War and Politics: How and Why Wars Affect Individual Level Attitudes and Behaviors

Anna Getmansky* Chagai M. Weiss†

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Abstract

How do wars affect voters' attitudes and behaviors? Previous studies that focus mostly on the US and UK do not provide a conclusive answer. We advance our understanding of this question by examining individual-level attitudinal data and disaggregated voting data from Israel surrounding the Yom Kippur war (1973). This war–unanticipated by voters–broke out during an election year. Leveraging the interruption of the Israeli National Election Study (INES) by the Yom Kippur war as a quasi-experimental design, we compare pre- and post-war survey responses, and find that the war increased the salience of security problems compared to social and economic issues; it lowered public support for center-left incumbent leaders, and increased support for the hawkish right-wing opposition. We supplement our public opinion study with a difference-in-difference analysis, demonstrating that war-related localized combatant deaths decreased support for the incumbent center-left party and increased support for the more hawkish right-wing opposition. Overall, this evidence suggests that war fatalities decrease support for incumbents in the context of wars that are fought over the home territory. This decrease is likely driven at least in part by a raise in the saliency of security concerns following the war.

*Department of International Relations, LSE. Email: a.getmansky@lse.ac.uk
†Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin - Madison. Email: cmweiss3@wisc.edu

Introduction

How do war fatalities affect public attitudes and voting? Security events, such as wars and terror attacks, have been shown to have political effects by making voters more hawkish (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015) and by increasing political participation in elections (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018). The political effects of military casualties have also been studied extensively, especially in the US and UK contexts. This literature is inconclusive as to the effect of war fatalities on elections. A substantial body of works suggests that democratically elected leaders may suffer electoral consequences for costly wars (Mueller, 1971; Karol and Miguel, 2007; Gartner, 2008). Alongside these works, others claim that military losses under some conditions may increase the popular support for leaders due to sunk costs and "don't let them die in vain" logic (Koch, 2011; Schott, Scherer and Lambert, 2011). Yet others suggest that fatalities' effect on public support for war and for leaders is conditional on other factors such as the likelihood of success, support for the overall war goals, as well as recency and proximity of casualties (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening, 1997; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 2006). Furthermore, fatalities could lead voters to become more nationalistic (Kibris, 2011), and more likely to turnout to vote (Koch and Nicholson, 2016). Finally, others dispute the effect that contextual factors–such as fatalities–have on voters, and instead suggest that elite consensus and structural factors such as partisanship and ethnicity determine public support for war (Berinsky, 2007).

Taken together, these different strands of literature suggest that our understanding of the electoral consequences of war is far from being settled. Several reasons make it difficult to obtain a reliable answer. First, selection effects hinder our ability to observe the political effects of war fatalities since leaders tend to minimize costs. Thus, we are more likely to witness military fatalities when they are less likely to lead to adverse political effects. More importantly, most of this literature is based on the US and UK experience with wars of foreign intervention fought far away from their borders. Meanwhile, there is extensive ev-

idence that wars over 'homeland' territory differ from other conflicts in many dimensions, including the willingness of the sides to fight and sustain sacrifices (Toft, 2014; Johnson and Toft, 2014). One implication of this difference is that the negative effect of military fatalities on public support for war and leaders–while not very surprising in the context of foreign interventions–might not arise in other cases, and especially in wars fought in close proximity to home territory.

We address these two concerns by analyzing the effects of the Yom Kippur War–a surprise attack against Israel, initiated by Egypt and Syria. The Yom Kippur War was not anticipated by Israeli voters and decision-makers, and resulted in over 2,200 military fatalities over the course of three weeks. The surprising nature of this war alleviates the concern of strategic selection into fighting. More so, by examining the Israeli public opinion and voting behavior before and after the Yom Kippur War, we extend the existing literature to a substantively-different case in which the fighting is over the home territory, and not due to foreign intervention abroad. What makes this case particularly useful for exploring the effect of wars on voting is the fact that the war broke out during an election year. We are thus able to leverage the Israeli National Election Study (INES) polls–that were interrupted by the war–and compare individual attitudes towards leaders and parties across the survey's pre- and post-war samples. The findings of this quasi-experimental design suggest that the war raised the salience of security related issues as opposed to domestic political concerns, and lowered support for the incumbent party as well as the individual leaders associated with the war (the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense).

We supplement this study with a difference-in-difference analysis which recovers the effects of 1973 local military fatalities on local voting. Combining the analysis of attitudinal data with behavioral data allows us to examine whether individual attitudes are consistent with behavior, and also to explore the effect of local military fatalities on voting. We find that local casualties decreased support for the Labor incumbent party following the Yom Kippur war by at least 2 percent. This effect extends beyond the immediate post-war elec-

tion. On a whole our evidence suggest that wars fought over home territories decrease support for dovish incumbents, an effect which is driven at least in part by a rise in the saliency of security related concerns.

War Fatalities and Politics

Wars can be politically costly for democratically-elected incumbents.[1] Voters are more likely to punish leaders for losing a war if these leaders are associated with the war initiation (Croco, 2011). Democratic leaders are more likely to be involved in wars earlier in the electoral cycle, and decrease their war participation closer to election (Gaubatz, 1991). Democracies are less likely to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions abroad before elections–consistent with the effort to minimize political risks when electoral accountability is higher (Marinov, Nomikos and Robbins, 2015). Democracies fight weaker opponents against whom they have a higher chance of winning (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Indeed, democracies, especially those with military conscription, suffer from fewer war fatalities–consistent with the argument that fatalities are politically-sensitive (Vasquez, 2005).

War fatalities "are the most salient, visible, and systematic measure of war's cost" (Gartner, 2008, 96). Similarly to economic retrospective voting, voters use fatalities to form expectations about the direction and the magnitude of future losses, and draw inferences about incumbent quality.[2] Several studies–mostly based on the US experience–suggest that higher war casualties often lead to a decline in popular support for war and for political leaders who are associated with the war. For example, the US public support for the military involvement in Vietnam declined as a function of the logarithm of American military casualties (Mueller, 1971). Other studies emphasize recency and proximity of casualties

[1] For the opposite argument that war outcomes have a larger impact on non-democratic than on democratic leaders see Chiozza and Goemans (2004) and Debs and Goemans (2010).

[2] An emerging literature suggests that the public may also be sensitive to foreign civilian casualties, and reduce support for war when such casualties rise (Johns and Davies, 2019).

rather than the cumulative trend (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening, 1997). For example, casualties affected the US public opinion on Vietnam War only in the early stages of fighting, whereas in the later period individual-level demographic factors were the best predictors of war attitudes (Gartner and Segura, 1998). More recently, Iraq casualties from a state reduced Bush's state-level vote-shares in 2004 election relative to 2000 election (Karol and Miguel, 2007). Outside the US context, local Turkish police fatalities are associated with an increase in the vote-share of nationalistic parties (Kibris, 2011) that are perceived to be more competent in dealing with security matters. [3]

Others argue that casualties' impact is conditional on contextual factors. For example, the public might be more tolerant of casualties when there is a consensus at the elite level over the importance of war–as it was the case during the first Gulf War (Larson, 1996). Conversely, military fatalities in combination with elite disagreement, especially if the opposition objects to war, may lead to a decline in public support for the incumbent (Arena, 2008). Moreover, elite disagreement may lead the public to adopt partisan views regarding conflict participation (Berinsky, 2007). Individual perceptions of war–such as beliefs about the likelihood of success–could also condition how voters interpret casualties (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 2006; Gribble et al., 2015).

Finally, there is a smaller literature that suggests that war fatalities may increase the popular support for war and for leaders associated with it. This may happen when some voters view military casualties as investment, making them in favor of sustaining the current course of action and supporting the leader to redeem the casualties and not to let them "die in vain" (Boettcher and Cobb, 2009; Koch, 2011; Schott, Scherer and Lambert, 2011).

Taken together, these studies imply that voters might be sensitive to the costs of war, and especially to military fatalities. However, there are conflicting findings as to whether

[3] Aside from the effect on support for incumbent, military fatalities can have political consequences through increased turnout in elections by bringing to ballot box those who were not politically active before (Koch and Nicholson, 2016). The effect of military fatalities on turnout may not be as robust as the effect of civilian fatalities (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018).

the effect of fatalities on incumbents' political fate is positive or negative. In what follows we leverage the unexpected eruption of the Yom Kippur war, to shed new evidence on ongoing debates in the literature.

The Yom Kippur War and the 1973 Elections

The Yom Kippur war began with a surprise Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel on October 6, 1973. The higher military and political echelons concluded that an attack was imminent only 11 hours before the outbreak of the war (Kam, 1988, 23), and voters did not anticipate this war. Given the unexpected nature of the war, there were no preparations for combat up until a few hours before the initial Syrian and Egyptian attacks.

The timing of the Syrian and Egyptian attacks made Israeli military mobilization rather difficult, as it occurred on the Jewish Day of Atonement (*Yom Kippur*)–when most of the military and defense personnel were away from their bases and disconnected from radio and telephone. Given this limitation, in the initial stages of the war Israel sustained heavy losses, and in the first 36 hours of war, 724 Israeli soldiers were killed (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 225). The military situation was particularly grave in the Southern front, where 103 Israeli tanks were left to hold back 850 tanks crossing from Egypt.

The initial days of the war were characterized by shock, confusion, and chaos.[4] Nonetheless, despite the initial losses, Israel ultimately succeeded in pushing the opponents back, and reconquered the territories it lost in the fist stages of the war–to some extent thanks to the massive military assistance from the US (Eriksson, 2013, 40). The ceasefire agreement was concluded on October 24, 1973, and the fighting with Egypt ended on October 26, 1973. The hostilities in the Syrian front continued until early 1974. Militarily, Israel was in control of more territory than it controlled prior to the outbreak of the fighting.

[4]The Israeli Defense Minister at that time, Moshe Dayan proclaimed that this is 'the end of the Third Temple' (Siniver, 2013, 5)–referring to the historic destruction of the Jerusalem temple, first by the Babylonians and then by the Romans, and the exile of the Jewish people from their homeland.

Although ultimately Israel won the war, it incurred very heavy losses: over 2,200 soldiers were killed,[5] and 7,251 injured. The main reason for these losses was the disorganized and the chaotic manner in which Israel entered the war. The unanticipated attack, together with the initial losses in the war, traumatized many Israelis, and shook their confidence in the invincibility of the Israeli army (Eriksson, 2013, 29). In Israel, the failure to anticipate the attack is often referred to as 'the blunder' (*ha-mehdal*) (Bar-Joseph, 2005, 6).

the surprise nature of the war for Israeli voters, policy-makers and politicians, and the high cost in military casualties (as depicted in Figure 1), make this a particularly compelling case to test existing theories of war and domestic politics. First, the surprise attack which ignited the war, limits concerns regarding leaders' selection into war for electoral gains, and soldiers selection into combat, due to mass-mobilization of military reserves. Second, unlike cases of foreign intervention and overseas war examined in the existing literature, the proximity of battlegrounds to voters resembles the majority of conflicts and wars fought in modern history. In the remainder of this section, we detail the unfolding of the Yom Kippur war and the way it interrupted and shaped the 1973 election campaigns.

The 1973 Elections

Israel's eighth national elections were schedule to take place on October 30, 1973. The main competing parties were The Labor party,[6] the Likud party,[7] and the National Religious Party (NRP) (Arian, 1975). As elections approached in the pre-war era, parties mainly debated the fate of the territories Israel occupied during the 1967 war. The Likud opposed "repartition", while politicians in the Labor party engaged in contentious intra-party debates regarding the future of the occupied territories (Peretz, 1974).

[5]This is a significant number given Israel's population size at that time. As depicted in Figure 1 military casualties nearly reached 0.1% of the Israeli population. Yom Kippur war is the second most deadly interstate war for Israel–the first being the War of Independence (1948). For comparison, in the Six Day War (1967), Israel incurred 779 military fatalities.

[6]Comprised of Mapai, Rafi and Ahdut Ha-Avoda

[7]Comprised of Herut, the Liberal Party, the Free Center, the National List, and the Movement fro Greater Israel



Figure 1: Combatant Deaths Relative to Population in Israel

Apart from the ongoing debates regarding the fate of the occupied territories, internal social and economic issues gained central prominence in the 1973 electoral campaign. As part of these debates, the Labor party which has ruled all coalitions since Israel's inception, emphasized its central and successful role in developing the state. Concurrently, the Likud party advocated for a liberal social agenda, which stood in contrast to the Labor's traditional socialist platform (Arian, 1975).

On October 6th, Israel's ongoing election campaign was interrupted by the Yom-Kippur war. Once the war has begun, elections were postponed, eventually taking place on December 31, 1973 (Arian, 1975). The eruption of the Yom Kippur war dramatically changed the main topics discussed in electoral campaigns. Suddenly, public debates revolved around the great costs of the war, and the role of Labor Party leaders (e.g. Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan) in the oversight of the Yom Kippur war (Landau, 1974). More specifically, the Likud party led by Menachem Begin emphasized the failure of Labor leaders to anticipate the war, and the great costs of such oversight. By framing the elections as a critical juncture in Israeli politics, and by arguing that the Labor party will eventually sign unfavorable peace agreements with countries which just attacked Israel, the Likud sought to mobilize voters against the Labor party. Such campaign strategies, and the broader debate between

Labor and Likud in the post 1973 war period, demonstrate the centrality of the Yom Kippur war and its costs in the delayed elections. More so, as Peretz (1974) argues, the war reenforced hawkish and dovish frames, which seemed to hold limited salience earlier that same year.

Though the war was formally over when Israeli citizens approached the ballot-box, Peretz (1974) describes how the 1973 election occurred during the most troublesome period in Israeli politics since 1948. Many voters were under the impression that the negotiated ceasefires were unfavorable to Israel and were a product of American forced persuasion. The existential crises which materialized between the October war and December elections, seemed to deeply affect the Israeli electorate. Thus in the days before the elections, public opinion polls pointed at equal support for the Labor and Likud parties. Nonetheless, despite these dramatic changes manifested in pre-election polls, and despite the Labor's loss of seats to the Likud party, the general political system remained rather stable following the Yom Kippur war (Arian, 1975).

Empirical Analysis

To test if and how wars shape politics, we introduce two novel studies of public opinion and voting data surrounding the Yom Kippur war. First, we leverage an INES public opinion poll which was interrupted by the war, as a quasi-experimental design, and compare individual attitudes towards leaders, parties and politics more broadly across the survey's pre- and post-war samples. Second, we present a difference-in-difference analysis recovering the effects of localized military casualties of the Yom Kippur war, on locality-level voting patterns following the war. Together, these analyses demonstrate that wars affect attitudes, and attitudinal change manifests in costly voting behavior.

A Quasi Experimental Analysis of Israeli Public Opinion

The INES polls, traditionally implemented prior to national elections, are representative of the adult Jewish-Israeli urban population.[8] The surveys we analyze were conducted in several rounds before[9] and after the 1973 war.[10] Overall, there are 2,487 respondents in the pre-war sample, and 1,172 in the post-war sample.[11]

Table A1 in our supplementary materials presents summary statistics of all survey respondents. As the table shows, the pre- and post-war samples are overall well balanced with respect to gender, religiosity, income, education and political variables. For an elaborate discussion of covariate balance between the pre- and post-war samples see section A of our supplementary materials.

The unexpected outbreak of the Yom Kippur war which interrupted the roll-out of the INES survey allows us to compare respondents who completed the INES survey before and after the war. Through this comparison, which leverages the unique covariate balance across pre- and post-war survey samples, we can credibly attribute attitudinal shifts to the occurrence of the unexpected Yom Kippur war. To do so, we estimate a series of probit models, controlling for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, place of birth, and voting in previous elections. These models, recover the effects of war exposure (i.e. being part of the post-war sample) on support for incumbent leaders and parties as well as general political preferences and intention to vote.

As detailed in Table 1 the Yom Kippur war had a statistically significant effect on the appraisal of leading politicians and parties.[12] More specifically, the first two columns of

[8] At the time of the survey, about 15% of the Israeli citizens were non-Jewish, most of them Israeli Palestinians (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 43). The overwhelming majority of Israelis at the time of the survey (approximately 85%) resided in urban areas (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 32).

[9] In May and September.

[10] In November, December, and January – the latter being also a post-election survey which we exclude from the analysis because election results may also affect answers.

[11] Excluding the January post-election survey. Unfortunately, not all question repeated in all the waves, and thus for some questions we focus only on one pre- and one post-war survey.

[12] For a detailed discussion of our measurements, see section A.1 of our supplementary materials.

Table 1, which measure the effects of the Yom Kippur War on the favorability of prime-minister Golda Meir, and minister of defense Moshe Dayan, demonstrate a statistically significant decrease in the two culpable leaders' favorability. The third column suggests that the war may have increased support for opposition leader Menachem Begin, however the effects of the war do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in this case. Lastly, as indicated by the last two columns of Table 1, the Israeli public does not only hold leaders, but also parties accountable for the Yom Kippur war. Indeed, post-war survey respondents report lower likelihoods of voting for the incumbent labor party, and higher likelihoods of voting for the competing Likud party.

Table 1: The Effects of 1973 War on Public Support for Incumbents

Probit Models: Support for Incumbents					
	Support Prime Minister	Support Minister of Defense	Support Opposition Leader	Support Labor	Support Likud
Post-War	-0.721***	-0.429***	0.152	-0.649***	0.566***
	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.153)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Constant	0.768	-0.306	-1.837**	-5.717	-4.446
	(0.810)	(0.399)	(0.754)	(236.808)	(111.832)
Observations	723	707	719	2112	2114
Pseudo R^2	0.20	0.07	0.21	0.57	0.52

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, place of birth, and voting in previous elections.

Our analyses thus far demonstrate that wars have an impressionable impact on leader and party favorability. Indeed, following the Yom Kippur war, survey respondents are far less favorable of incumbent leaders and parties, and their support for the opposition rises. These results suggest that wars can have a negative effect on support for incumbents. Nonetheless, one may wonder what drives such effects. Put differently, decreased support for incumbents may be a result of changes in political preferences or a reappraisal of the incumbent's qualities. While these mechanisms are theoretically distinct, in the analyses above they are observationally equivalent.

To begin disentangling this observational equivalence we test whether changes in political preferences may account for decreased support for incumbents. To do so, we employ

additional survey items regarding respondents' appraisals of the general situation in Israel, as well as the most important political issues to be addressed by the government. An elaborate discussion of our outcome measures appears in section A.1 of the supplementary materials.

The first two columns of Table 2 demonstrate that respondents in the post-war period have a rather pessimistic appraisal of Israel's general situation. More so, following the Yom-Kippur war respondents are much more likely to mention foreign policy issues such as security and peace as the most important political problem to be addressed by the government. Concurrently, the probability of reporting domestics (i.e. economic and social) concerns as key political issues is reduced in the post-war period. These results, which are in line with qualitative analyses of the 1973 electoral campaigns (Peretz, 1974), suggest that wars increase (decrease) the salience of foreign policy (social) issues. Thus we interpret these findings as suggestive evidence in support of a preference change mechanism linking wars and decreased support for incumbents. In other words, the relative salience of peace and security related issues, as opposed to social and economic concerns amongst post-war respondents, may explain why the war increased respondents likelihood of supporting the Likud party, as opposed to the socialist labor party.

Table 2: The Effects of 1973 War on Situation Assessment and Political Preferences

Probit Regression: War Effects on Situation Assessment and the Main Problems						
	Worst	Better	Security	Peace	Economy	Social
Post-War	1.624***	-1.053***	0.279***	0.528***	-0.766***	-1.068***
	(0.079)	(0.148)	(0.060)	(0.169)	(0.191)	(0.144)
Constant	-1.363***	0.356	0.045	-2.271***	-2.423***	-1.231***
	(0.261)	(0.227)	(0.199)	(0.547)	(0.446)	(0.301)
Observations	1835	1462	2345	1958	2442	2457
Pseudo R^2	0.26	0.06	0.02	0.14	0.13	0.10

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, place of birth, and voting in previous elections.

Do Attitudes Translate into Voting: The Effects of Casualties on Voting

Our analyses above demonstrate that wars have an impressionable effect on public opinion. Nonetheless, one may wonder whether attitudinal effects translate into costly voting behavior. To test this question, we introduce an original dataset of military casualties from the Yom Kippur War. These data obtained from the Israeli military of defense include information on the locality of origin and grave-yard location of all soldiers killed in 1973. For more information on data collection procedures see section B of our supplementary materials. Employing the military casualty dataset, we implement a difference-in-difference analysis, which recovers the effects of locality-level casualties on locality-level support for Likud and Labor, as well as turnout.

Unlike our unique quasi-experimental design of pre- and post-war survey responses, which allows us to plausibly identify the attitudinal effects of the Yom Kippur war as a whole, a naive comparison of voting patterns before an after the Yom Kippur war will likely be confounded by a host of variables. This is since four years, and multiple political developments stand between the 1969 electoral cycles and the following electoral competitions of 1973 and 1977. Therefore, we leverage locality-level military casualty data to obtain variation in exposure to the costs of the Yom Kippur war, rather than the war in and of itself. This variation enables us to implement a difference-in-difference analyses, and recover the effects of military casualties on voting behavior. The equation below represents our main model:

$$Y_{ic} = \zeta_{Casualties_i} + \psi_{Post_{ic}} + \gamma_{(Post*Casualties)_{ic}} + \phi_{Controls_{ic}} + \eta_{cycle} + \epsilon_{ic} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{ic} denotes our outcome of interest - Support for the Labour incumbent party (As well as the competing Likud party and turnout) in locality i during cycle c. ζ is the coefficient of a binary variable indicating whether locality i bereaved soldiers during the

1973 war, and ψ is a temporal indicator which takes a value of 1 in the post-war period (i.e. the 1973 and 1977 election cycles). γ is our main coefficient of interest, which represents the effects of Casualties in locality i following the Yom Kippur war (An interaction of Casualties and Post variables). Lastly ϕ represents a vector of controls for terror victims and population (proxied by number of eligible voters) in locality i during cycle c, η represent cycle indicators and ϵ_{ic} is the model's error term.

Table 3 presents results of our main models recovering the effects of locality-level 1973 casualties on support for Labor. The first two columns, which consider all Israeli localities, demonstrate that Yom-Kippur casualties had a negative effect on support for the labor party in the election cycles following the war. Indeed, even after controlling for locality level terror victims and population size (second column of Table 3), it appears that localities suffering from casualties decreased support for the Labor party in the 1973 and 1977 elections by almost 2.5 percent.

Table 3: Yom Kippur War Casualties and Labor Vote

73' Casualties and Labor Vote				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
Casuaties in 73'	15.630***	16.346***	27.455***	27.609***
	(2.180)	(2.208)	(2.561)	(2.621)
Post 73' period	-22.781***	-22.798***	-11.388***	-11.457***
	(1.030)	(1.030)	(1.754)	(1.760)
73' Casualties in the post	-2.543**	-2.477**	-9.433***	-9.460***
73' period	(1.209)	(1.217)	(1.774)	(1.777)
Terror victims		-0.730		-0.334
		(0.694)		(0.299)
Eligible voters		-0.153**		0.003
		(0.067)		(0.012)
Constant	47.416***	47.503***	19.468***	19.505***
	(1.516)	(1.515)	(2.205)	(2.209)
N	2693	2693	468	468
Clusters	941	941	158	158

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Cycle indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Since our public opinion analyses focused on the urban Israeli population, the last two columns of Table 3 consider the effects of locality-level military casualties amongst urban voters. Even when confining to the small urban sample and controlling for potential time

varying confounders, our main effect remains negative, and consistent with our other findings. Thus it appears that Yom Kippur military casualties led to over a 9 percent decrease in support for Labor amongst urban localities.

The results above suggest that military casualties decreased electoral support for the Labor incumbent party. However, one may wonder whether such decreased support following the Yom-Kippur war benefitted the hawkish Likud party. Table 4 suggests that amongst the universe of Israeli localities, military casualties did not have a statistically significant affect on support for the competing Likud party. However, consistent with our analyses of the INES survey, it appears that urban localities which suffered from military casualties registered an increase in support for the Likud party following the 1973 war. As our analyses of public opinion data suggest, this shift was likely driven at least in part by the growing salience of foreign policy and security concerns, as well as by the decline of social and economic concerns following the 1973 war.

Table 4: Yom Kippur War Casualties and Likud Vote

73' Casualties and Likud Vote				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
Casuaties in 73'	2.393***	1.761**	17.572***	17.119***
	(0.841)	(0.838)	(1.146)	(1.199)
Post 73' period	8.336***	8.318***	6.052***	6.028***
	(0.515)	(0.516)	(1.133)	(1.137)
73' Casualties in the post	-0.586	-0.709	8.039***	7.947***
73' period	(0.642)	(0.645)	(1.185)	(1.191)
Terror victims		-0.174		0.004
		(0.544)		(0.171)
Eligible voters		0.170***		0.029***
		(0.065)		(0.010)
Constant	7.879***	7.826***	3.320***	3.281***
	(0.576)	(0.577)	(0.872)	(0.876)
N	2693	2693	468	468
Clusters	941	941	158	158

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

War and Turnout

We further investigate whether the Yom Kippur War increased self-reported vote intentions and turnout. In line with previous studies, we find that the Yom-Kippur war had a positive and statically significant effect on self-reported intentions to vote as well as locality level turnout. More specifically, the probit and oprobit models presented in Table 5 demonstrate that post-war INES survey respondents are more likely to report higher intentions to vote (First column) and they are also more likely to express the importance of voting.[13] In addition, Table 6 demonstrates that amongst the full sample of localities (i.e. first and second columns of Table 6), military casualties increased turnout rates. These results are consistent with previous cross-sectional and sub-national studies of the United Kingdoms and the United States (Koch and Nicholson, 2016), which suggest that increased turnout may be an additional mechanism linking wars with decreased support for incumbents.

Table 5: The Effects of 1973 War on Turnout Intention

Probit/Oprobit Regression: Turnout Intention		
	Intend to Vote (Probit)	Important to Vote (Oprobit)
Post-War	0.665***	0.299***
	(0.203)	(0.068)
Constant	1.648***	
	(0.474)	
Observations	2490	1623
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.03

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, place of birth, and voting in previous elections.

[13] A detailed discussion of our outcome measures appears in section A.1 of the supplementary materials.

Table 6: Yom Kippur War Casualties and Turnout

73′ Casualties and Turnout				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
Casuaties in 73′	0.317	0.459	-6.178***	-5.902***
	(0.698)	(0.702)	(1.283)	(1.317)
Post 73′ period	-0.102	-0.090	-5.115***	-5.146***
	(0.527)	(0.527)	(1.305)	(1.308)
73′ Casualties in the post	1.325**	1.367**	1.664	1.688
73′ period	(0.613)	(0.613)	(1.331)	(1.335)
Terror victims		-0.002		-0.213*
		(0.224)		(0.115)
Eligible voters		-0.037***		-0.009
		(0.013)		(0.006)
Constant	80.123***	80.136***	85.054***	85.092***
	(0.551)	(0.551)	(0.996)	(0.996)
N	2571	2571	465	465
Clusters	926	926	157	157

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses

Placebo Test: Public Opinion Analyses

To ensure that our main public opinion findings are not an artifact of arbitrary differences across survey waves, we implement a placebo test comparing the first two waves of the INES survey. Since the Yom Kippur war erupted following the implementation of the second wave, and since we expect survey waves to be similar, one would expect this comparison to result in null effects. Indeed, as depicted in table A3 adapting a different comparison point which is not the Yom Kippur results in null results.[14] These null results, dovetailed with our general covariate balance, provide further confidence that our main findings are driven by the Yom Kippur war, rather than arbitrary differences across survey waves.

[14]Or significant findings which introduce bias against our main findings, in the case of the security preference outcome

Alternative Specification: Voting Analyses

To test the robustness of our findings regarding the effects of military casualties on voting behavior, we consider a host of alternative specifications. First, we introduce locality fixed effects to our main model. As reported in Table A5 our main findings remain consistent, though the effect of casualties on turnout does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance when locality fixed effects are introduced.

Second, we consider an alternative measurement to our main treatment. Thus in Tables A8-A6 of our supplementary materials, only localities that experience high levels of military casualties–75^{th} percentile or higher–are defined as treated localities. Consistent with our main findings, the average treatment effect of casualties on support for the incumbent Labor party presented in Table A6 is negative and statistically significant for our full sample, as well as our limited sample of urban localities. Nonetheless, as noted in Table A7 under this alternative treatment specification we find no evidence for a positive effect of casualties on support for Likud in our urban sample. Nonetheless, amongst the general sample we do find evidence for decreased support for the Likud. Lastly, Table A8 suggests that under the alternative treatment measurement the positive effects of turnout remain positive and statistically significant.

Third, in Tables A9- A10 we disaggregate our outcome measure to consider the immediate and long-term effects of military casualties. Overall, our results remain consistent, however, when analyzing the effects of casualties on the 1973 and 1977 election separately for the full sample, we find that casualties may have increased support for the Labor incumbent party immediately after the Yom Kippur war. However, consistent with our main evidence, the longer term effect remains negative.

Conclusion

In this paper, we reconsider the effects of war on public opinion and voting behavior by analyzing Israeli voters' reaction to the Yom Kippur war. We extend the existing literature, which has mainly focused on military casualties from the US and UK contexts. In doing so, we address two main limitations which relate to selection effects and an overemphasis on foreign intervention wars rather than battles over homelands.

Leveraging the unanticipated eruption of the Yom Kippur War, which led to mass-mobilization of Israeli military reserves and a postponement of Israel's eighth election cycle, we show that wars, and the casualties they produce reduce support for incumbent leaders and parties. More specifically, our first quasi-experimental study of public opinion data demonstrates that following the Yom Kippur war, respondents report lower favorability of leaders associated with the war, as well as a lower intention to vote for the incumbent Labor party and higher intentions to vote for the competing hawkish Likud party. We suggest that these patterns are driven, at least in part, by the rising saliency of foreign policy concerns relating to peace and security, and the declining importance that voters place on domestic social and economic political concerns.

In our second study, we implement a difference-in-difference analysis to investigate whether attitudinal shifts following the Yom Kippur war translated into costly voting behavior. Introducing new data of Israeli military casualties, we find that localities suffering from casualties during the Yom Kippur war decreased support for the incumbent labor party. We also find evidence that in urban localities, military casualties increased support for the hawkish Likud party.

To conclude, our investigations of Israeli public opinion and voting behavior in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war suggest that electorally minded leaders and parties should avoid engaging in wars. Both incumbent leaders and parties suffered from decreased support following the Yom Kippur war. This decrease in public support has been associated

in the past with the slow decline of the incumbent labor party (Peretz, 1974), and as we show in our investigations the Yom Kippur war indeed contributed to the Labor party?s eventual loss of power in the dramatic elections of 1977.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
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A INES Study

Our study of Israeli public opinion following the Yom Kippur war relies on the unexpected interruption of the INES survey. This interruption resulted in balanced pre- and post-war survey samples which we analyze as a quasi-experimental design. On a whole, pre- and post-war samples are remarkably similar. Nonetheless, hereinafter we discuss several unbalanced covariates for which we control in all our models.

As depicted in Table A1, the pre-war sample appears to be slightly older than the post-war sample, and the post-war sample has a somewhat higher share of Israeli-born respondents, although the share of respondents of African or Asian descent is similar for both the pre- and post-war eras. Political variables denoting vote choice in previous election cycles are also overall balanced, except for a slightly higher share of Labor voters in the pre-war sample. Additionally, the share of those who did not vote in the previous election is significantly higher in the post-war sample.[15]

Considering the generalizability of our samples to the general Israeli population, we find that the samples we analyze are overall similar to the Jewish-Israeli public. However, females are slightly over-represented in the surveys.[16] In addition there is a slightly higher share of Israeli-born respondents in our sample,[17] which is also slightly more educated than the general population. The surveys are representative of the overall population also with respect to political variables. Thus the share of Alignment voters in the surveys is 50%, whereas the vote-share of this party in 1969 election is 46%–a small difference. Similarly, the 19% of respondents indicated that they voted for the Likud in 1969 election–very close to the 22% that this party obtained in the elections.

[15] Though this difference may be driven by individuals' urge to disassociate themselves from sitting politicians in the post-war sample.

[16] 56% in the surveys and 50% in the population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 43).

[17] 27% in the surveys compared to 22% in the general population of Jewish adults

Table A1: Summary statistics

	Pre-war sample			Post-war sample		
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**
Female	0.549	0.498	2433	0.575	0.495	1171
Age group	3.004	1.353	2417	2.631	1.398	1164
Religiosity	2.842	0.965	2410	2.94	0.985	1145
Household income	4.264	2.118	2239	4.279	2.089	1091
Education	2	0.896	2423	2.073	0.924	1161
Born in Israel	0.23	0.421	2429	0.359	0.48	1162
Africa/Asia origin	0.296	0.456	2429	0.313	0.464	1162
Alignment voter in 1969	0.519	0.5	1762	0.468	0.499	1007
Likud voter in 1969	0.196	0.397	1787	0.19	0.392	1007
Left parties voter in 1969	0.008	0.089	1748	0.016	0.125	1007
Independents-Liberals voter in 1969	0.046	0.21	1751	0.029	0.167	1007
Religious party voter in 1969	0.098	0.298	1747	0.071	0.258	1007
Voted for other parties in 1969	0.003	0.053	1749	0.009	0.094	1007
Did not vote in 1969	0.061	0.24	1931	0.217	0.413	1007
1969 vote unknown	0.321	0.467	2437	0.141	0.348	1172

Note: The pre-war surveys were conducted in May and in September. The post-war surveys were conducted in November and December. Female is a binary indicator of whether a respondent is a female. Age group is an ordinal variable on 1-5 scale (1=20-29; 2=30-39; 3=40-49; 4=50-64; 5=65 or older). Religiosity is an ordinal variable on 1-4 scale (1=observes thoroughly; 2=observes to a great extent; 3=observes to some extent; 4=does not observe). Household income (monthly, in Israeli liras) is measured on an ordinal scale 1-7 (1=0-599; 2=600-799; 3=800-999; 4=1,000-1,249; 5=1,250-1,499; 6=1,500-1,749; 7=1,750 or higher). Education is measured on an ordinal scale 1-4 (1=0-8 years of schooling; 2=9-12 years of schooling; 3=>12 years of schooling, but less than a college degree; 4=college degree or higher). Born in Israel is a binary indicator of whether a respondent was born in Israel or abroad. Africa/Asia origin is a binary indicator of whether a respondent or his/her father was born in Africa or in Asia (excluding Israel). Voting in 1969 (previous election) is measured using several binary indicators, using respondents' answers to the question of whom they voted for in 1969. The number of respondents varies because of missing answers to some questions.

A.1 Measurement of Outcomes: INES Study

Our leader favorability outcomes are based on a pre- post war survey item, which asks "*Which leaders would you like to see the most in election advertisements?*" Possible answers include:

- `0 = No Answer`
- `1 = Golda Meir (prime Minister)`
- `2 = Moshe Dayan (minister of defense)`
- `3 = Menachem Begin (opposition leader)`

- `4 = Shmuel Tamir (Likud member)`
- `5= Igal Alon (member of the ruling Labor party)`
- `6 = Arik Sharon (military commander during the war)`
- `7 = Other`
- `8 = Don't Want to See Anyone`

Using this item, we create binary dependent variables which measure the share of respondents who mention the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, or the opposition leader Menachem Begin as figures they would like to see in campaign advertisements. This survey item appears in one pre-war survey (September) and in one post-war survey (November), and by recoding the item we obtain three outcome measures used in table 1:

- `Support for Prime Minister`
- `Support for Minister of Defense`
- `Support for Opposition Leader`

To measure support for political parties, we make use of a survey item which asks *"Which party do you intend to vote for in the upcoming elections?"* Recoding this item we create two binary indicators used in table 1:

- `Support for Labor`
- `Support for Likud`

To measure respondents' general appraisal of life in Israel, we make use of a survey item which appears in one pre-war and post-war survey,[18] asking: *"As to the country's general situation in comparison to four years ago, would you say it has improved, is the same, or is it worse?"* Possible answers include:

- `0 = No Answer`
- `1 = Improved`
- `2 = The Same`

[18] May and December 1973

- `3 = worse`

Using this item, we create two binary variables which measure whether respondents report that the country's general situation improved or worsened. The two items used in table 2 are:

- `Worse`
- `Better`

We further generate a variable to measure respondents main political preferences. To do so, we use the following question which appears in all survey waves: "*What are the two most important problems the government should be taking care of?*" to which respondents could reply:

- `0 = No Answer`
- `1 = Security`
- `2 = Peace`
- `3 = Economy`
- `4 = Social and Domestic Problems`
- `5= Socio-economic Inequality`
- `6 = Young Couples and Housing`
- `7 = Education`
- `8 = Other`

Using this item, we create four binary variables which indicates whether a given policy-area is considered as one of the two most salient issues to respondents. The four outcomes we use in table 2 are:

- `Security`
- `Peace`
- `Economy`

- `Social and Domestic Problems`

Finally, to test the effects of the Yom Kippur War on intention to vote we generated two variables relating to individual level intention and perceived value in voting. Our first variable `Intend to Vote` is based on a survey item directly asking respondents whether they intend to vote. Our second variable `Important to Vote` is based on a survey item which ask respondents whether it is important to vote. Original responses ranged on a scale from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important), which we converted to a scale ranging from 0-1. This latter question regarding the importance of voting appears in all the waves, except for the September wave.

B Military Casualty Dataset

We introduce a new dataset based on aggregated grave-yard records which detail fallen soldiers' first and last name, military unit, year of death and locality of origin.[19] To compile the relevant information regarding combatant deaths, we collected the universe of grave-yard lists (886 in total) from the ministry of defense website, and appended them into one cross-sectional dataset of combatant deaths which occurred in 1973. Since precise dates are not available in our raw data, we make a plausible assumption that most casualties in 1973 were related to the Yom Kippur War.

Our data includes information regarding any soldier that died during service. Therefore we consider soldiers that died on the battlefield as well as soldiers that died in training accidents, car accidents and other noncombat related occurrences. While it would be optimal to clean the existing data and focus only on soldiers dying on the battlefield during the Yom Kippur War, the existing records provided by the ministry of defense do not include sufficient information to do so. We expect this limitation to introduce measurement error and noise rather than bias. This in turn poses an additional hurdle to identifying existing effects. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in our analyses of military casualties and voting patters are presented in Table A2

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Turnout	2571	77.0	12.0	0.0	100.0
Likud vote-share	2693	13.9	16.1	0.0	100.0
Labor vote-share	2693	44.1	33.0	0.0	100.0
Fallen soldiers (count)	2693	1.2	9.3	0.0	263.0
Fallen soldiers 1969 (count)	2575	0.5	2.9	0.0	56.0
Fallen soldiers 1973 (count)	2647	2.9	15.7	0.0	263.0
Fallen soldiers 1977 (count)	2669	0.4	2.1	0.0	35.0
Fallen soldiers (percent)	2571	0.1	0.3	0.0	4.3
Fallen soldiers 1969 (percent)	2575	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.2
Fallen soldiers 1973 (percent)	2647	0.2	0.5	0.0	4.3
Fallen soldiers 1977 (percent)	2355	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.9
73' casualties - binary Treatment	2693	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0
Post Yom Kipur war	3296	0.7	0.4	0.0	1.0
Urban locality	3296	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0

To ensure that our difference-in-difference models recovering the effects of casualties on voting behavior are comparable to the public opinion analyses of urban Jewish population, we estimate our models considering all localities as well as only urban localities. To shed light on the spatial distribution of military fatalities, Figures A1-A2 compare fatality rates

[19] Locality of origin can be a city, a town or a village.

and shares across urban and rural localities. These figures demonstrate that the majority of military fatalities originated from urban localities (which as noted above populated a higher share of the Israeli population in 1973), but the share of fatalities to population was higher in rural localities in comparison to urban localities.



Figure A1: 1973 Casualties in Urban and Rural Localities



Figure A2: Relative Share of 1973 Casualties in Urban and Rural Localities

C Robustness Checks: INES Public Opinion Analyses

Table A3: INES Pre-War Placebo Test

Placebo Test: Pre-War						
	Labor	Likud	Security	Peace	Economy	Social
Pre-War Placebo	0.194	-0.188	-0.481***	-0.160	-0.126	-0.207
	(0.166)	(0.186)	(0.096)	(0.457)	(0.220)	(0.143)
Constant	-5.702	-4.309	-0.221	-2.007**	-2.348***	-1.178***
	(197.049)	(123.633)	(0.233)	(0.847)	(0.469)	(0.316)
Observations	1440	1440	1450	706	1539	1548
Pseudo R^2	0.66	0.66	0.03	0.16	0.11	0.04

Note: All regressions include indicators to control for gender, age group, income group, education level, religiosity, origin, place of birth, survey wave, and voting in previous elections.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

D Robustness Checks: Military Casualties and Voting

Table A4: Placebo Test: The Effects of 1973 Casualties on 1969 Electoral Outcomes

1969 Election Outcomes						
	Turnout	Turnout, with controls	Labor	Labor, with controls	Likud	Likud, with controls
1973 Deaths	0.317	0.446	15.630***	16.367***	2.393***	1.841**
	(0.735)	(0.744)	(2.213)	(2.235)	(0.850)	(0.851)
Terror victims		-0.057		0.320		-0.182
		(0.469)		(1.407)		(0.536)
Eligible voters		-0.031		-0.204**		0.150***
		(0.033)		(0.099)		(0.038)
Constant	80.123***	80.137***	47.416***	47.474***	7.879***	7.834***
	(0.482)	(0.483)	(1.451)	(1.449)	(0.557)	(0.552)
N	868	868	868	868	868	868

Note:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A5: Alternative Specification: Fixed Effects Models

Fixed Effects Models for all Voting Outcomes						
	Turnout	Turnout (Urban)	Likud	Likud (Urban)	Labor	Labor(Urban)
Post 73' period	0.314	-4.925***	8.183***	5.442***	-21.765***	-10.965***
	(0.501)	(1.328)	(0.527)	(0.978)	(0.995)	(1.759)
73' Casualties in the post	0.645	0.989	-0.670	9.002***	-2.536**	-8.479***
73' period	(0.560)	(1.618)	(0.623)	(1.083)	(1.121)	(1.757)
Terror victims	0.189	-0.209	-0.015	-0.275	0.104	0.468
	(0.272)	(0.257)	(0.285)	(0.212)	(0.854)	(0.403)
Eligible voters	-0.173*	0.122	0.487***	-0.018	0.361**	-0.202*
	(0.097)	(0.154)	(0.114)	(0.076)	(0.158)	(0.109)
Constant	80.403***	80.243***	7.938***	13.827***	52.893***	37.006***
	(0.235)	(1.379)	(0.285)	(0.741)	(0.435)	(1.082)
N	2571	465	2693	468	2693	468
Clusters	926	157	941	158	941	158

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A6: Alternative Specification of Treatment: Labor Vote

73′ Casualties and Labor Vote				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
$>=75^{th}$ pctl casuaties in 73′	17.698***	17.567***	18.534***	19.465***
	(2.504)	(2.517)	(4.050)	(4.111)
Post 73′ period	-23.358***	-23.366***	-16.636***	-16.902***
	(0.908)	(0.907)	(1.168)	(1.204)
73′ Casualties in the post	-2.496*	-2.507*	-12.446**	-12.270**
73′ period	(1.482)	(1.483)	(5.215)	(5.243)
Terror victims		-0.433		-0.069
		(0.458)		(0.688)
Eligible voters		-0.036		0.092**
		(0.024)		(0.045)
Constant	49.464***	49.621***	34.853***	33.914***
	(1.271)	(1.297)	(1.648)	(1.730)
N	2693	2693	468	468
Clusters	941	941	158	158

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A7: Alternative Specification of Treatment: Likud Vote

73′ Casualties and Likud Vote				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
$>=75^{th}$ pctl casuaties in 73′	-2.118**	-1.737*	9.365***	10.632***
	(0.927)	(0.928)	(3.107)	(3.217)
Post 73′ period	9.010***	8.912***	10.734***	10.439***
	(0.464)	(0.468)	(0.855)	(0.895)
73′ Casualties in the post	-3.243***	-3.169***	-6.621	-6.251
73′ period	(0.728)	(0.729)	(4.302)	(4.294)
Terror victims		-0.190		0.225
		(0.541)		(0.505)
Eligible voters		0.167***		0.126**
		(0.062)		(0.049)
Constant	9.466***	9.050***	13.232***	11.794***
	(0.500)	(0.503)	(0.916)	(0.963)
N	2693	2693	468	468
Clusters	941	941	158	158

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A8: Alternative Specification of Treatment: Turnout

73′ Casualties and Turnout				
	All localities	With controls, all localities	Only urban	With controls, only urban
$>=75^{th}$ pctl casuaties in 73′	0.473	0.416	-3.262***	-3.550***
	(0.734)	(0.738)	(1.098)	(1.197)
Post 73′ period	-0.078	-0.057	-4.199***	-4.175***
	(0.453)	(0.454)	(0.869)	(0.877)
73′ Casualties in the post	2.153***	2.139***	4.255***	4.079***
73′ period	(0.674)	(0.674)	(0.884)	(0.858)
Terror victims		0.013		-0.270
		(0.215)		(0.168)
Eligible voters		-0.024***		-0.029***
		(0.009)		(0.010)
Constant	80.135***	80.196***	81.568***	82.004***
	(0.449)	(0.456)	(0.692)	(0.717)
N	2571	2571	465	465
Clusters	926	926	157	157

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A9: Effects by Cycle (All Localities)

Yom Kipur Casualties′ Effects by Cycle						
	Turnout 1973	Turnout 1977	Labor 1973	Labor 1977	Likud 1973	Likud 1977
Casuaties in 73′	0.414	0.500	16.440***	16.246***	1.804**	1.764**
	(0.703)	(0.702)	(2.215)	(2.206)	(0.839)	(0.839)
Post 73′ period	-9.553***	-0.877	-6.099***	-20.918***	6.725***	8.350***
	(0.525)	(0.600)	(0.829)	(1.132)	(0.500)	(0.569)
73′ Casualties in the post	-0.349	3.298***	2.048*	-6.754***	-0.589	-0.862
73′ period	(0.686)	(0.759)	(1.086)	(1.774)	(0.665)	(0.873)
Terror victims	-0.035	0.032	-0.646	-0.228	0.206	-0.631
	(0.245)	(0.153)	(0.820)	(0.696)	(0.405)	(0.581)
Eligible voters	-0.024**	-0.049***	-0.181**	-0.149**	0.143***	0.189***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.084)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.072)
Constant	80.133***	80.139***	47.509***	47.479***	7.819***	7.840***
	(0.551)	(0.551)	(1.515)	(1.516)	(0.578)	(0.577)
N	1769	1670	1769	1792	1769	1792
Clusters	915	904	915	939	915	939

Note:
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by locality. Year indicators included in models but omitted for ease of representation.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A10: Effects by Cycle (Urban Localities)

Yom Kipur Casualties' Effects by Cycle (Urban)						
	Turnout 1973	Turnout 1977	Labor 1973	Labor 1977	Likud 1973	Likud 1977
Casuaties in 73'	-5.858***	-5.903***	27.631***	27.621***	16.996***	17.157***
	(1.329)	(1.324)	(2.639)	(2.619)	(1.200)	(1.201)
Post 73' period	-4.676***	-8.661***	-4.808**	-7.179***	3.389***	4.409***
	(1.083)	(1.570)	(1.929)	(1.919)	(0.969)	(1.217)
73' Casualties in the post	-4.421***	7.920***	-1.995	-16.983***	5.111***	10.777***
73' period	(1.378)	(1.746)	(1.987)	(2.119)	(1.049)	(1.588)
Terror victims	-0.104	-0.193*	-0.476*	-0.443**	0.051	-0.008
	(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.242)	(0.217)	(0.138)	(0.172)
Eligible voters	-0.016**	-0.010	0.007	0.007	0.035***	0.027**
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Constant	85.088***	85.091***	19.517***	19.514***	3.268***	3.285***
	(0.998)	(0.998)	(2.211)	(2.212)	(0.878)	(0.878)
N	311	308	311	311	311	311
Clusters	157	156	157	157	157	157

Note:
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01