

# **National Past and Populism: The Re-Elaboration of Fascism and Its Impact on Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe**

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**Abstract:** The electoral performance of right-wing populism also depends on the type of re-elaboration of countries' national past and their collective memories. Complementing socio-economic and political-institutional factors, the paper analyses cultural opportunity structures. Given the link between fascist and populist visions of power, it shows that different collective memories of the fascist past and World War II may open up or close down the space for right-wing populist parties. Theoretically, the typology includes four types of re-elaboration: culpabilization, victimization, heroization and cancellation. Results of a comparative analysis of eight West European countries based on a novel measurement method point to (1) culpabilization and heroization as types of re-elaboration limiting right-wing populist parties' electoral performance, (2) cancellation as a type having an undetermined effect, and (3) victimization as a type triggering the success of right-wing populist parties.

**Keywords:** populism, fascist past, re-elaboration, collective memory, cultural opportunity structures, comparative.

## Introduction

The success of Alternative for Germany in the 2017 federal elections came to many as a shock. Germany is a country that dealt critically with its past and developed a political culture making it unthinkable that right-wing populist discourses and parties would establish themselves. The stigma attached to positions even vaguely reminiscent of a traumatic past had kept right-wing populism at the fringes of the public sphere for decades.

The burden of the past is often evoked to explain the absence in some countries of right-wing populism in both academic and in media outlets.<sup>1</sup> Many scholars mention the fascist legacy as a factor linked to the success of right-wing populist parties (Betz 1988, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007, Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). However, in comparative research such explanations are only vaguely mentioned and quickly abandoned in favour of political-institutional and socio-economic ones. At the same time, the rich historical research on collective memories does not make the link with party politics, focussing mostly on country-specific historical case studies or binary comparisons – often with Germany (Art 2006, Berger 2002, Deighton 2002, Östling 2011, Rousso 1990).

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<sup>1</sup> *Die Zeit* stated that “Austria has consistently presented itself as the first victim of fascism and has dealt with the past, if at all, timidly. The Germans started reckoning with the past at the beginning of the 1960s. [...] There is no respectable right in Germany and the non-respectable right, such as the NPD or the Republikaner, were systematically marginalized” (October 2, 2013). On release of the copyright of *Mein Kampf* in 2015, *The Economist* reported on Germany’s dealing with the past. The *Financial Times* reported on the obstacle for populist movements in Spain from memories of Franco’s regime (June 13, 2016) and on Alternative for Germany breaking a taboo in *Länder*-elections (September 9, 2016).

This paper connects, comparatively, the legacy of the fascist past and World War II with the success of right-wing populist parties. To what extent does the type of memory and collective re-elaboration of the fascist past block or trigger right-wing populism in different countries? Do certain types of re-elaboration hinder the success of such parties or, conversely, provide a more fertile ground? The paper argues that collective memories create more or less favourable “cultural opportunity structures” for this party family.<sup>2</sup>

The goal of the paper is to test the plausibility of this hypothesis in a bivariate way using eight West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The theoretical argument relies on a new typology of re-elaboration (culpabilization, victimization, heroization and cancellation). Methodologically, it uses an innovative “in-depth expert survey” (of their scientific writings) to classify countries' memories, striking the balance between thick case-oriented historical data, and analytical relationship.

The paper starts by outlining the theoretical argument about the impact of the re-elaboration of national pasts on the electoral performance of right-wing populism. It then presents the typology of re-elaborations and formulates hypotheses about the link between each type and right-wing populism. This is followed by the research

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<sup>2</sup> The debate on terminology turns, tellingly, around German concepts: *Aufarbeitung* (originally by Adorno, which translates as “working through”) and *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (“coming to terms with the past”), which for Adorno involves silencing rather than self-critical engagement. This paper uses “re-elaboration” as it has the same root as *Aufarbeitung*.

design, case selection and operationalization, and the plausibility test. The conclusion discusses the recent fading of memories.

## **Towards Cultural Explanations of Right-Wing Populism**

As a thin ideology, populism is based on people-centrism and anti-elitism. Populist democracy is illiberal and advocates the putative will of the sovereign people unconstrained by procedures, checks-and-balances and distortions by intermediary actors. Furthermore, populism has a homogenous and non-pluralistic vision of the people, which leads to distrust for parties as carriers of particularistic interests against the common good. The embodiment of people's will is based on plebiscitarian mobilization. As a thick ideology, right-wing populism is characterized by nativism and an exclusionary definition of the "other".<sup>3</sup> Following this definition, various studies have analysed the conditions under which right-wing populism emerges and varies across countries based on structures of opportunities.

The more or less successful populist mobilization in different countries has so far been exclusively linked to the interaction of socio-economic factors (demand-side) with political-institutional opportunity structures (supply side). On institutional opportunity structures, research has mainly analysed the openness of the electoral

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<sup>3</sup> This definition of populism includes elements from the work of Canovan (1999), Mény and Surel (2002), Mudde (2004), Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) and Hawkins (2009) among others. The right-wing nature of populism is given by its focus on the exclusionary definition of the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

system operationalized through its proportionality.<sup>4</sup> On political opportunity structures, the literature has looked at the electoral strategies of established parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). This kind of opportunity structure is based on the strategic interactions between parties and focusses on the changing space of competition (Kitschelt 1995, Kriesi et al. 2012).

In contrast to socio-economic and political-institutional explanations, cultural explanations have received less attention in comparative research. Although many have noted the relevance of cultural factors such as collective memories of traumatic past events for the study of populism, comparative research has not pursued what seems a promising approach (Art 2011). The in-depth research on different types of re-elaboration is found more prominently among historians.<sup>5</sup> The goal of this paper is to bridge comparative empirical research that does not include cultural factors with research that does but not comparatively.

The argument about the stigmatization of right-wing populist positions has been advanced almost exclusively in relation to Germany. Authors mention the role of the Nazi period and the legacy of the Nazi regime on the emergence of extreme-right parties (Kitschelt 1995, Tarchi 2002). Others have addressed the impossibility of de-criminalizing the Nazi past as a factor explaining the lack of success of right-wing

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<sup>4</sup> See Abedi (2002) and Carter (2002). Other institutional elements include presidential systems, federal structures and direct democracy. A more radical type of threshold is outright bans.

<sup>5</sup> For comparative work on European countries see Ekman and Edling (1997), Judt (1992), Langenbacher et al. (2012), Lebow et al. (2006) and Pakier and Str ath (2010). See Online Appendix 1 for single-country studies or binary comparisons.

populists (Betz 1988). The “handicap” of the right set by the restrictions arising from the historical burden that weights on Germany’s political culture – the shadow of the Nazi past and the deeper stigma attached to right-wing extremism in Germany – also recurs in the literature (Art 2006; Decker 2008).<sup>6</sup>

Hence, as a complement to political-institutional and socio-economic opportunity structures, this paper introduces cultural opportunity structures, i.e. what is taboo or socially acceptable based on the re-elaboration of the past. We focus on the restrictions of the ideological space that make it harder for specific parties to succeed, created by a specific relationship with the past, making the “authoritarian” end of the cultural axis a “no go area” (Figure 1).<sup>7</sup>

Crucially, the re-elaboration of the past is not the past itself. The relationship to fascism and to the role a country played during World War II matters first and foremost in terms of their re-elaboration, the establishment of a specific collective memory and its progressive objectivation (Burke 1998). The paper does not aim at establishing an objective, historical role for each country.<sup>8</sup> Its goal is rather to define

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<sup>6</sup> Similar points can be found in Heinisch (2002), Mudde (2007), Fella (2008), Bornschier (2012) and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015).

<sup>7</sup> The limitation of purely political opportunity structures appears in Kitschelt’s quote: “the political opportunity structure of the German extreme right was ... constrained by the long-term historical legacy of Germany’s Nazi past” (1995: 221; see also 3 and 28–42). Koopmans and Olzak (2004) speak of “discursive opportunity structure” and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) of “ideological opportunity structure”.

<sup>8</sup> Berger, for example, distinguishes perpetrators (Austria, Germany, Italy), victims (France, Netherlands, Britain) and neutrals (Switzerland) or sometimes villains and heroes (Berger 2010). As we argue below, this is not necessarily how countries re-defined their role, even if the type of military action (such as suffering Nazi occupation, upholding neutrality, perpetrating aggression or fighting the Nazi regime) provides the handhold for given narratives.

which collective memory has emerged from a process of re-elaboration and its impact on the opportunity for right-wing populists to be successful.

Re-elaboration is a process of definition of countries' role during the fascist period and World War II. This process leads to the formation of collective memories as a "kind of narrative that nations [...] tell about themselves, that is subject to moral claims and counter-claims" (Müller 2010: 29). Re-elaboration is obviously a conflictual process, with a politics of re-elaboration and an instrumentalization of the past driven by memory "entrepreneurs". There can be conflicting (or, at least, not homogenous) cultures of remembrance in each country (Berger 2010: 32). Collective memories may also be layered vertically, namely between the elite (intellectual or official) and the people.

Memories change over time and go through stages of memory-building:


- After World War II re-elaboration is blocked in a *silencing phase* of variable duration during which thorny topics are avoided.<sup>9</sup>
- Subsequently, a *self-critical phase* examines a country's role vis-à-vis the fascist past and the war through intellectual and political negotiations.
- The result is a re-elaboration that imposes itself during a *crystallization phase*.

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<sup>9</sup> During this phase, no stigmatization exists allowing populist right-wing movements such as *Poujadisme* or *Uomo Qualunque* to emerge. Even in Germany, "the memory of those responsible for the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944 was used to draw a distinction between evil Nazis and good Germans" (Berger 2010: 121). On this phase, see Pakier and Stráth (2010).



Figure 1 The restrictive role of memory on the space of electoral competition



- Recent years presage a *fading phase*. After the Cold War, memories of fascism and World War II become obsolete and their salience decreases.

Re-elaboration processes are complex, more or less cross-national, academic and official, more or less salient in the public debate, and more or less consensual or polarized. We do not analyse the nuances of the process, the power relationships, the strategies of the main actors (for example, parties) involved in the construction of the collective memory. We treat the process itself as a "black box". In the research design, we describe the way in which we operationalize re-elaboration and memories. Before that, the next section specifies the link between fascist past and right-wing populism and formulates the hypotheses.

## The Re-Elaboration of the Past

### *The Link between Fascist Past and Right-Wing Populism*

The argument of the paper stipulates a connection between how the fascist past is re-elaborated and the electoral performance of right-wing populism. The way in which the past is re-elaborated makes it more or less likely for right-wing populist features to be accepted or stigmatized. A certain type of re-elaboration may open up or, conversely, close down the opportunity structure for right-wing populism to develop in given countries. Why do we focus on the fascist past and the role of the country in World War II? What is the link with right-wing populism specifically?

We focus on the fascist past, the relationship countries had with fascist regimes, as well as the role countries had in either confronting or accommodating fascism before and during World War II because this past – and not another past – is defining for attitudes towards populism today. Fascism has embodied many of the features that denote right-wing populism.<sup>10</sup> Even if manifesting itself at different levels of radicalism, the latter includes core elements of that past.<sup>11</sup> Both share an illiberal definition of democracy that includes the unconstrained will of the people as well as

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<sup>10</sup> See Eatwell (2017). Similarly, others have spoken of right-wing populism in terms of a proto-totalitarian ideology (Abts and Rummens 2007: 406, 422). Kitschelt lists the commonalities between fascist and new radical right parties (1995: 43). Of course, no perfect overlap is stipulated as fascism includes para-militarism, corporatism, totalitarianism and imperialism among other things.

<sup>11</sup> New and old-style radical-right parties succeed under different conditions (Golder 2003; Ignazi 1992; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015). We apply our hypothesis about the impact of re-elaboration to both insofar as both share these core common elements.

an unmediated relationship between elite and people typical of the authoritarian end of the cultural axis. The two have a unitary vision of the people as homogenous and non-plural, leading to distrust for parties (and their competition) as carriers of particularistic interests. Most importantly, they have in common a nativist definition of the people based on exclusionary criteria. This link is stronger the more radical parties are.

This is the single most important moment of definition of national identity comparable only to state formation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, it is a common European-wide defining moment, a property that countries share making them comparable. In the 1930s and 1940s, every country was confronted, more or less directly, with Fascist regimes and had later to take a position, which crystallized into a collective memory of the country's role during that historical juncture. Finally, the re-elaboration of this past takes place in conditions of full democratic mobilization involving the masses in the formation of a truly collective memory. Accordingly, we do not focus on other historical phases such as imperialism, World War I, civil wars or state formation.<sup>12</sup>

### *A Typology of Re-Elaboration*

Four types of re-elaboration of the past are used to operationalize collective memory. Each type opens or closes to a certain degree the opportunity for populist parties to succeed electorally. The types are the values of the independent variable that we

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<sup>12</sup> Berger asks, "was the Second World War [...] really a common lieu de mémoire shared by the nations of Europe, or are there national differences in how the conflict is remembered?" (2010: 199). In either case, the reference is to a common event.

assign to the countries. Two caveats apply to the operationalization further down. First, countries fit mostly into one type of re-elaboration. Second, most countries' types of re-elaboration remain stable since the crystallization phase (for most countries since the 1970s).

Ideal-types are defined in Table 1. A memory of *heroization* presents the country as the hero taking full merit for fighting fascist and aggressive external regimes, implying the idea of having been on the right side. It stresses the country's role in maintaining liberal values and democratic institutions, and is solidly anchored in public opinion and official discourse. Alternative or more nuanced narratives about the role of the country in its relation to fascism are unacceptable and marginal.<sup>13</sup>

The opposing re-elaboration is that of *culpabilization*. Instead of presenting itself as the hero, the country accepts its role as culprit of own (internal) regime. The collective memory is based on taking responsibility for its authoritarian past. The country makes amends and compensates in various forms – symbolically and otherwise – through processes of internal, bottom-up support for the re-elaboration that are shared and have official character. Also in this case, alternative or more nuanced narratives about the role of the country during its fascist past are stigmatized.

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<sup>13</sup> The term *Salonfähigkeit* (sometimes also *bürgerlich*) refers to positions that are respectable and acceptable (Art 2006: 103) in a given society at a certain time. The term also refers to social boundaries – beside spatial and temporal ones – with permissibility varying along class lines (as, for example, across news outlets).

Table 1 A typology of strategies of re-elaboration of the past

<i>Locus of Fascist regime</i>	<i>Placement of responsibility</i>	
	<i>Internalized (high stigmatization)</i>	<i>Externalized (low stigmatization)</i>
Internal	<p><i>Culpabilization</i> The country assumes the burden of guilt for the fascist regime and its perpetrations.</p>	<p><i>Victimization</i> The country fabricates victimhood of “external” fascist regimes and denies responsibility.</p>
External	<p><i>Heroization</i> The country takes full merit for opposing and defeating fascist regimes and upholding liberal values.</p>	<p><i>Cancellation</i> The country’s role is not problematized and denies responsibility, little public debate takes place.</p>

The third and fourth types have in common the avoidance of responsibility. By developing a memory of *cancellation* a country removes its past relation with fascism from the public debate. The country does not thematize its implicit or explicit complicity with, and accommodation of, external regimes. A mainstream official narrative is weak. Various narratives may exist but they are not prominent in the public sphere so no narrative is really stigmatized. The main feature is not the divided nature of collective memory but the absence of it.

On the contrary, in a re-elaboration based on (self-) *victimization* the collective memory is present. The country does not take responsibility for its own fascist and aggressive past (and role as perpetrator), or its association with such regimes, and plays the victim. It shifts the blame to outside forces of which it claims to be the victim.<sup>14</sup> Rather than scrutinize its own role during fascist periods it distorts the

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<sup>14</sup> Victimization is available only to countries, which were – at least to a certain extent – perpetrators, and does not apply to actual victim countries.

national experience in a positive light and negatively portrays external forces. As a result, the country's relationship with fascism is embellished.


As types of narratives, we see this variable as a nominal one. However, in terms of acceptance of responsibility or degree of stigmatization, it can be conceived as an ordinal one. At one extreme is culpabilization, in which the acceptance of guilt and stigmatization of fascism is total and existential (++)). Heroization is similar, but stigmatization of fascism is not associated with the need to question fundamental features of identity, collective psychology and national culture (+). At the other extreme is victimization, in which the responsibility is not only rejected but is also positively altered, and consequently not stigmatized (--). Cancellation is a milder form, in which responsibility is neither discussed nor altered (-).

### *Hypotheses*

We expect the first two types of re-elaboration (culpabilization and heroization) to close down the space for right-wing populism while the two latter types (cancellation and victimization) to open it up. In the two former types, stigmatization acts as a brake to alternative narratives to the mainstream one. In the two latter types, this is not the case. This leads us to formulate our hypotheses.

1. We expect *culpabilization* to narrow the cultural opportunity structure for right-wing populism. A country whose narrative is defined in condemnation of its role in illiberal regimes is unlikely to tolerate right-wing populism.

Figure 2 Types of re-elaboration, degrees of stigmatization and opportunity structure of right-wing populism



2. We expect *heroization* to narrow the cultural opportunity structure for right-wing populism. A country whose narrative is defined in opposition to illiberal regimes is unlikely to accept right-wing populism.
3. We expect *cancellation* not to act as a brake to right-wing populism. A country whose narrative does not include a mention of its past role does not stigmatize right-wing populism.
4. We expect *victimization* to open up the cultural opportunity structure for right-wing populism. A country whose narrative embellishes its past role provides a fertile ground for right-wing populism.

Why do we expect culpabilization and heroization to close down the space for right-wing populism? In the former case, the collective feeling of guilt makes it shocking and unacceptable to hold values, attitudes and views even remotely associated with

a shameful past. Responsibility and guilt have been internalized through socialization over generations. In the latter case, the collective feeling of pride makes it shocking and unacceptable to hold values, attitudes and views even remotely aligned with a past which had been fought with sacrifice. It is socially sanctioned.<sup>15</sup>

Why do we expect victimization and cancellation to open up the space for right-wing populism? In both cases the stigma associated with the fascist past or the stance towards such regimes is weak or absent – and contested. At least in part, the past has no negative connotations and is acceptable. In the case of cancellation, this is due to the lack of public debate. In the case of victimization, the narrative has an active effect on populist performance by shifting the blame away from embellished national right-wing regimes and placing it on others. Responsibility for past actions is not associated with domestic fascist regimes but rather with foreign ones. Fascism is not only not stigmatized but also put in a positive light. The hypothesis is thus that victimization does more than passively “not blocking”. It has a triggering effect. It is not shocking and unacceptable to hold values, attitudes and views aligned with the fascist past. It is not sanctioned socially.<sup>16</sup> The impact of the opportunity structure for right-wing populism can be represented in linear terms as in Figure 2.

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<sup>15</sup> Alternatively, it may be argued that heroization increases nationalist sentiments and, therefore, prepares favourable conditions for right-wing populism. This, however, is not our hypothesis.

<sup>16</sup> There is difference between “opening up” and “not closing down”. While the former implies activation, the latter is passive in the same way as lying involves an action and omitting does not. However, as it would be difficult to argue that omitting does not involve action, the two are equivalent. On strategies of “deciding to forget”, see Proglia (2011).



## Research Design

Empirically, this paper carries out a “plausibility test” of a novel explanatory factor in comparative perspective. We are interested in assessing the impact of the type of re-elaboration and its role in shaping the cultural opportunity structure. Our focus is on the independent variable. We do not have the goal of producing an encompassing model in which re-elaboration is combined with other explanatory variables.<sup>17</sup> The plausibility test is based on the empirical observation of the association between the type of re-elaboration and levels of right-wing populism.

### *Case Selection*

The eight West European countries on which the analysis is based are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom since the 1970s. The focus on Western Europe allows a certain degree of similarity among the cases in terms of patterns of state formation, nation-building and democratization (a most-similar-systems design). More importantly, differently than other areas, all countries have been confronted with fascism and World War II. To confront implies that the country could not ignore the presence of fascist regimes: even if simply to declare itself neutral, the country needs to take a stand and, consequently, develops a collective memory of re-elaboration of the past.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> This is intended for future research. Similarly, re-elaboration as a mediating “blocking” factor does not distinguish whether specific types are necessary or sufficient conditions.

<sup>18</sup> The choice of these eight countries is linked to the project collaboration (see acknowledgements).

We do not include Eastern Europe, where right-wing populism has been prominent since the end of the Cold War, given the communist path after World War II. First, this created a distinct narrative of the role of communism in the fight against fascism based on regime doctrine. Second, it is a heroization narrative not addressing the authoritarian features of fascist regimes (as communism was authoritarian itself). Third, re-elaboration is possible only with democratization, which would create a timing difference with Western Europe. Fourth, current efforts of re-elaboration focus on the communist experience rather than on the fascist one, which has been pushed further back in history. This makes left-wing, not right-wing, populism less likely.<sup>19</sup>

We also do not analyse other West European cases (Belgium, Finland or Norway) that would change little to the results. The analysis may “travel” to non-European cases, but we refrain from extending our interpretations without the same level of empirical scrutiny.

### *Measurement of the Independent Variable*

The operationalization of the type of re-elaboration occurs through the classification of countries into the four types distinguished above. To define a dominant type of re-elaboration for each country, we rely on the wealth and detail of a large bulk of studies, which we have systematically collected and processed analytically. On each

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<sup>19</sup> These comparative issues also concern Germany with its roughly 30 years of experience as German Democratic Republic. This is a divided case as it appears in the success that right-wing populist movements such as Pegida and Alternative for Germany, as well as neo-Nazi parties such as the NDP or the Republicans enjoy in the Eastern *Länder*.

country a huge amount of literature on images of the past, debates and conflicts, and processes of re-elaboration, is available from history and cultural studies, to sociology and political science. Secondary sources tell us the outcome of decades of research in each country. Our approach is to draw from the riches of these analyses. Contrary to other methods, this approach allows us to address also secondary narratives and change over time.

We treat the literature available as an “in-depth expert survey”. Instead of surveying experts by means of a questionnaire based on one time-point, we “survey” what they have written over time. We use major publications for each country and both national and international academic sources.<sup>20</sup> We rely on the degree of agreement between scholars (a sort of “inter-coder reliability” level) and in case of contradiction, we make an informed decision.

Our choice of period excludes the “silencing phase”. It is from the 1970s that critical engagement with the past stabilizes. Except in cancellation countries, where a debate is absent, the critical engagement revolves around commemorations, trials and books, and key events. This process results in a dominant and ritualized narrative. In Online Appendix 1, we thoroughly document the sources with the page numbers and keywords of the relevant passages on which we base the country

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<sup>20</sup> The choice of publications is based on: (1) an extensive review of key texts, (2) the degree to which publications are cited, (3) a check of the list by country experts (see the Online Appendix for details). We are confident that we did not miss large chunks of academic studies that would alter our classification. The number of studies varies between countries. Tellingly, in the cancellation type it has been harder to find sources, as it were, because little debate has taken place.

classification. It includes the main and secondary narratives, the key events around which the re-elaboration revolves, as well as the bibliographical sources.

### *Measurement of the Dependent Variable*

To operationalize right-wing populism we focus on political parties. Parties provide a specific vision of power and society. It is parties that seek popular legitimation to translate their vision into action and policies. It is votes for parties that reveal the opportunity for such parties to thrive or fail.<sup>21</sup>

The populist vision of power and society is present in different types of parties that we label as right-wing populist. This category includes old and new extreme-right populists (Mudde 2007) but also new and old non-radical right populists (Rooduijn et al. 2014; Van Kessel 2015). It is, therefore, a larger category in which parties with different levels of radicalism are included. They are not exactly the same but all share the crucial elements of illiberalism, unconstrained and unmediated interest of the whole, unitary, homogenous and non-plural vision of the people, exclusionary nativism and critique of liberal elites, party competition and parliamentarism. It is because of such commonalities, that such diverse parties are linked to fascism.

To determine the overall, “structural” rank of countries’ right-wing populism since the 1970s we consider three “thresholds” of their success:

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<sup>21</sup> We keep the focus on parties even if some of them are highly personalized and controlled by individual mavericks.

1. The existence of radical right-wing populist parties;
2. Their duration of sustained electoral support, which indicates their acceptance by voters;
3. Their role in the executive, which indicates their acceptance by other parties.

Table 2 shows the aggregate ranking of the eight countries from 1 (lower rank) to 4 (higher rank) based on these thresholds.<sup>22</sup> The values given in Table 2 indicate a relative ranking between countries rather than an absolute level of populism. It is realistic to assume that this ranking does not change over time even if the overall levels of right-wing populism increase in every country.<sup>23</sup> Details on countries' values are given in the Online Appendix 3.

## **Analysis**

The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we determine the type of re-elaboration for each country (the values of the independent variable) by classifying countries into the four types defined above. Second, we test whether these types open or close the opportunity structure for right-wing populism as hypothesized.

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<sup>22</sup> We base the ranking on votes rather than seats as the latter are influenced by the electoral system. The same applies to the executive role as coalitions are more likely under PR. However, the participation in coalitions indicates the acceptance of these parties by other parties (cross-party legitimation and absence of “barrage”).

<sup>23</sup> Van Kessel (2015) provides a similar ranking with three levels (limited, reasonable, substantial) on seven of our eight countries. Rooduijn et al. (2014) rank five of our eight countries as unsuccessful, successful, very successful. Both rankings largely overlap with ours.

Table 2 Right-wing populist parties in eight countries (1970–2016)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Right-wing populist parties</i>	<i>Duration/timing</i>	<i>Size (% valid votes)</i>	<i>Radicalism</i>	<i>National executive role</i>	<i>Rank-value</i>
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)	1975–2014	5–35	High	YES	4
	Future Alliance (BZÖ)	2006–13	5–10	High	YES	
	Team Stronach	2013	6	High	NO	
France	National Front	1984–2014	10–25	High	NO	3
Germany	Republicans	1989–2014	1–7	High	NO	1
	NPD	2004–14	1–2	High	NO	
	German People's Union	1989–98	1–2	High	NO	
	Alternative for Germany	2013–14	5–7	Medium	NO	
Italy	Northern League	1989–2014	5–10	High	YES	4
	Go Italy	1994–2014	17–37	Low	YES	
	MSI-National Alliance	1972–2014	5–15	High	YES	
	MSI-Tricolour Flame	1999–2008	2–3	High	NO	
Netherlands	Freedom Party	2006–14	6–17	High	NO	3
	List Pim Fortuyn	2002–04	3–17	High	NO	
	Centre Democrats	1994	1–2	Medium	NO	
	Centre Party	1984	2	Medium	NO	
	Liveable Netherlands	2002	2	Medium	NO	
Sweden	Swedish Democrats	2002–14	3–13	High	NO	2
	New Democracy	1991–94	1–7	High	NO	

(continued)

(continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Right-wing populist parties</i>	<i>Duration/timing</i>	<i>Size (% valid votes)</i>	<i>Radicalism</i>	<i>National executive role</i>	<i>Ranking</i>
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	1995–2015	15–30	High	YES	4
	League of Ticino	1991–95	4–5	Low	NO	
	Swiss Democrats	1971–99	1–4	High	NO	
	Freedom Party	1991–95	4–5	High	NO	
	Republican Movement	1971–75	3–4	High	NO	
United Kingdom	British National Party	2004–14	5	High	NO	2
	UK Independence Party	1999–2015	6–27	High	NO	
	Referendum Party	1997	2	Low	NO	
	English Democrats	2009	2	High	NO	

*Notes:* The table considers elections up to 2016. Electoral figures are approximations and consider only parties with more than 1 percent of the nationwide votes in national or European (EP) parliamentary elections (lower houses, first ballot in France, and *Zweitstimmen* in Germany, PR-seats in Italy) as well as presidential elections (first-ballot figures). Regional and mayoral elections are not considered. Change of names over time are not indicated.

We validated the degree of radicalism of political parties through the Comparative Manifesto Project (which, however, does not include smaller parties) and the Chapel Hill expert survey data (which, however, starts only in 1999). Early timing refers to the presence of right-wing populists earlier than the fall of the Berlin Wall.

## *Assigning the Type of Collective Memory*

The extensive analysis of each country is presented in the tables in Online Appendix 1. Each country has been classified into a type of re-elaboration. We base the classification on the sources quoted and extract the essence of these analyses in core concepts. As it appears in Table 3, not for all countries does one single narrative characterize the entire collective memory. In some cases, other narratives co-exist with, or challenge, the main one. The summary table therefore also lists secondary narratives. The degree to which the main narrative is dominant in a country's collective memory is captured by the values in the last column.<sup>24</sup>

Sources are unanimous in identifying the narrative of (West) Germany, Britain and Austria. Germany is the model of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, a country that reckoned with its own role during fascism and World War II by carrying out a thorough critique (Art 2006, Herf 2002). A culture of contrition, responsibility and the burden of guilt has dominated the political culture of the Federal Republic leading it to accept its role as culprit and make amends. Although a process of normalization took place after reunification this narrative has remained predominant (Berger 2002).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Values add up to 100. A value of 80 means that a minority narrative is present and accepted in the public debate. A value of 100 means that only one narrative has legitimate status. "Negationists" exist also in homogenous collective memories but cannot be considered an accepted narrative. We speak of secondary narrative and deliberately not of a counter-narrative as the latter implies that they are not part of a same memory.

<sup>25</sup> The table in Online Appendix 1 indicates that this is not the case for Eastern Germany to which an "East European" model of re-elaboration can be applied wherein communism sees itself as opposed (either as a victim or as a hero) to fascism.



Table 3 Country classification

Country	Type of re-elaboration	Keyword(s) in sources and timing	Secondary narrative	Fit with type
1. Austria	Victimization	Victimization, amnesia. Waldheim affair (mid-1980s), Vranitzky speech in 1991	Uncertain or non-existent.	100/0
2. France	Victimization	Aberration, victimization. De Gaulle's death, Paxton (1972), Barbie trial (1983)	Heroization (Gaullist and communist <i>résistance</i> ) and cancellation of responsibility of "collaboration" and Vichy regime.	70/30
3. Germany	Culpabilization	Guilt, contrition. Adornos' <i>Aufarbeitung</i> (1960s), <i>Historikerstreik</i> (1980s), Bitburg (1985).	Practically absent except for attempt to "normalize" and alleviate burden of guilt.	100/0
4. Italy	Victimization	Victim of internal/external dictatorship. <i>Sdoganamento</i> (clearance) of fascist party (1994).	Heroization (communist <i>resistenza</i> ) and cancellation of responsibility for support to fascist regime.	80/20
5. Netherlands	Cancellation	Denial, oblivion. Publication of De Jong (1978), Blom's inaugural lecture (1983).	Victimization: impossibility to act differently due to occupation. Myth of the good Dutch.	80/20
6. Sweden	Cancellation	Playing down, memory purge, realism. Publication of Boëtius (1991) and the decade of debate.	Uncertain or tending towards victimization (small-country realism).	100/0
7. Switzerland	Cancellation	Public ignorance as policy, realism. Nazi gold and Bergier commission (1990s).	Heroization (neutrality) as small country between fascist Italy, Nazi Austria-Germany and Vichy France.	80/20
8. United Kingdom	Heroization	Victor nation, defeated fascists. Churchill's <i>Finest Hour</i> speech and memoirs.	Uncertain or non-existent.	100/0

Notes: The table summarizes the evidence and the sources in Online Appendix 1. "Fit with types" is a subjective value given by us on a scale from 0 to 100 about the degree of ambiguity of a country belonging to a given type of re-elaboration. The value is not based on the degree of agreement between sources. Secondary narrative considered only if not stigmatized (for example, revisionism).

Similarly unanimous is the position of the literature that such a process has not taken place in Austria (often the counter-example to Germany). Austria portrays itself as the “first victim” of Nazism through the shift of responsibility, which is denied (externalization). This involves self-delusion, amnesia and alteration. It is a case of victimization narrative (Art 2006, Bischof and Pelinka 1997, Pick 2000). British collective memory, on the contrary, is one of heroization stressing the merit of fighting fascism. The portrayal of its role is one of victory, as an indomitable bastion against evil supported by superior values. Not only standing against, but also liberating Europe from, fascism is presented as a heroic moment in official and public celebrations (Berger 2010, Deighton 2002). In all three cases, no other memories have gained any credible acceptance.<sup>26</sup>

The table also indicates a value of 100 for Sweden. However, this case is more problematic than the previous three because cancellation is, in fact, absence of a narrative and refusal to talk about the past. Yet the literature is unanimous in claiming that this is precisely what happened in Sweden (Johansson 1997, Östling 2011). Small-state realism justifies the avoidance of public debate without resulting in victimization. Similarly, the country did not take responsibility for any aspect of its role in World War II. The literature instead points to purging memories and a hypocritical stance in sweeping uncomfortable truths “under the carpet”. Other, very minoritarian narratives exist but they are not strong enough to warrant a lower value than 100.

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<sup>26</sup> For Germany and Britain the effect is reinforced by narratives stressing that the same roles apply to World War I.

These four countries present homogenous types of re-elaboration. The remaining four countries fit two of these types but not as neatly. Italy and France are cases of victimization similar to, but not as clearly as, Austria. The Netherlands and Switzerland are cases of cancellation similar to, but not as clearly as, Sweden.

France and Italy share with Austria a narrative of victimization, which presupposes elements of cancellation. One finds elements of self-delusion and removal. Moreover, both deny responsibility and shift blame externally to German occupation (Focardi 2013, Gildea 2002). The victim status is reinforced by narratives about the exceptionalism of the fascist past (in terms of aberration, interlude or parenthesis) linked to a positive image of Italian and French people, as inherently good and well-meaning, and linked to an embellished image of the fascist regime in Italy and Vichy (Del Boca 2005, Rousso 1990). However, the victimization narrative is paralleled by a second one stressing the role in fighting fascism, more so in France than in Italy. This is why we do not give a value of 100. A consistent chunk of these collective memories relies on a heroized role during the resistance on which the post-war republican legitimacy is based.<sup>27</sup> Stressing heroization avoids assuming responsibility, as this role redeems from the country's responsibility and acts as a facilitating factor.

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<sup>27</sup> The heroization narrative is stronger in France than in Italy because the resistance in Italy was mainly a narrative from the communists while in France it is a narrative of national cohesion carried forward by both left and right (Gaullism). The fact that in Italy this narrative was carried mainly by a communist left made it non-acceptable to large parts of the political spectrum.

The Netherlands and Switzerland share with Sweden a narrative of cancellation, again with the caveat that one rather deals with the absence of a narrative. Indeed, sources reveal the lack of relevance and the reluctance in confronting the past, deliberate policies of underplaying the relationship to fascist regimes and of selective representations (Bovenkerk 2000, Brants 2000, Ludi 2004 and 2006). Public opinion is described as ignorant about the country's past and the public record avoids explicit mentions. In both cases, small-state realism is used to justify the absence of critical examination. In Switzerland, in addition, the lack of occupation in spite of being surrounded by fascist powers has activated a significant narrative of heroization with a small country standing up to defend its neutrality, but not to the same extent as France's active resistance role both on the left or right. In the Netherlands, the occupation allows for a significant narrative of victimization (for example, in the image of "reluctant collaborators") reinforced by the myth of the good Dutch (similar to Italy) and by the victim status granted by great powers at the end of the war. For these reasons, we give 80 to the Netherlands and Switzerland on the cancellation narrative reserving space for minor narratives of victimization and heroization respectively.<sup>28</sup>

### *Testing the Plausibility of the Hypotheses*

The second step of the analysis is to test if the levels of right-wing populist performance vary across country according to the types of re-elaboration as

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<sup>28</sup> Sources also show that the silencing phase is very long for countries with cancellation narratives. The critical confrontation takes place late (1980s–90s) compared to other types.

hypothesized. Results are visualized in Figure 3. Five of eight countries display levels of populist performance in line with our expectations. These are depicted in bold characters along the diagonal. For these cases, expected and empirical values of populist performance correspond. For three cases, however, the empirical levels of populism are either one rank “too high” or “too low” compared to the expected one. For France (a predominant narrative of victimization) we expected a higher populist ranking (4 instead of 3). Similarly, for Sweden (cancellation) we expected a ranking of 3 instead of 2. In Switzerland (mostly a case of cancellation) the ranking is higher than expected (4 instead of 3). It is therefore mainly the cancellation type that is indeterminate, whereas the other types yield mostly results as expected.


According to hypotheses 1 and 2, culpabilization and heroization narrow the space for right-wing populism. In the bottom-left quadrant, we find the two cases in our sample that display these types of re-elaboration and which, accordingly, rank lowest (Germany) or second-lowest (Britain). We do not find any countries in the upper-left quadrant as these two types of re-elaboration block the success of right-wing populism.<sup>29</sup>

According to hypotheses 3 and 4, cancellation and victimization do not act as a brake to right-wing populism or open up the space for its success. In the upper-right quadrant we find five cases that display these types of re-elaboration and which, accordingly, rank highest (Austria, Italy and Switzerland) or second-highest (France

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<sup>29</sup> We prefer not to generalize the argument to other countries with a fascist past (Japan, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, as well as some Latin American countries), nor to the US and the Commonwealth, without in-depth analysis.

Figure 3 The association between collective memory and right-wing populism



and the Netherlands) as these two types of re-elaboration do not block the success of right-wing populism. We find only one country in the bottom-right quadrant. This does not mean that the “error” in the position of Sweden is larger than that of France or Switzerland because it finds itself in the “wrong” quadrant.

It appears from Figure 3 that cancellation leads to three different ranks of populism. This goes against hypothesis 3, which states that, on the one hand, cancellation does not act as a brake to right-wing populism (a passive effect), but, on the other, nor does it trigger it either (an active effect). We expected this to result in a high level of right-wing populism due to the absence of stigmatization, but not in the highest level either as for victimization. Contrary to the hypothesis, Switzerland has “too much” populism compared to what we expected, also considering that its secondary narrative is one of heroization, which should pull down the ranking according to our second hypothesis. Sweden, on the other hand, has “too little” populism compared to what we expected. For the Netherlands, we find the expected level of populism.

However, it is difficult, given the random effect of cancellation, to trace this back to this specific type of re-elaboration, also given the presence of a secondary narrative of victimization. Because of these “errors” we cannot confirm hypothesis 3. The variation between the three countries in this column cannot be traced back to a uniform type of re-elaboration and might be explained by factors other than the type of re-elaboration of fascism and World War II.<sup>30</sup>

According to our last hypothesis, a narrative of victimization has an active effect on populist performance by shifting the blame away from embellished national right-wing regimes and placing it on others. Fascism is not only not stigmatized but also put in a positive light. The hypothesis is thus that victimization does more than passively “not blocking”. It has a triggering effect. Austria and Italy have the highest rank of right-wing populism and are in line with this hypothesis. France is included in the same quadrant but is a rank below what we expected. This goes against our hypothesis. However, this is true only if one disregards the presence of a secondary narrative of heroization (which pulls down the right-wing populism rank according to hypothesis 2), and the fact that the fascist experience in France was less pronounced than in Italy and Austria, and almost completely deprived of a positive image. A narrative of heroization is present also in Italy. However, it is mainly a communist narrative that divides the collective memory and therefore does not weaken the victimization narrative. The heroization narrative is distinct from the victimization one. In France,

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<sup>30</sup> These can be pre-existing and long-lasting cultural factors affecting levels of stigmatization that are not modified by this type of re-elaboration. Factors other than cultural ones refer to institutional-political conditions (direct democracy in Switzerland), or socio-economic conditions (social-democratic welfare in Sweden). Additional countries in this category of collective memory may be Belgium, Denmark and Norway.

there is a nationally cohesive heroization narrative shared by left and right, which does not divide collective memory but rather weakens the victimization one.<sup>31</sup>

### **Conclusion: Fading Memories?**

Our contribution is to have operationalized and tested the plausibility of the impact of a variable (the type of re-elaboration of the past) to which the literature has frequently but unsystematically pointed. We have tested its mediating effect on the electoral performance of right-wing populism in a long-term perspective. Our results support the cultural opportunity structure hypothesis. The association is strong in spite of some deviations which, however, are of degrees and not direction, and explained either through secondary narratives or the lack of clear effect of one type of re-elaboration only, namely cancellation. Overall, we think that we can add, in a complementary way to political-institutional and socio-economic factors, a significant portion of explanation of the long-term cross-country ranking of right-wing populism.

Does the argument outlined in this paper still hold in times witnessing a dramatic populist wave wiping across Europe? Collective memories are not fixed and processes of re-elaboration are dynamic and subject to constant re-elaboration, as it were. In particular, memories related to a distant trauma are vulnerable to fading away. In times of profound economic and identity crisis, can the “braking” role of

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<sup>31</sup> With the caveat of the communist regime experience adding an additional layer in today’s collective memory in Eastern Europe, similar cases of victimization may be Hungary and Poland.



collective memories still be maintained in accounting for various levels of right-wing populist performance across countries?

At the time when both political-institutional (cartelization) and socio-economic conditions (inequality, immigration) provide favourable conditions for right-wing populism, the brake effect provided by certain types of past's re-elaboration loses strength. In the post-ideological world after the Cold War and with generational change, the stigmatization of distant past experiences loses its bite and is perceived as empty ritual. The loosening of the blocking effect of certain collective memories contributes to sharpen the feeling of danger for a society less immune to populism and its anti-liberal elements. The success of Alternative for Germany in the 2017 general election best exemplifies the loosening of taboos even if it is mostly limited to former-communist Eastern Germany. Rather than collective memories, it is specific policies on the "demand side" to decrease inequality that are invoked to counter the populist waves (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).

Where does this leave the role of collective memories and types of re-elaboration?

It is impossible to say what will happen to collective memories in the long term. In the short term, it is plausible that they will weaken, with "materialist" concerns gathering renewed salience vis-à-vis cultural narratives. Inequality, security and financial crises may be responsible for the current shift away from the path given by the crystallization phase. Yet it is unlikely that differences between countries in the type of re-elaboration will be fundamentally altered. The type of re-elaboration operated by Germany or the United Kingdom may fade but it will maintain a stronger blocking effect compared to, say, the one operated in Austria or Italy. Differences between

countries persist in spite of an overall loosening of the stigmatization brake. Possibly, these differences between countries may even be strengthened. Political cultures with strong stigmatization may reinforce their warnings regarding the danger of populist sirens while others – in particular, complacent heroization cultures – may be caught off guard for not having been inoculated against these dangers (an alternative hypothesis we did not consider).

This calls for further and more focussed analysis of recent periods, as well as longitudinal comparisons over the long period possibly based on alternative empirical measures of narratives and memories such as more or less automated content analysis of a variety of primary sources. Theoretically, too, the new typology of re-elaboration that we propose in this paper can be further developed to include other past events such as imperialism, military or party dictatorships and civil wars, as well as a larger pool of countries outside the European or even the Western context. Methodologically, this would lead to the creation of a “memory dataset”. Finally, analytically, further research should attempt the combination of the impact of memories with other factors to obtain a more encompassing model to explain right-wing populism. At any rate, it seems to us that cultural factors are useful to explain cross-country differences.

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## Online Appendices

The country tables in *Online Appendix 1* list the secondary literature used as a source to determine the type of re-elaboration for each country. Each country table indicates the publication, the page numbers and the summary of the passages in the texts (keywords) on which the type of re-elaboration for each country is based. For the general criteria on the selection of sources, see the methods section in the paper.

To indicate the level of relevance of the selected texts in a transparent way, the country tables in Online Appendix 1 give the number of citations for each source. In a first step, we compared the number of citations from Google Scholar and the Web of Science. As the former indexes more journals and has a more complete list of citations, we focussed on this tool only. Google Scholar citation figures are indicative. For all the texts, the number of citations has been retrieved between 7 November and 7 December 2016. When the citation was a chapter from a book, we included how many times the chapter was cited and, additionally, how many times the book itself was cited. Some of the older books have newer editions that are widely cited. We provide both statistics.

Tables also indicate other texts (“Other sources consulted”) that have not been “coded” in depth but have been consulted to make sure they do not contradict the type of collective memory identified by the texts we analyzed in depth. Finally, tables include the primary sources when relevant under “Turning points”, namely books that have spurred the debate about the collective memory: Paxton (1972) for France,

Goldhagen (1996) for Germany, De Jong (1978) for the Netherlands, Boëtius (1991) for Sweden and Häsler (1967) for Switzerland.

The table in **Online Appendix 2** gives the names, affiliations and areas of expertise of two country experts for each country who were consulted to check and integrate the sources of Online Appendix 1 in case we missed important works and/or works reaching different conclusions about the type of re-elaboration. They were shown the tables of Online Appendix 1 and they agreed with the classification of the country of their specific expertise.

The **Online Appendix 3** gives the details of the ranking of right-wing populism for single countries in the last column in Table 2. Values between 1 and 4 indicate the *ranking* between countries in the levels of populism according to the criteria specified in the methods section of the paper of the eight countries. This ranking is assumed to remain stable over time even if overall levels of right-wing populism may vary.

## Online Appendix 1 Coding Evidence by Country

### 1.1 Austria

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: victimization</b>		
Art (2006)	42–43	First victim.
Art (2006)	103, 137	Revisionist, lost occasion.
Art (2007)	338	Amnesia, culture of victimization, denial of responsibility.
Art (2011)	363	No and, eventually, very delayed apology.
Art (2011)	366	Polarization on role as victim.
Berger (2010)	121–22	First victim, distance from responsibility.
Berger (2012)	83	Convenient myth of first victim, historical amnesia.
Berger (2012)	86–93	Strategy of nation-building through victimization.
Bischof and Pelinka (1997)	3	Victim.
Judt (1992)	96	Relief of any responsibility.
Ludi (2004)	118	Victim theory, refutation of evidence.
Mitten (1992)	Entire text	Absence of confrontation with past.
Pick (2000)	198	Victim, self-delusion, failure to recognize responsibility.
Uhl (2006)	40–41	Victimization in Declaration of Independence.
Uhl (2006)	40–41	Occupation by force in 1938, “innocentation”.
<b>Secondary narrative: uncertain or not existent</b>		
Berger (2010)	126	Partial revision of victim theory, perpetrator nation.
Ellinas (2010)	48–50	Bloc of debate, denial of Nazi past for 40 years.
Riedlsperger (1998)	28	Partly different view from population compared to elites.
Uhl (2006)	61–63	Co-responsibility thesis after Waldheim affair.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Art (2006)	9	Waldheim’s affair of 1986.
Berger (2012)	112	Vranitzky’s speech in 1991 and Israel visit in 1993.
Berger (2012)	113–14	Arrest of David Irving as negationist in 2005.
Ellinas (2010)	48	Reder affair (return in Austria in 1986).
Uhl (2006)	43–44	<i>Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch</i> in 1946.
Uhl (2006)	44	Movie “1 April 2000” of 1952.
Pick (2000)	199	Vranitzky’s speech of 1991.
Pick (2000)	Entire text	Moscow Declaration of 1943.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Berger and Conrad (2015), Bukey (2000), Pauley (1981), Uhl (2012), Wodak (1990).		
<b>References:</b>		
Art, D. (2006). <i>The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Cited 169 times]		
Art, D. (2007). Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Austria and Germany. <i>Party Politics</i> 13: 331–49. [Cited 99 times]		
Art, D. (2011). Memory Politics in Western Europe. In Backes, U. and P. Moreau (eds.), <i>The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives</i> . (pp. 359–81). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. [No information; book cited 18 times]		
Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945–2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Stråth (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i> . New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]		
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- Berger, S. and C. Conrad, C. (2015). *The Past as History*. Palgrave: Macmillan.  
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[Cited 45 times]
- Bukey, E.B. (2000). *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
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[Cited 101 times]
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[Cited 74 times]
- Pick, H. (2000). *Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider*. London: I.B. Tauris.  
[Cited 44 times]
- Riedlsperger, M. (1998). The Freedom Party of Austria: From Protest to Radical Right Populism. In Betz, H. G. and S. Immerfall (eds.), *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. New York: St. Martin's Press (pp. 27–43).  
[Cited 85 times]
- Uhl, H. (2006). From Victim Myth to Co-Responsibility Thesis. In Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W. and C. Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (pp. 40–72).  
[Cited 22 times; book cited 150 times]
- Uhl, H. (2012). *Transformationen des österreichischen Gedächtnisses*. Innsbruck: Studien Verlag.  
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- Wodak, R. (1990). The Waldheim Affair and Antisemitic Prejudice in Austrian Public Discourse. *Patterns of Prejudice* 24: 18–33.  
[Cited 29 times]

## 1.2 France

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: victimization</b>		
Berger (2010)	123	Historical aberration.
Gildea (2002)	60–68	Responsibility of foreign occupation, Nazi tyranny.
Gildea (2002)	75	French and Germans as victims of Nazi rule.
Jackson (2014)	141	Collaboration as occupation parenthesis.
Judt (1992)	96	Aberration, interlude, activity of minority.
Michel (2011)	182	Block out responsibility.
Rousso (1990)	41	Myth of “liberation” from occupation.
<b>Secondary narrative: heroization/cancellation</b>		
Art (2011)	372	Exculpatory, myth of resistance against occupation.
Art (2011)	376	Contrition after affirmation of Front National.
Bell (2013)	156	Forgetfulness.
Berger (2010)	123	Communist and Gaullist resistance.
Berger (2010)	131	Positively accentuated national history.
Gildea (2002)	75	Cancellation of Algerian war.
Golsan (2006)	78–79	Gaullist myth of resistance.
Jackson (2014)	141	Gaullist and communist myth of fight against traitors.
Michel (2011)	170	Myth of Vichy regime’s isolation, everyone was resisting.
Rousso (1990)	101	Resistance mythology against occupation.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Art (2011)	363	Chirac’s apology in 1995.
Art (2011)	375	Papon’s trial in 1997.
Art (2011)	375	Touvier’s trial in 1994.
Berger (2010)	127	1970s: confrontation with past role of French people.
Frank (2013)	183	Paxton’s book in 1972 on French responsibility.
Golsan (2006)	99	Le Pen in second round of presidential election in 2002.
Jackson (2014)	141–50	Movie “Le chagrin et la pitié” in 1981
Michel (2011)	173	May 1968, challenge image of victims and resisters.
Michel (2011)	174	Paxton’s book in 1972 on French responsibility.
Rousso (1990)	42	Beginning of Cold War, Paxton’s book in 1972.
Rousso (1990)	120	De Gaulle’s death (1970) weakens victimization image.
Rousso (1990)	148	Movie “Le chagrin et la pitié” in 1981.
Rousso (1990)	246	Trial of Klaus Barbie.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Finney (2011), Golsan (1998, 2000), Paxton (1972), Rousso (1992), Rousso and Conan (1998), Wieviorka (1999).		
<b>References:</b>		
Art, D. (2011). Memory Politics in Western Europe. In Backes, U. and P. Moreau (eds.), <i>The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives</i> . (pp. 359–81). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. [No information; book cited 18 times]		
Bell, P.M. (2013). Introduction. In Tombs, R. and E. Chabal (eds.), <i>Britain and France in Two World Wars. Truth, Myth and Memory</i> . London: Bloomsbury (pp. 155–60). [Cited once]		
Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945-2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Stråth (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i> . New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]		
Finney, P. (2011). <i>Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory</i> . London: Routledge. [Cited 25 times]		
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- Michel, A. (2011). Collaboration and Collaborators in Vichy France: An Unfinished Debate. In Stauber, R. (ed.), *Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust*. London: Routledge (pp. 169–85).  
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[Cited 4 times; 2014 edition cited 597 times]
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[Cited 12 times; book cited 133 times]
- Rousso, H and E. Conan (1998). *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England.  
[Cited 69 times]
- Wieviorka, O. (1999). *Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
[No information; 2012 edition cited 13 times]

### 1.3 Germany

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: culpabilization</b>		
Art (2006)	19–20	Dealing with the past; critical confrontation with past.
Art (2006)	19–20	Confrontation as precondition for Federal Republic.
Art (2006)	19–20	Narrative of the <i>nie wieder</i> (never again).
Art (2006)	63–65	Contrition frame on the left against Kohl's normalization.
Art (2006)	99	Culture of contrition.
Art (2006)	338	Shared culture across the entire elite (Lipstadt, 1987).
Art (2011)	363	Unique position, contrition as form of state craft.
Art (2011)	396–70	Contrition only publicly acceptable position.
Berger (2002)	94–95	German guilt which ritualization has not diminished.
Berger (2002)	97	Incompatibility between nationalism and democracy.
Berger (2012)	63–64	Penitence, penitent narrative.
Berger (2012)	63–64	Need to apologize, face up to the past.
Diner (2000)	219	<i>Schuldfrage</i> (Karl Jaspers)
Herf (2002)	184	Exceptional <i>Vergangenheitsbewältigung</i> in Germany.
Herf (2002)	185	Nuremberg trials and de-Nazification.
Herf (2002)	190–92	Role of President Heuss in political culture.
Judt (1992)	87	Acceptance of decision about their responsibility.
Kansteiner (2006)	102	Early (late 1950s) <i>Vergangenheitsbewältigung</i> .
Moeller (2006)	111	<i>Aufrechnung</i> .
Olick (1998)	548–54	"Moral nation", responsibility in 1960–75.
<b>Secondary narrative: atypical victimization</b>		
Art (2006)	50	Adenauer: Nazis crazy minority vs. ordinary Germans.
Art (2006)	50	Attempt by Kohl to free Germans from burden of past.
Berger (2010)	91	"Adenauer years".
Berger (2010)	121	Plot against Hitler: distinguish good Germans evil Nazis.
Herf (2002)	188	Role of Adenauer in de-emphasizing memory.
Moeller (2005)	150	Victimization.
Olick (1998)	548–54	"Normal nation", relativization, ritualization, from 1980s.
<b>Eastern Germany: heroization/cancellation/victimization</b>		
Art (2006)	43	Heroic anti-fascists, liberators, externalization of past.
Art (2006)	98	Victimization: similar path to Austria.
Herf (1997)	160–61	Rejection and denial of responsibility; amnesia, timidity.
Herf (2002)	192, 204	Suppression of memory, turning point after Reunification.
Margalit (2010)	42	Victimization and apologetic narrative.
Moeller (2005)	159	Victimization, lost <i>Heimat</i> in Germany's East.
Moeller (2006)	Entire text	Debate on J. Friedrich's victimization thesis.
Olick (1998)	559	Opposition to fascism, no responsibility.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Art (2006)	19–20	1960s but no specific event mentioned.
Art (2006)	50	Culture of contrition from 1959.
Art (2006)	56–57	1959–85 critique from left (Willy Brandt) and greens.
Art (2006)	79	1990s: second wave of <i>Vergangenheitsbewältigung</i> .
Art (2006)	82	New boundaries of legitimate discourse in 1980s.
Berger (2002)	99	Normalization after Reunification.
Berger (2006)	131	2006 football World Cup in Germany.
Berger (2010)	131	<i>Historikerstreit</i> .
Berger (2012)	59	Anne Frank's diary in 1957.
Berger (2012)	59	Eichmann trial in 1961.
Diner (2000)	219	Deputy (1963 movie), Holocaust (1978–79 TV series).

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Diner (2000)	223	Goldhagen debate (1996) on “willing executioners”.
Herf (2002)	190–92	President Heuss in remembering Nazi crimes (1950s).
Judt (1992)	98	<i>Historikerstreit</i> (Baldwin against Nolte).
Kansteiner (2006)	124	1980s most active phase of <i>Vergangenheitsbewältigung</i> .
Lipstadt (1987)	22–26, 37	US President Reagan’s visit, Bitburg scandal.
Olick (1998)	548	Theodor Adorno’s 1959 analysis as <i>Aufarbeitung</i> .
Olick (1998)	558	1990s: second wave of <i>Vergangenheitsbewältigung</i> .

**Other sources consulted:** Art (2007), Assmann and Frevert (1999), Finney (2011), Frei (1996), Friedrich (2002), Gregor (2008), Herf (2016), Moeller (2003 and 2006), Niven (2010), Olick (2007, 2016), Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy (2011).

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- Friedrich, J. (2002). *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg, 1940–45*. Munich: Propyläen Verlag.  
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[Cited 7 times; book cited 171 times]
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- Moeller, R.G. (2005). Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post-Cold War History of World War II's Legacies. *History & Memory* 17: 147–94.  
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[Cited 97 times]
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[Cited 327 times]

## 1.4 Italy

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: victimization</b>		
Art (2011)	376	Italians think of themselves as victims.
Berger (2010)	122	Italians as victims of German occupation.
Berger (2010)	131	Distinction between fascist and Nazi anti-semitism.
Bosworth/Dogliani (1999)	Entire text	Sense of victimization towards fascist regime.
Consonni (2011)	215	Negation of any aspect of collaboration.
Consonni (2011)	222	Place full responsibility on the Germans.
Del Boca (2005)	Entire text	Myth of the good Italians ( <i>italiani brava gente</i> ).
De Luna (2011)	43	Victimizing storytelling as basis for legitimacy of republic.
De Luna (2011)	43	Schizophrenic narrative.
Focardi (2005)	13	Liberation from external oppressor as defining moment.
Focardi (2005)	15	Unchallenged hostility of Italian people towards Mussolini.
Focardi (2013)	43	Portrait of a "light" dictatorship unlike Germany.
Focardi (2013)	173	Removal.
Fogu (2006)	147	Role of "Città aperta" in image of <i>italiani brava gente</i> .
Fogu (2006)	150	Re-invention as anti-fascists, transfiguration of history.
Judt (1992)	96	Myths of dictatorship, German occupation and liberation.
Poggiolini (2002)	228	Divided memories, one-sided victims.
Poggiolini (2002)	240–42	Multiplicity of memories, victims vs. perpetrators.
<b>Secondary narrative: heroization/cancellation</b>		
Art (2011)	376	Most limited public discussion.
Berger (2010)	121	Resistance as "second Risorgimento".
Berger (2010)	122	Anti-fascism as ingredient of political culture.
Consonni (2011)	215	Repudiation of divergent recounting than resistance.
Consonni (2011)	220–21	Repressed memories of deportations, exterminations.
Del Boca (1996)	Entire text	Cancellation of crimes in Africa.
Focardi (2013)	Entire text	Amnesia and remembrance of resistance.
Fogu (2006)	156–57	"Officialization" of resistance in 1960s.
Judt (1992)	96	Active part of people in liberation from tyranny.
Poggiolini (2002)	224–25	No process of recasting collective memories.
Poggiolini (2002)	232	Amnesia, communist memories of resistance.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Berger (2010)	126–27	After 1960 more critical reading of national past.
De Luna (2011)	14, 40	Post-fascist party in cabinet in 1994.
Fogu (2006)	159	Normalization of fascism in 1980s.
Fogu (2006)	162	Critique towards anti-fascism and resistance.
Franzinelli (2002)	Entire text	Exposure of <i>armadio della vergogna</i> (1994).
Poggiolini (2002)	Entire text	Censorship of movie "Leone nel deserto" and BBC doc.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Bidussa (1994), Chiarini (2005), Collotti (2000), Del Boca (2009), Finney (2011), Focardi (2013), Germinario (1999), Mattioli (2010), Oliva (2006).		
<b>References:</b>		
Art, D. (2011). Memory Politics in Western Europe. In Backes, U. and P. Moreau (eds.), <i>The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives</i> . (pp. 359–81). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. [No information; book cited 18 times]		
Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945-2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Stráth (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i> . New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]		
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[Cited 13 times; book cited 171 times]

## 1.5 Netherlands

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: cancellation</b>		
Berger (2010)	127–28	Late critical voices of collaboration.
Bovenkerk (2000)	237–46	Inaccurate myth of the good Dutch.
Bovenkerk (2000)	241	Blame on members of the National Socialist Movement.
Bovenkerk (2000)	245	Impossibility to act, role of Queen.
Brants (2000)	229	Clemency towards responsible, reluctant collaborators.
Brants (2000)	231	Inaction of exile government against deportations.
Brants (2000)	233	Complicity of Dutch population.
De Haan (2011)	78	Mild sentences for collaborators; reluctant collaborators.
De Jong (1978)	Entire text	“Good” ( <i>goed</i> ) people and “wrong” ( <i>fout</i> ) collaborators.
Judt (1992)	96	Collaboration stricken from the public record.
<b>Secondary narrative: victimization</b>		
Bovenkerk (2000)	241	Blame shifted on National Socialist Movement.
Judt (1992)	96	Victim status granted by powers.
Judt (1992)	96	Victimization as precondition for cancellation.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Berger (2010)	127–28	Late 1970s–80s but no specific event mentioned.
Bovenkerk (2000)	244	1978 publication of de Jong’s <i>Prisoners and Deportees</i> .
De Haan (2011)	81	Late 1960s–70s inaugural lecture of Hans Blom in 1983.
De Haan (2011)	84–85	Ernst Kossmann pointing to “adaptation” strategy.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Bessel and Schumann (2003), Gans and Ensel (2016), Hondius (2003), Lagrou (1997), van Vree (1995), van Vree and van der Laarse (2009).		
<b>References:</b>		
<p>Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945-2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Str�ath (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i>. New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]</p> <p>Bessel, R. and D. Schumann (2003). <i>Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s</i>. Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute. [Cited 51 times]</p> <p>Bovenkerk, F. (2000). The Other Side of the Anne Frank Story: The Dutch Role in the Persecution of the Jews in World War Two. <i>Crime, Law and Social Change</i> 34: 237–58. [Cited 6 times]</p> <p>Brants, C. (2000). Dealing with the Holocaust and Collaboration: The Dutch Experience of Criminal Justice and Accountability after World War II. <i>Crime, Law and Social Change</i> 34: 211–36. [Cited 7 times]</p> <p>De Haan, I. (2011). Failures and Mistakes: Images of Collaboration in Postwar Dutch Society. In Stauber, R. (ed.), <i>Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust</i>. London: Routledge (pp. 71–90). [Cited once; book cited 8 times]</p> <p>De Jong, L. (1978). <i>Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog</i>. Volume 8: <i>Gevangenen en gedeporteerden</i>. The Hague: Government Printing and Publishing Office. [1999 edition cited 422 times]</p> <p>Gans, E. and R. Ensel (2016). <i>The Holocaust, Israel and “the Jew”: Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society</i>. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. [No information]</p> <p>Hondius, D.G. (2003). <i>Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism</i>. New York Praeger. [Cited 8 times]</p> <p>Judt, T. (1992). The Past Is Another Country. <i>Daedalus</i> 121: 83–118. [Cited 327 times]</p>		
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## 1.6 Sweden

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: cancellation</b>		
Boëthius (1991)	9	Lack of sense of history, little known about World War II.
Colla (2002)	133	Playing down forced sterilization policy, taboo argument.
Gilmour (2010)	70	Neutrality as realpolitik.
Johansson (1997)	175	Small-state realism.
Johansson (1997)	176	Difficult questions swept under the carpet.
Judt (1992)	96	Purge of abiding memories of dealings with Germany.
Östling (2011)	128, 203	Dominance of small-state realistic narrative.
Östling (2011)	139	Post-war exercise in hypocrisy.
Östling (2011)	202	No post-war action against Nazis.
Östling (2011)	202	World War II no part in official national memory culture.
Rydgren (2008)	149	Fascist roots of Swedish Democrats.
<b>Secondary narrative: tending towards victimization</b>		
Colla (2002)	133	Sweden as small victim or bystander.
Östling (2011)	132	1. Counter-narrative of critical interpretation.
Östling (2011)	134	2. Communist counter-narrative: critical.
Östling (2011)	207	3. Ultra-nationalist counter-narrative: patriotism.
Östling (2008)	203	4. Humanitarian efforts: heroization.
Östling (2008)	204	All very weak counter-narratives.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Östling (2008)	137	Book by Boëthius (1991), German <i>Historikerstreit</i> .
Östling (2011)	139	1990s: decade of debates.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Ekman, Amark and Toler (2003), Östling (2016), Spektorowski and Mizrachi (2004), Trägårdh (2002).		
<b>References:</b>		
Boëthius, M.-P. (1991). <i>Heder och Samvete: Sverige och Andra Världskriget</i> . Sweden: Ordfront Förlag. [1999 edition cited 61 times]		
Colla, P. (2002). Race, Nation, and Folk: On the Repressed Memory of World War Two in Sweden and Its Hidden Categories. In Witoszek, N. and L. Trägårdh (eds.), <i>Culture and Crisis: The Case of Germany and Sweden</i> . New York: Berghahn Books (pp. 131–54). [Cited 4 times; book cited 10 times]		
Ekman, S., Amark, K. and J. Toler (eds.) (2003). <i>Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi German and the Holocaust: A Survey of Research</i> . Stockholm: Swedish Research Council (translated by David Kendall). [Cited 15 times]		
Gilmour, J. (2010). <i>Sweden, the Swastika, and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second World War</i> . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. [Cited 10 times]		
Johansson, A.W. (1997). Neutrality and Modernity: The Second World War and Sweden's National Identity. In: Ekman, S. and N. Edling (eds.), <i>War Experience, Self Image and National Identity: The Second World War as Myth and History</i> . Stockholm: Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (pp. 163–85). [Cited 19 times; book cited 4 times]		
Judt, T. (1992). The Past Is Another Country. <i>Daedalus</i> 121: 83–118. [Cited 327 times]		
Östling, J. (2008). Swedish Narratives of the Second World War: A European Perspective. <i>Contemporary European History</i> 17: 197–211. [Cited 3 times]		
Östling, J. (2016). <i>Sweden After Nazism: Politics and Culture in the Wake of the Second World War</i> . New York: Berghahn. [No information]		
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Östling, J. (2011). The Rise and Fall of Small-State Realism: Sweden and the Second World War. In Österberg, M., Stenius, H. and J. Östling (eds.), *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War*. Lund: Nordic Academic Press (pp. 127–48).

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Rydgren, J. (2008). Sweden: The Scandinavian Exception. In Albertazzi, D. and D. McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave (pp. 135–50).

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## 1.7 Switzerland

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: cancellation</b>		
Berger (2010)	124	Reluctance to confront memory.
Judt (1992)	96	Purge of abiding memories of dealings with Germany.
Ludi (2004)	119	Selective representation of the past, no confrontation.
Ludi (2004)	121–22	Public opinion ignorance as deliberate policy.
Ludi (2004)	133–34	Externalization of responsibilities.
Ludi (2004)	135	Rejection of responsibility, refusal to feel ashamed.
Ludi (2004)	141	No relevance, no visibility given to ICE reports.
Ludi (2006)	225–26	Until 1970s no resonance of “Helvetic malaise” thesis.
<b>Secondary narrative: tending towards heroization and victimization</b>		
Berger (2010)	124	Small country between big powers.
Berger (2010)	124–26	Neutrality as heroization, standing up to big powers.
Lebow (2006)	20	Neutrality as pillar of national identity.
Ludi (2004)	119–20	Armed neutrality as deterrent to invasion.
Ludi (2006)	212	Victimization similar to Austria.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Berger (2010)	129	Book by Häsler (1967) critical of refugee policy.
Ludi (2004)	122	Nazi gold scandal in 1990s.
Ludi (2004)	124–25	Doubts about ambiguous role of “national redout”.
Ludi (2004)	133–34	Apology by Villiger (President) to Jewish people.
Ludi (2004)	135	ICE reports shifted mainstream narration.
Ludi (2004)	141	Publication of ICE reports.
Ludi (2006)	231	Referendum on abolition of army in 1989.
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Art (2011), Burgmeister (2014), Lasserre (1989).		
<b>References:</b>		
<p>Art, D. (2011). Memory Politics in Western Europe. In Backes, U. and P. Moreau (eds.), <i>The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives</i>. (pp. 359–81). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht. [No information; book cited 18 times]</p> <p>Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945–2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Stråth (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i>. New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]</p> <p>Burgmeister, N. (2014). <i>Intergenerationelle Erinnerung in der Schweiz: Zweiter Weltkrieg, Holocaust und Nationalsozialismus im Gespräch</i>. Wiesbaden. [Cited twice]</p> <p>Judt, T. (1992). The Past Is Another Country. <i>Daedalus</i> 121: 83–118. [Cited 327 times]</p> <p>Lasserre, A. (1989). <i>La Suisse des Années Sombres: Courants d’Opinion Pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, 1939–1945</i>. Lausanne: Payot. [Cited 12 times]</p> <p>Lebow, R.N. (2006). The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe. In Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W. and C. Fogu (eds.), <i>The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe</i>. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (pp. 1–39). [Cited 69 times; book cited 150 times]</p> <p>Ludi, R. (2004). Waging War on Wartime Memory: Recent Swiss Debates on the Legacies of the Holocaust and the Nazi Era. <i>Jewish Social Studies</i> 10: 116–52. [Cited 14 times]</p> <p>Ludi, R. (2006). What Is So Special about Switzerland? Wartime Memory as a National Ideology. In Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W. and C. Fogu (eds.), <i>The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe</i>. Durham: Duke University Press (pp. 210–48). [Cited 6 times; book cited 150 times]</p>		

## 1.8 United Kingdom

Source	Pages	Keywords
<b>Master narrative: heroization</b>		
Bell (2013)	156	"Good war" liberating Europe from evil.
Berger (2010)	124–30	Britain's "finest hour", alone against almighty enemy.
Berger (2010)	130	Stable heroic and positive war memories.
Deighton (2002)	100	Heroism, war success, sense of superiority.
Deighton (2002)	102	Martial and imperial myth of two world wars.
Deighton (2002)	106	Suspicion of Europeans, Euroscepticism.
Reynolds (2013)	204	Heroic moment, fortress island alone against hostility.
Reynolds (2016)	11–14	Good, war, finest hour, epic, heroic, people's war, legendary.
Tombs (2013)	3	Heroism, totemic of an indomitable Albion.
<b>Secondary narrative: absent with few elements of cancellation</b>		
Bell (2013)	156	Bombing offensive, protection of Jews.
Reynolds (2013)	204	Obfuscation of contribution of Commonwealth.
<b>Turning points</b>		
Bell (2013)	156	Main narrative never undermined by passage of time.
Berger (2010)	124	Churchill's memoirs, <i>Their Finest Hour</i> speech (1940)
Berger (2010)	130	Constant unchanged narrative.
Lebow (2006)	39	Constant production of movies and books about war.
Tombs (2013)	3	Martin Alexander's "Britain alone".
<b>Other sources consulted:</b> Black (2015), Calder (1991), Finney (2011), Weight (2002).		
<b>References:</b>		
Bell, P.M. (2013). Introduction. In Tombs, R. and E. Chabal (eds.), <i>Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory</i> . London: Bloomsbury (pp. 155–60). [No information; book cited once]		
Berger, S. (2010). Remembering the Second World War in Western Europe, 1945–2005. In Pakier, M. and B. Str�ath (eds.), <i>A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance</i> . New York: Berghahn (pp. 119–36). [Cited 12 times; book cited 35 times]		
Black, J. (2015). <i>Rethinking World War Two: The Conflict and its Legacy</i> . London: Bloomsbury [No information]		
Calder, A. (1991). <i>The Myth of the Blitz</i> . London: Cape. [Cited 339 times]		
Deighton, A. (2002). The Past in the Present: British Imperial Memories and the European Question. In M�ller, J.W. (ed.), <i>Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 100–20). [Cited 17 times; book cited 171 times]		
Finney, P. (2011). <i>Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory</i> . London: Routledge. [Cited 25 times]		
Lebow, R.N. (2006). The Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe. In Lebow, R.N., Kansteiner, W. and C. Fogu (eds.), <i>The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe</i> . Durham, NC: Duke University Press (pp. 1–39). [Cited 69 times; book cited 150 times]		
Reynolds, D. (2013). France, Britain and the Narrative of Two World Wars. In Tombs, R. and E. Chabal (eds.), <i>Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory</i> . London: Bloomsbury (pp. 193–210). [No information; book cited once]		
Reynolds, D. (2016). Britain, the Two World Wars, and the Problem of Narrative. <i>The Historical Journal</i> 59: 1–35. [No information]		
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Tombs, R. (2013). Two Great Peoples. In Tombs, R. and E. Chabal (eds.), *Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory*. London: Bloomsbury (pp. 1–16).

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Weight, R. (2002). *Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1940-2000*. London: Macmillan.

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## Online Appendix 2 List of Experts Consulted

<i>Country</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Expertise (from personal homepages)</i>
Austria	David Art	Professor, Tufts University	Comparative Politics, Populism, Political Economy
	Stefan Berger	Professor, Ruhr-University, Bochum	Social History, Nationalism and National Identity
France	Richard J. Golsan	Professor, Texas A&M	History, Memory of World War II, Vichy
	Henry Rousso	Professor, Columbia University	World War II, History of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century
Germany	Jeffrey C. Herf	Professor, University of Maryland	20 <sup>th</sup> Century, Nazi Germany, Holocaust, World War II
	Robert G. Moeller	Professor, University of California (Irvine)	Modern Germany, Nazi History, World War II
	Jeffrey Olick	Professor, University of Virginia	Cultural Sociology and History, Collective Memory
Italy	Roberto Chiarini	Professor, University of Milan	Contemporary History, Fascism, World War II, Memory
	Filippo Focardi	Professor, University of Padua	Fascist Memory, Politics of Memory, World War II
Netherlands	Chrisie H. Brants	Professor, University of Utrecht	International Justice, Comparative Studies of Criminal Law
	Pieter Lagrou	Professor, Free University Brussels	Comparative Contemporary History, History of Nazism
	Ido De Haan	Professor, University of Utrecht	Political History, Nation-Building, Regime Change
Sweden	John Gilmour	Fellow, University of Edinburgh	World War II, Scandinavian Studies, Nordic memory
	Jens Rydgren	Professor, Stockholm University	Political Sociology, Ethnic Relations, Social Networks

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Switzerland	Richard Lebow	Professor, King's College, London	International Political Theory, IR, War and Strategy
	Regula Ludi	Professor, University of Bern	Modern History, Holocaust, World War II
United Kingdom	Anne Deighton	Professor, Oxford University	International Politics, Cold War, British Foreign Policy
	David Reynolds	Professor, University of Cambridge	International History, Modern European History
	Robert Tombs	Professor, University of Cambridge	Cultural and Political History of Britain and France

## Online Appendix 3 Measurement of the Dependent Variable

### *Austria, Italy and Switzerland*

Austria, Italy and Switzerland have a rank-value of 4 based on a number of populist right-wing parties receiving consistently high levels of electoral support since the early 1970s. In Italy and Switzerland, these parties also had substantial executive roles over decades indicating the degree to which they are considered legitimate by other parties. Go Italy, in spite of its low radicalism, has built long-lasting electoral and governmental alliances with the post-fascist National Alliance thus legitimizing it. The coalition also included the Northern League, which allowed them to win elections repeatedly.<sup>32</sup> The Swiss People's Party has been part of the "magic formula" coalition since World War II. We include it as right-wing populist party since the early 1990s when it transformed from a largely agrarian and petit-bourgeois party into a nationalist and xenophobic one stressing anti-elitism, nativism and the sovereignty of the people.<sup>33</sup> In Austria, the participation to the executive was more sporadic. In 2000 of the Austrian People's Party participation to the executive was controversial prompting the EU to issue a strong condemnation. The party is nonetheless very radical and electorally successful, and in 2016 their candidate nearly won the presidential election.

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<sup>32</sup> As we focus on right-wing populism we do not include the Five-Star Movement which received more than a quarter of the votes in the 2013 elections (and about a fifth in the 2014 European elections). According to Comparative Manifesto Project data, it is the most left-wing programme to be presented in Italy since 1945.

<sup>33</sup> Given direct democracy, the role of this party is even stronger as it appeals directly to the people through popular initiatives. This reinforces the unmediated relationship with the people who have repeatedly approved initiatives launched by them.

### *France and the Netherlands*

France and the Netherlands have a rank-value of 3 because of the more reduced support that right-wing populist parties receive and their more recent growth. From other parties the *cordon sanitaire* against them is strong and, consequently, they have never had executive roles. The only exception is a short-lived external support of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) to the minority cabinet coalition participation in 2010. In France, the National Front, despite its radical nature, is the only such party and it has rarely achieved more than 10 percent of votes in national elections. In elections to the European Parliament, it is only since 2014 (in regional elections only since 2015) that it has increased its support in parallel with de-radicalization. In the Netherlands right-wing populist parties have existed in the last 15 years through the political entrepreneurship of Wilders and Fortuyn.

### *Sweden and United Kingdom*

Sweden and the UK have a rank-value of 2. Right-wing populism in both countries is, compared to France and the Netherlands, much more recent (i.e. in the last two–three years). In the United Kingdom, it is only since the 2015 national election and in the 2014 European elections that the UK Independence Party has emerged. Historically, right-wing populist parties have been marginal. Furthermore, the UK Independence Party is less radical than, say, the British National Party, and is mainly anti-EU without strong authoritarian traits. In Sweden, not before the 2014 national election do the Swedish Democrats receive more than 12 percent of the votes. The

only short-lived previous case of right-wing populism is New Democracy in the 1990s. In neither country have these parties ever assumed executive functions.

### *Germany*

We rank Germany as the country with the least right-wing populism based on the fact that even recently no party has emerged with support similar to, say, that of the UK Independence Party or the Swedish Democrats. Since 2005, populism in Germany is usually associated with The Left. The Republicans have only once reached about 7 percent of the votes (in 1989, in European elections). Otherwise, all figures would be around 1 to 2 percent. Alternative for Germany is mostly an anti-Euro party with an economic and financial agenda with relative success in only one European and one national election (2017) so far in Eastern *Länder*. The barrage from other parties towards right-wing populists is total and they never had any executive role.