoral and institutional majorities, thus determining the nature of democracy and the type of policies it is likely to produce. We will conclude by reflecting on the possibility of institutional innovations within the structure of representative democratic systems.

Requirements

Each session will be divided into a general introduction to the topic of the week, student presentations, and a guided discussion. Since the course has been organized as a seminar,

active participation is required. Students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the literature assigned for the session.

The grade will be based on three criteria: 1) participation in class discussions (10%), 2) two short papers and in-class presentations (20% each) by each student throughout the course of the semester, and 3) a research paper (50%).

The two short papers should be 2-3 pages in length, double-spaced. These papers must be submitted to the seminar before each weekly meeting. They are expected to present a critical review of different aspects of the reading assignments of the week and propose issues for collective discussion. The final research paper is usually based on a topic developed from course materials, but conceptually or empirically related topics are also admissible. This paper requires conducting independent research on the theories and concepts discussed in class and may include a case study or a comparative analysis. The paper should be 20-25 pages in length, double-spaced typed, with proper citations.

Contents and class schedule

I. History and Concept

Introduction to the course

Session 1. From representative government to representative democracy: political and institutional foundations (September 21st)

Required

- Adam Przeworski. 2010. "Introduction" and Chapter 3, in *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daniel Caramani. *Elections in Western Europe Since 1815*, Chapter 2, "The Institutional Development of Elections in Europe".
- Daniel Ziblatt. 2006. "How Did Europe Democratize?", *World Politics* 58, 311-38.
- Stein Rokkan. 1961. "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation", *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2: 132-152.

Recommended

- Bernard Manin. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Adam Przeworski. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Charles Tilly. 2007. *Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Session 2. Universal suffrage, secret voting, and the inclusion of electoral minorities (September 28)

Required

- Adam Przeworski. 2009. “Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions”, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 291-321.
- Adam Przeworski. 2015. “Suffrage and Voting Secrecy in General Elections”, in Jon Elster *Secrecy and Publicity in Votes and Debates*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Isabela Mares. 2015. *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting*, Chaps. 1 y 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Amel Ahmed. 2013. *Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice*, Chapters 1-3. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 115, Nov.4.
- Jan Teorell, Daniel Ziblatt, and Fabrice Lehoucq. 2016. “Introduction to Special Issue: The Causes and Consequences of Secret Ballot Reform”, *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Leeman, Lucas, and Isabela Mares. 2013. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation: One Phenomenon, a Plethora of Explanations." *Journal of Politics* no. 76 (2).
- Gabriel Negretto and Giancarlo Visconti. 2018. “Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America”. *Latin American Politics and Society* 60 (1).

Session 3. Empirical and normative questions about the concept of democracy (October 5)

Required

- Adam Przeworski. 1999. “Minimalist conception of democracy: A Defense”, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds, *Democracy’s Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 23-55.
- Carles Boix, Michael Miller & Sebastian Rosato. 2010. A Complete Dataset of Political Regimes, 1800-2007, 46 *Comparative Political Studies*, 1523.
- Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Pérez-Liñan. 2007. “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-2004”, in Gerardo Munck (ed.), *Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods*. Oxford University Press.
- Michael Coppedge and John Gerring, et al. 2011. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach ”, *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 9: 2, pp. 247-267.

Recommended

- Adam Przeworski *et al.* *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. “Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War ”. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-36.
- Jean Teorell. 2006. “Political Participation and Three Theories of Democracy: A Research Inventory and Agenda”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 45: 785-810.

II. Democratization

Session 4. Class conflict, mass mobilization, and redistribution (October 19)

Required

- Carles Boix. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*, Introduction and Chapter 1. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Ch. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Ben Ansell and David Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach”. *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (12), 1543-157.

Recommended

- Carles Boix. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruth B. Collier. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Kaufmann and Stephan Haggard. 2016. *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. New Haven: Princeton University Press.
- Ben Ansell and David Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Session 5. Political conflict, elite strategies, and institutions (October 26)

Required

- Adam Przeworski. 1988. “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, and Barry Weingast. 2010. “Democratization and Counter-majoritarian Institutions: Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy”. In Tom Ginsburg (ed.), *Comparative Constitutional Design*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69-100.
- Daniel Ziblatt. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy*, Chaps. 1 and 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

- John Higley and Michel Burton. 2006. *Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- John Higley and Richard Gunther. 1992. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. John Hopkins University Press.

- Brian Downing. *The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Session 6. Constitutional change and democratization (November 9)

Required

- Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Chapter 5. 1996. John Hopkins University Press.
- Barry Weingast. 2004. “Constructing Self-Democracy in Spain”. In Irwin L. Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, and Karlo Edward Soltan (eds.), *Politics from Anarchy to Democracy: Rational Choice in Political Science*. Stanford University Press.
- Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. Chaps. 1-3. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Todd A. Eisenstadt, Carl Levan, and Tofigh Maboudi. 2015. “When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing Effects of Deliberation during Constitution-Making, 1974–2011”. *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume 109, Issue 3.

Recommended

- Andrea Bonime-Blanc. 1987. *Spain’s Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution Making*. Westview Press.
- Barry Weingast. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law”. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 245-263
- Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Todd A. Eisenstadt, Carl Levan, and Tofigh Maboudi. 2017. *Constituents Before Assembly: Participation, Deliberation, and Representation in the Crafting of New Constitutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

III. Democratic Institutions

Session 7. The problem of popular control through elections (November 16)

Required

- Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. “Elections and Representation”, in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin (eds.),

Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- G. Bingham Powell. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, Chapter 1. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists*, Chapter 1, Princeton University Press.
- Belén Barreiro. 2008. “Explaining the Electoral Performance of Incumbents in Democracies”, in Jose María Maravall e Ignacio Sánchez Cuenca (eds.), “Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability”. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

- William Riker. 1982. *Liberalism, Populism, and the Theory of Social Choice. Liberalism Against Populism*. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- G. Bingham Powell. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists*. Princeton University Press.
- Andrew Reynolds. 2000. “Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government”, in Markus Crepaz et al., *Democracy and Institutions: The Life and Work of Arend Lijphart*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Session 8. Majority-enabling and majority-restraining institutions (November 23)

Required

- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chaps. 2, 3, and 16.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapter 2 and Chapter 10.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (3): 289–325.

Recommended

- Colomer, Josep. 2001. *Political Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Colomer, Josep. 2008. “Comparative Constitutions”, in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*.
- Riker, William. 1988. *Liberalism Against Populism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Session 9. Electoral rules: parties, citizens, and policy-makers (November 30)

Required

- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*, Chapter 2 and 11.
- Taagepera, Rein. 1999. “The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral system.” *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (5): 531–548.
- Huber, John and Bingham Powell. 1994. “Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy”. *World Politics* 46 (3): 291-326.
- Golder, Matt and Jacek Stramski. 2010. “Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions” . *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2010), pp. 90-106

Recommended

- Negretto, Gabriel L. 2015. "From Duverger to Rokkan and Back: Progress and Challenges in the Study of Electoral Systems." *Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions*: 113-127.
- Taagepera, Rein. 2011. *Predicting Party Sizes*. Oxford University Press.
- Bingham Powell Jr. 2009. “The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods”. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 12.

- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. 1997. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 149–174.

Session 10. Decision making rules: executive influence over policy making (December 11)

Required

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, Cap. 7.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Chap. 4.
- Shugart, Matthew S. and Stephen Haggard. 2001. "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–104.
- Doering, Herbert. 1995. "Time is a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda", en Herbert Doering (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York, St. Martin's, pp.223-246.

Recommended

- Cheibub, José Antonio, and Fernando Limongi. 2011. "Legislative-Executive Relations", in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, eds. *Comparative Constitutional Law*.
- Negretto, Gabriel. 2004. "Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5): 531–562.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, "Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution", en Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, *New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices*. London: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 73-98.
- Howell, William, *Executives-The American Presidency*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Institutions*, Oxford University Press, 2007, Chap. 16.
- Cameron, Charles. 2004. *Veto Bargaining*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., *Executives in Parliamentary Governments*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Institutions*, Oxford University Press, 2007, Chap. 17.

Session 11. Decision making rules: Legislative institutions and bicameralism (December 14)

Required

- Michael Laver. 2008. “Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context”, in Donald Wittman, and Barry Weingast, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.
- Rasch, B. E, Shane Martin, Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules*. New York: Oxford University Press, Chapter 1.
- Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money, *Bicameralism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Chap. 1
- Patterson, Samuel and Anthony Mughan, “Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism”, in Patterson, Samuel, and Anthony Mughan (eds.) *Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World*. Ohio State University Press, pp. 1-31

Recommended

- Gary Cox, 2006. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures.” In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.
- Gary Cox. 2002. *The Efficient Secret*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gary Cox, Matthew McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott Morgenstern, Benito Nacif (eds.). 2000. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Session 12. Democratic institutional innovations? (December 18)

Required

- Russel Dalton, Susan Scarrow, and Bruce Cain. 2003. “New Forms of Democracy? Reform and Transformation of Democratic Institutions”, in Bruce Cain, Russell Dalton, and Susan Scarrow (eds), *Democracy Transformed: Expanding Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford University Press.
- Graham Smith. 2009. *Institutional Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*. Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 4. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Simon Hug and George Tsebelis. 2002. “Veto Players and Referendums Around the World”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.

Recommended

- Susan Scarrow, “Direct Democracy and Institutional Design: A Comparative Investigation”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 2001, 34: 651-661.
- Graham Smith. 2009. *Institutional Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation* Gary Cox. 2002. *The Efficient Secret*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruce Cain, Russell Dalton, and Susan Scarrow (eds), *Democracy Transformed: Expanding Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford University Press.