Combat Experience and Foreign Policy Attitudes: Evidence from World War II

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Abstract

How does combat exposure affect veterans' political attitudes? Studying wartime experiences of violence, we distinguish between combat veterans (i.e. those exposed to direct battlefield violence), near-combat veterans (i.e. those exposed to enemy fire but not combat), and non-combat veterans (i.e. those never exposed to combat or enemy fire). We analyze the consequences of combat exposure on attitudes toward postwar foreign policy, peace, and reconciliation. We study a large, representative sample of active-duty, enlisted US soldiers using declassified surveys fielded by the US War Department during World War II. Overall, we find that combat experience reduces veterans' support for an active US role in world affairs, Marshall Plan aid, and the formation of the United Nations. Combat exposure increases support for a punitive peace imposed on Axis powers. We find no evidence that combat veterans hold more negative views of the enemy in general. Data on respondents' demographics, campaign history, unit cohesion, news access, and valor allow us to rule out multiple sources of confounding, and support a more causal interpretation of the results. Overall, this study offers micro-level evidence for existing theories about how combat experience fosters conservatism about the use of force in general, but hardens attitudes in support of military action to preserve hard-won victories.

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"... the only men who are even going to want to bloody noses in a fist fight after this war will be those who want people to think they were tough combat men, when they weren't. The surest way to become a pacifist is to join the infantry."

–Bill Mauldin[1]

Introduction

Military service is a ubiquitous and transformative life event. Worldwide, some 75 million people—about 1.5% of the global adult population—serve in a national military. In the United States, more than 8% of adults are veterans or military servicemembers. Among political leaders, military experience is even more common: 30% of all world leaders between 1875 and 2004 were veterans (Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015). Individual experiences in uniform are politically salient. Basic training socializes soldiers into a military mindset (Huntington, 1957), and fosters human capital (Vanden Eynde, 2016). Subsequent deployments increase political interest (Jennings and Markus, 1977), volunteerism (Nesbit and Reingold, 2011), and civic activism (Parker, 2009). Even the risk of conscription is sufficient to shift political beliefs (Erikson and Stoker, 2011). Combat is perhaps the most politically consequential military experience. Exposure to wartime violence alters political trust, cooperation, and altruism (Blattman, 2009; Grosjean, 2014; Bauer et al., 2016), with consequences for voting (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015), collective action (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012), and government decisionmaking (Saunders, 2011; Weeks, 2012; Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Lupton, 2017).

A central debate in international relations surrounds the influence of combat exposure on foreign policy attitudes. One prominent view contends that military experience breeds militarism (Vagts, 1937). Militaries attract hawkish individuals (Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019), promote belligerent views (Endicott, 2020; Navajas et al., 2020) and offensive doctrines (Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984), and socialize soldiers to view national security as a military issue (Sechser, 2004; DiCicco and Fordham, 2018). Consistent with this view, Weeks (2012) shows that military regimes are particularly prone to using force.

A competing perspective sees combat exposure as fostering conservatism about the use of force (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Soldiers are attuned to battlefield realities, including the

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[1]Mauldin (1945, p. 14).

human costs of war, and must sacrifice when force is initiated (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Horowitz and Stam, 2014). In addition, servicemembers tend to eschew reckless belligerence for a measured accounting of enemy capabilities (Huntington, 1957). An implication of military conservatism is a preference for tactical escalation, conditional on conflict beginning. Although veterans tend to be cautious about force in general, when it is used they prefer decisive action to ensure victory (Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990; Betts, 1991; Gelpi and Feaver, 2002).

Because veterans occupy a disproportionate share of leadership roles in government (Lewis and Frank, 2002),[2] and wield significant influence on public opinion (Jost and Kertzer, 2021), this debate matters for for civil-military relations and foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, little consensus exists about how and why combat exposure alters foreign policy preferences and support for the use of force. In line with the militarism school, quasi-experimental evidence suggests combat reduces psychological barriers to perpetrating future violence (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012; Navajas et al., 2020), and worsens attitudes toward adversaries (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). On the other hand, some observational and qualitative studies show combat veterans tend to reject interventionism (Jennings and Markus, 1977; Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Lupton, 2017) and favor tactical escalation (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002), as proponents of military conservatism expect.

Resolving this debate is challenging because soldiers select into military service, and conditional on front-line deployment, select into combat action.[3] Existing research in comparative politics and behavioral economics has made remarkable strides toward causal inference to overcome these issues. Through design-based strategies leveraging quasi-random exposure to wartime violence, a number of studies provide credible estimates of the effect of combat on outcomes like prosociality, tolerance, and voting (e.g. Blattman, 2009; Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). However, there is important heterogeneity in findings across studies depending on the context, nature of the conflict, and time since violence exposure (Bauer et al., 2016). Further, there is a paucity of micro-level work examining how combat exposure affects foreign policy attitudes, despite the importance of this question for politics. In large measure, this neglect likely results be-

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[2]Since 1945, in the United States, 68% of Secretaries of State, 72% of CIA Directors, and 73% of Secretaries of Defense have prior military service.
[3]Many studies examine conscription contexts to mitigate concerns about selection into service (Erikson and Stoker, 2011; Navajas et al., 2020).

cause most existing studies examine irregular warfare and post-civil war settings. Sociobehavioral outcomes are vital for understanding reconciliation after civil war, but the influence of combat on foreign policy preferences is likely more salient in the wake of interstate conflict.

In this paper, we use unique, archival survey data and micro-level empirical techniques to help adjudicate the seminal debate over whether combat exposure breeds militarism or conservatism. Specifically, we study a set of declassified, military surveys from the "American Soldier in World War II" (ASWW2) collection, which were gathered by the War Department during World War II (WWII) and cover thousands of soldiers across branches, ranks, and theaters. The surveys we analyze were fielded in summer 1945, and cover large, representative samples of active-duty US soldiers deployed on or recently returned from the front-lines. Using these data, we wed theoretical debates in international relations with empirical tools from the comparative politics and economics literatures on violence exposure. We examine how combat exposure affects soldiers' attitudes about postwar foreign policy, peace, and reconciliation. To assess the causal effect of combat exposure, we rely on a high-dimensional fixed effects approach, which allows us to rule out multiple sources of confounding, including from selection into military service, unit cohesion, campaign history, access to news about postwar planning, and individual differences in valor.

Three notable findings emerge. First, in line with the military conservatism school (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004), combat reduces soldiers' support for an active US role in postwar global affairs, including reducing support for the formation of the United Nations (UN) and for Marshall Plan aid to allies. Relatedly, combat veterans express greater support for isolationism and less enthusiasm about further military service. Second, combat exposure increases support for a punitive peace imposed on the Axis powers. This result is consistent with Gelpi and Feaver (2002)'s finding that veterans prefer decisive action to ensure victory once conflict is initiated. Third, in contrast with research on combat exposure in civil wars, we find no evidence that combat exposure in World War II increased out-group hostility (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). This latter result suggests that combat veterans' support for a punitive peace did not result from generalized hatred of the adversary, but rather a more functional desire to cripple the Axis powers' future war-making capabilities.

Four aspects of our data mark key departures from the extant literature. First, we study the individual-level effects of combat in WWII, one of the largest and most important wars in world

history. As such, our study is one of the first to examine individual consequences of wartime violence exposure in a major, conventional war between great powers.[4] Most studies of violence exposure examine irregular warfare contexts, where victims of violence are low-status (Bauer et al., 2016), and perpetrators are asymmetrically capable of inflicting harm (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). Status differentials between combatants evoke unique psychological responses (Fiske et al., 2002), moderating the effect of combat. In our setting, soldiers engaged in combat against well-resourced and symmetrically capable adversaries.

Second, we study the effects of combat exposure in a context of ongoing, active hostilities. With few exceptions (e.g. Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015), existing work examines the legacies of violence exposure in postwar settings, with a temporal gap in violence exposure ranging from 1 year to 65 years or more (Grosjean, 2014). By contrast, respondents in our setting were on active-duty military service, with a temporal gap of at most 4 months between front-line duty and survey fielding. Our context thus provides a unique opportunity to assess the immediate effects of combat exposure. This is empirically important because analyses examining longer temporal windows risk confounding if individuals exposed to violence have distinct, shared experiences in the intervening years between exposure and assessment.[5] More generally, evidence reveals that effects of violence exposure are persistent (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), and if anything, grow over time (Bauer et al., 2016, p. 264-65). Hence, our estimates likely represent a floor for the long-run effects of combat on foreign policy attitudes.

Third, we observe a range of soldiers' battlefield experience. In particular, we distinguish individuals who never encountered hostile action (non-combat veterans), those who faced enemy fire, such as artillery bombardment, but did not engage the enemy themselves (near-combat veterans), and individuals who were involved in direct engagement with enemy forces (combat veterans). At best, existing work captures combat versus non-combat (Horowitz and Stam, 2014) or wartime versus peacetime military service (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). Studying the diversity of soldiers' combat-related experiences helps shed light on causal mechanisms (Usry, 2019;

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[4]Grosjean (2014) also examines WWII, but focuses on the effects of civilian exposure to violence. Vanden Eynde (2016) and Jha and Wilkinson (2012) examine WWI and WWII respectively, but study community rather than individual-level exposure.

[5]For example, WWII service is correlated with less nationalistic attitudes. A naive assessment might attribute reduced nationalism to wartime service. However, Silverstein, London and Wilmoth (2018) show that this effect is actually driven by higher educational attainment resulting from the G.I. Bill, rather than due to military service itself.

Endicott, 2020). For instance, if combat veterans differ from near-combat veterans, that suggests that perpetrating violence in combat, and not just facing enemy fire, is impactful.

Fourth, our analyses focus on active-duty, enlisted soldiers. While most existing work studies recruits before military service (Erikson and Stoker, 2011; Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019) or veterans after military service (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004), our data offer unparalleled access to then-current servicemembers. Using military samples holds a number of advantages we elaborate below. Above all, because survey methodologists in the War Department had access to classified data on troop characteristics and locations, they could draw stratified random samples. This sampling strategy provides numerous advantages over opt-in convenience samples used in other surveys of soldiers and veterans. More broadly, studying the population of ordinary, enlisted men marks a critical step because these individuals comprise the vast bulk of soldiers. Researchers examine the behavior and attitudes of officer candidates (Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019), and veteran Congresspeople (Lupton, 2017), bureaucrats (Holsti, 1998), and executives (Carter and Smith, 2020), but enlisted men differ from military elites in key ways.[6] Our analyses thus shed light on the generalizability of findings from military elite samples to the more numerous population of enlisted soldiers.

In sum, we intervene in a seminal debate over how military service influences foreign policy attitudes (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). This debate bears implications for scholarship on civil-military relations (Sechser, 2004; Weeks, 2012), leaders (Saunders, 2011; Lupton, 2017; Carter and Smith, 2020), and the legacies of war (Blattman, 2009; Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015; Bauer et al., 2016). Using unique, military survey data and empirical tools from the growing literature on violence exposure in comparative politics and economics, we offer some of the first evidence on the effects of combat in a historically-important, conventional, interstate war between major powers. Overall, our results lend micro-level empirical support for the expectations of the military conservatism perspective. Combat fosters greater caution about using force in general, but increases support for decisive action when force is used. Several differences emerge between our findings and those of studies on combat in irregular wars, suggesting the consequences of violence exposure vary by the technology of warfare, and particularly by the

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[6]Kertzer (2021) shows that elites differ less from non-elites than is typically assumed. However, military officers (Stadelmann, Portmann and Eichenberger, 2015) and officer candidates (Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019) are compositionally different from enlisted soldiers, for instance in levels of hawkishness.

symmetry of combatants' capabilities. We also show that our core results hold comparing combat veterans with soldiers exposed to enemy fire but not direct combat. This finding highlights the importance of nuanced analyses of violence exposure, and suggests personal involvement, rather than mere exposure to risk, is critical. Finally, we introduce military surveys as a useful and heretofore neglected tool for examining the consequences of military service (see also Cockerham and Cohen, 1981; Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019). Future research should leverage the hundreds of available surveys collected by military social scientists in the past eight decades.

Political Legacies of Military Experience

The ways military service shapes the political attitudes and behaviors of those that serve is an important question for politics. Apart from the fact that conflict is prevalent and a large share of people hold military backgrounds worldwide, veterans occupy prominent political leadership roles (Lewis and Frank, 2002; Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, 2015), and wield crucial influence over public opinion (Jost and Kertzer, 2021). Understanding how military service shapes future attitudes, then, bears critically on foreign policy decision-making, civil-military relations, and conflict resolution. Unsurprisingly, a large body of literature examines the political legacies of military experience. Are soldiers, and particularly combat veterans, more prone to advocating force than civilians? Two dominant views prevail: the *militarism* perspective and the *military conservatism* perspective.

Militarism

According to the militarism perspective, military experience makes servicemembers and veterans more supportive of using force (Vagts, 1937). Selection, socialization, parochial interests, and familiarity with the technologies of war all underpin alleged military bellicosity. More hawkish individuals select into military service (Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019) and combat duties (Cockerham and Cohen, 1981), yielding a military population predisposed to belligerence. Socialization within the armed forces exacerbates hawkish predispositions. Soldiers are trained to view national security as a military issue (Sechser, 2004; DiCicco and Fordham, 2018), fixate on potential threats and opportunities (Walt, 1987), and discount economic and diplomatic solutions in favor of military ones (Schreiber, 1979; Holsti, 1998). Bureaucratic self-interest compounds these belligerent pressures. Officers seeking promotions and glory hold incentives to obtain battlefield

experience (Mauldin, 1945). Militaries have a budgetary interest in promoting the use of force to justify defense expenditures (Stewart and Zhukov, 2009). One manifestation of this interest is a reliance on offensive doctrines (Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984), which prescribe the use of force in crisis scenarios. These organizational biases also translate to individual preferences. Veterans, and particularly combat veterans, are more supportive of mandating military service (Navajas et al., 2020) and maintaining a robust defense posture (Ivie, Gimbel and Elder Jr., 1991).

Advocates of the militarism perspective contend that combat exposure, above and beyond military service, is likely to magnify these effects. Combat can harden attitudes toward enemies and out-groups (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015), making it psychologically easier to justify killing. By increasing psychological trauma, combat also fosters aggression (Taft et al., 2007; Usry, 2019). Combat veterans' familiarity with the tools and skills needed to wage war make them more likely to support (Navajas et al., 2020) and engage (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012) in subsequent violence. Cross-national evidence corroborates these intuitions. Military regimes (Weeks, 2012) and countries with weak civilian control (Sechser, 2004) are particularly prone to initiating conflict.

Military Conservatism

A competing view contends that military experience, and especially combat exposure, promotes conservatism about the use of force. As Huntington (1957, p. 69-70) famously claimed, "The military man normally opposes reckless, aggressive, belligerent action... [and believes] war should not be resorted to except as a final recourse... ." From a Huntingtonian perspective, conservatism results from the military's unique values, priorities, and experiences with war. For one, the "military mind" is pessimistic and rational, preferring a measured accounting of enemy capabilities and a risk averse course of action (Huntington, 1957; Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990). This socialized, realpolitik mindset reserves the use of force for circumstances like major interstate crises, where the threat is substantial (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). Conservatism is also motivated by fears about taking on wider commitments with ill-defined conditions for victory (Petraeus, 1989), a need to balance competing preferences of civilian officials (Avant, 1996), and reputational and career incentives to avoid quagmires or defeats (Sechser, 2004). By comparison, civilians are more naive and less realistic about the limits of military force (Janowitz, 1960). For instance, Betts (1991) and

Feaver and Gelpi (2004) show civilian leaders are often more supportive of interventionist foreign policies than military elites.

Proponents of the conservatism perspective view combat exposure specifically as fostering caution about the use of force. Combat experience gives soldiers direct knowledge of the physical and psychological toll of war (Huntington, 1957). As General Douglas MacArthur explained: "the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war" (quoted in Petraeus, 1989, p. 498). Individual-level and cross-national evidence corroborate this notion. Combat veterans are less supportive of using force (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004), and more restrictive about when they think force is required (Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro, 1990). When combat veterans hold public office, they also prefer greater Congressional oversight over military operations (Lupton, 2017), and initiate fewer militarized disputes (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002; Saunders, 2011; Horowitz and Stam, 2014). Psychologically, these phenomena may reflect "post-traumatic growth," whereby individuals who survive traumatic events like combat become more resilient, altruistic, and politically engaged (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004; Blattman, 2009).[7]

Nevertheless, conservatism about the use of force in general does not imply that military experience always reduces support for military action. Military service and combat exposure make individuals more judicious about when to use force. But conditional on deciding to engage, servicemembers and veterans tend to prefer escalating quickly (Petraeus, 1989) and using higher levels force to ensure decisive victory (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002; Sechser, 2004) and minimize casualties (Avant, 1996). Military experience also makes veterans more likely to view existing conflicts in zero sum terms (Holsti, 1998), to remain committed to the cause of war despite setbacks (DiCicco and Fordham, 2018), and to favor arming in an effort to deter adversaries (Huntington, 1957). Betts (1991) describes numerous instances where military officials urged "tactical escalation" during crises. Perhaps most famously, General Colin Powell advocated overwhelming force during the Gulf War. The Powell Doctrine advocated applying every resource available in a conflict in order to ensure a quick, decisive victory while reducing casualties (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002, p. 780).

In sum, we intervene in the mature debate over whether military experience fosters militarism or conservatism about the use of force. We adjudicate these competing perspectives using novel,

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[7]However, altruism and cooperation resulting from post-traumatic growth are typically parochial (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015; Bauer et al., 2016).

archival survey data collected by the War Department during WWII. Our findings also extend a large empirical literature on the legacies of violence exposure (e.g. Bauer et al., 2016).

The American Combat Experience in World War II

To examine the political legacies of combat exposure, we focus on the American experience in World War II. Our core results center on the European and Mediterranean theaters, where three-quarters of American divisions (69 of 91 divisions) were deployed.[8] Understanding this case is crucial because WWII is the largest and deadliest war in world history, and was characterized by prolonged, intense episodes of combat between symmetrically capable great power adversaries. During the conflict, 16,112,566 Americans—about 12% of the national population—served in the military. Of these servicemembers, more than 9.7 million served in a combat zone, more than 8 million were exposed to war-related casualties, between 1.5 and 3.4 million were in combat, and at least 1.7 million experienced conflict-related psychological trauma.[9] On average, US soldiers served for 33 months, with an average overseas deployment of 16 months. WWII was also extremely costly. 291,557 American soldiers died in combat; in addition, 113,842 troops died of non-combat causes, and a further 670,846 were wounded. Worldwide, military and civilian casualties from battlefield violence in WWII are estimated at more than 50 million.

Although WWII began with the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939, the American role in the war was limited to giving material aid to Allied countries until 1941.[10] After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and German and Italian declarations of war on December 11, 1941, the US entered WWII against the Axis powers. The first American troops deployed to the European theater in January 1942, and American combat operations in Europe began on July 4, 1942 with a series of aerial raids. Ground combat operations began in earnest in

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[8]We describe the surveys we draw on in greater detail below. Although the Research Branch of the War Department fielded studies across theaters, the primary survey with outcome questions about foreign policy attitudes covered soldiers in Europe and the Mediterranean. A similar survey from the Pacific theater has never been digitized or publicly released. We also draw on an additional survey of soldiers demobilizing at the end of the war, which sampled soldiers who served in the Pacific and include some pertinent foreign policy questions.

[9]These estimates are calculated as follows based on statistics from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Survey of Veterans. 16,112,566 individuals served in the US military during WWII. Of these, 60.3% "served in a combat or war zone" ($16,112,566 \times .603 = 9,715,877$), and 49.7% were "exposed to dead, dying, or wounded people" ($16,112,566 \times .497 = 8,007,945$). Approximately 15-35% of those who served in war zones served in infantry roles that put them in the line of fire ($9,715,877 \times .15 = 1,457,382$; $9,715,877 \times .35 = 3,400,557$). Of those in combat zones, 18% experienced war-related psychological trauma or neuroses ($9,715,877 \times .18 = 1,748,858$).

[10]We offer a very brief summary of US combat operations in Europe and the Mediterranean for background. Williams (1989) gives a comprehensive account of US military operations across the globe in WWII.

November 1942, when American troops landed in North Africa, where Axis resistance collapsed by May 1943. Thereafter, Allied forces in Europe undertook a multi-pronged invasion strategy. In July 1943, American troops invaded Sicily, before progressing up the Italian peninsula against fierce German resistance in autumn 1943 and throughout 1944. At the same time, the US and British air forces carried out a massive strategic bombing campaign aimed at crippling Nazi infrastructure and industry. On June 6, 1944, Allied forces commenced Operation Overlord, landing in France and opening a Western Front against the Nazis. As they advanced through Western Europe between June 1944 and April 1945, American infantry engaged in some of most prolonged and devastating battles of the war. Over this period, US forces in Europe suffered combat deaths exceeding 9,500 per month and total casualties exceeding 50,000 per month.

The typical US soldier on front-line duty during WWII was 20-26 years old, with some high school education and a middle-class socioeconomic background.[11] Because the US had reestablished a draft in 1940, most servicemembers—about 61%—were also conscripts. Most draftees were inducted into the Army, the largest service branch during the war, and the branch which bore the brunt of combat in Europe. After induction, new Army recruits were assessed on their skills and intelligence, and assigned to roles in the Ground, Air, or Service Forces. The highest scoring recruits were forwarded to officer candidate school or the Army Air Force, meaning infantry roles were occupied by relatively less educated recruits. Nevertheless, as the the need for infantry replacement troops on the front-lines grew, the overall quality of combat ground forces increased, since top recruits were shifted from specialist to infantry roles (McManus, 1998, p. 8-11). Once their roles were assigned, recruits were dispatched for basic training. Newly activated infantry divisions received 35-44 weeks of training, split roughly evenly between basic, small unit, and combined arms exercises. Later in the war, replacement troops received a shorter training regimen of 13-17 weeks, of which 12-13 were basic training and 1-4 were field tactical training.

After training, soldiers were deployed for operations. The military emphasized interoperability so that front-line units and troops could be replaced interchangably depending on military needs and logistical constraints. The wartime Army often quickly shifted organizational and tactical plans in response to unforeseen battlefield developments (MacDonald, 1997). Thus, where

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[11]Stouffer et al. (1949) and McManus (1998) offer scholarly profiles of American soldiers in WWII. Mauldin (1945) offers an anecdotal, battlefield account.

recruits were deployed—in combat, near combat, or in the rear echelon—was generally determined by their military occupational specialties (e.g. infantry, field artillery, signal corps), not by heterogeneous characteristics like motivation or bravery (Mauldin, 1945; McManus, 1998).[12] Military occupations were assigned before deployment on the basis of observable characteristics like age, education, and marital/parenthood status (MacLean, 2011), in tandem with personnel needs dictated by the course of the war. Together with the fact that most of the force was conscripted, these factors help mitigate some concerns about non-random selection of individuals into combat.

The American Soldier Surveys

To study the effects of combat exposure on foreign policy attitudes, we draw on a compilation of declassified military surveys known collectively as *The American Soldier in World War II* (ASWW2) surveys (Stouffer et al., 1949). The Research Branch of the US War Department's Information and Education Division fielded the ASWW2 survesy between 1941 and 1945.[13] An academic sociologist, Dr. Samuel Stouffer, led the research project, which involved military and civilian personnel, including statisticians, survey methodologists, psychologists, and other social scientists. The official task of the Research Branch was to help the War Department understand issues of morale, discipline, and combat motivation in the US military, and to recommend practicable solutions to enhance effectiveness. To this end, at least 200 surveys were administered to more than 500,000 US servicemembers across ranks, theaters, and branches during World War II. Surveys were fielded on dozens of topics ranging from psychiatric well-being and tropical disease prevention to news access and post-war employment plans. Topics were typically suggested by command staff sections according to known needs and challenges.[14] The Army developed a careful, set of guidelines to standardize the survey process during the war. First, researchers would consult with requesting commands about their needs. Second, trained staff would discuss issues bearing on the proposed study with soldiers. Third, based on these initial conversations, a ques-

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[12]Barber IV and Miller (2019, p. 490) also describe the randomness of combat exposure for soldiers on or near the front.

[13]See section A.1 for background and details on the ASWW2 project. Ryan (2013) provides an excellent account of the research effort.

[14]For instance, one of the earliest surveys concerned behaviors while on leave following boot camp (Ryan, 2013, p. 6). The survey was fielded in response to high desertion rates when soldiers returned home between training and deployment. After finding that recruits felt prouder and more enthusiastic about service when they wore their uniforms around family and friends, Stouffer recommended that the Army require soldiers to stay in uniform while on leave. In response, rates of desertion at the point of embarkation dropped precipitously.

tionnaire was drafted, tested, and revised to ensure question and response wordings were clear and unambiguous.

After questionnaires were finalized, units were sampled. In general, sampling followed a two-stage approach. First, units were selected through quota sampling depending on the aim and requirements of a particular survey. Preselection occurred in Washington, D.C. for surveys fielded in the continental US, and at theater headquarters for surveys fielded overseas. In most cases, the focal population was the cross-section of enlisted men in a given theater. Survey administrators had access to the latest secret data on troop strength, unit locations, and troop demographics. As such, although strictly random sampling was not possible given time and personnel constraints, stratification ensured sampled units represented the focal population in terms of branch and unit type.[15] Deliberate efforts were also made to sample units at different stages of training or with different levels of experience. Following stratified unit sampling, systematic random sampling was used to select every *nth* individual from a unit duty roster.[16]

For questionnaire administration, randomly selected individuals were ordered by unit commanders to assemble at a specified time and place, where a soldier trained by the Research Branch would explain the purpose of the survey. Then, anonymous written surveys were administered to groups of selected troops. When interviewees expressed difficulty reading or understanding the written questionnaire, survey administrators conducted personal, oral interviews. In order to maximize comfortability during assessment, the Research Branch ensured interviewers and subjects were matched on race and enlistment status, so Black (white) subjects had Black (white) interviewers, and enlisted (commissioned) subjects had enlisted (commissioned) interviewers. Following completion of each wave, sampling experts verified representativeness along key dimensions like rank, age, and length of service, and drew corrective samples when necessary. Finally, responses were processed using numerical codes, converted to punch cards, and analyzed. Key findings were disseminated in a monthly report distributed within-theaters down to the company-level. Survey records were declassified following the war, and described in a landmark, four-volume manuscript (Stouffer et al., 1949). Our analyses draw on a number of *The American Soldier* surveys provided

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[15]It was logistically simpler to survey a variety of units at a few posts than to survey one unit across many posts.

[16]When a survey required specific numbers of individuals at a given rank or age, the research team could randomly sample for any desired category using individuals' Form 20 Qualification Cards.

by the National Archives[17] and Roper iPoll.[18]

S-235: Attitudes Toward Post-Hostilities Problems

In our main analyses we draw on the the "Attitudes Toward Post-Hostilities Problems" survey, designated S-235 in the ASWW2 series. S-235 is the only available survey from the ASWW2 collection that focuses primarily on troops' attitudes about postwar foreign policy. The survey was fielded from August 14-24, 1945, just after publication of the news of victory over Japan. The sample includes 1,824 white enlisted men across 1,185 Army outfits in the European theater.[19] In total, 1,422 respondents were in the Army Ground Forces and 402 respondents were in the Army Air Forces. The survey also provides background and demographic data. Table 1 compares sample demographics to the demographics of the US military overall during WWII. The sample is somewhat younger and better educated than the US military as a whole, and includes slightly fewer single men.[20]

Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy relies on high-dimensional fixed effects to isolate the effects of combat experience on foreign policy attitudes. This approach mirrors that of several other recent papers focused on violence exposure in WWII (Barber IV and Miller, 2019; Conzo and Salustri, 2019). Although we cannot exploit fully arbitrary exposure to combat stemming from idiosyncratic recruitment practices (Blattman, 2009; Jha and Wilkinson, 2012), a number of features of our setting help mitigate concerns about unobserved selection. First, a majority of US soldiers—and an even larger majority of Army enlistees—were conscripted.[21] Second, a soldier's military occupational specialty was the main predictor of exposure to combat. In particular, infantrymen bore the brunt of combat responsibilities, accounting for 75% of all casualties in the Army Ground Forces. In turn, assignment to occupational roles was determined almost wholly by three factors: education, race, and period of enlistment (MacLean, 2011). Less educated white men enlisting between 1943 and 1945 were most likely to see combat (McManus, 1998). In Figure 1 we corroborate this assertion,

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[17] Available at https://catalog.archives.gov/id/620483.

[18] Available at https://bit.ly/32Fdub6.

[19] Unfortunately, archivists did not preserve the list of camps/outfits in the sample when the survey was digitized in December 1979.

[20] Results are robust to the inclusion of entropy weights to correct for these slight imbalances.

[21] We show the robustness of our results to questions of conscript versus volunteer recruitment below.

Table 1: Demographics of American WWII Servicemembers vs. S-235 Sample

	American WWII Servicemembers	S-235 Sample
Marital Status:		
Single	0.696	0.585
Married	0.250	0.395
Divorced/Separated	0.049	0.018
Widowed	0.005	0.003
Age:		
Age 15-25	0.499	0.521
Age 26-37	0.426	0.443
Age 38+	0.075	0.036
Education:		
Completed Some High School	0.568	0.763
Completed Some College	0.123	0.151
Service Duration:		
Mean Time in Military	33 Months	30-36 Months
Mean Time Overseas	16 Months	12-18 Months

Note: Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Data on demographics of US soldiers in WWII come from the National World War II Museum. The S-235 sample is intended to be representative of white enlisted men in the Army in the European theater. Overall demographic statistics are not disaggregated by branch (e.g. Army, Navy, Marines), theater, or race, so it is not possible to directly compare our sample demographics to the focal population. Some imbalances owe to the fact that our sample does not include Black enlisted men, who were generally younger, less educated, and single (McManus, 1998).

modeling the correlates of combat exposure in the S-235 sample. As expected, most combat veterans are younger and less educated, with less time deployed abroad, less time in their present outfit, and service in the invasion of Germany. Third, battlefield violence in WWII was subject to a significant degree of randomness. Front-lines and operational plans shifted rapidly (MacDonald, 1997), and for any troops in range of the front, the risk of encountering hostile patrols, snipers, shelling, or bombing was ever-present (McManus, 1998, p. 104, 236). As Bill Mauldin famously cartooned, casualties were so frequent and unpredictable on the front-lines that "[surviving infantrymen felt] like a fugitive from th' [sic] law of averages" (Mauldin, 1945, p. 39).

Apart from these features of the setting we study, the unique granularity of our data allow us to observe and control for a host of potential confounders, including valor, unit cohesion, news access, and campaign history. If the effect of combat holds after partialling out these factors and taking steps to address selection into combat, the data will support a causal interpretation of the results. Leveraging these aspects of our setting and data, we estimate the following linear equation:

Figure 1: Correlates of Combat Exposure

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The plot shows correlates of combat exposure in the S-235 sample. Results are from a linear regression of combat exposure on demographic and service-related covariates with outfit-clustered standard errors. Regression estimates are available in Table A.2.

$$Y_{i,o} = \beta_1(\text{Combat}_{i,o}) + \beta_2(X_{i,o}) + \epsilon_o$$

Where $Y_{i,o}$ is a set of foreign policy-related outcomes for individual i in outfit o, and β_1 captures the effect of combat exposure. $X_{i,o}$ is a vector of fixed effects that varies across specifications, but includes covariates like age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, service duration, physical condition, and morale of individual i in outfit o. ϵ_o are robust, outfit-clustered standard errors.[22]

Dependent Variables

We focus on nine attitudinal outcomes: (1) isolationism; (2) deterrence; (3) democracy promotion; (4) postwar aid to Allies; (5) United Nations formation; (6) punitive peace imposition; (7) Nazi justice; (8) postwar reconciliation; and (9) out-group animosity. Six of these nine outcomes—all but isolationism, deterrence, and democracy promotion—are measured using multiple questions. To reduce the number of hypothesis tests, we combine these related measures into inverse-covariance weighted summary indices (Anderson, 2008). For all index outcomes, we

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[22]We cluster by outfit because these were the primary sampling units.

coded constituent items in the same direction and used principal-component analysis to confirm items were loading on a common factor. In the appendix we explore additional outcomes pertinent to extant scholarship and the theoretical debate in which we intervene, including attitudes toward future service, political engagement, and anxieties about postwar employment and civilian life. In Table 2 we describe the focal outcomes and predicted effects of combat on each according to the militarism and military conservatism perspectives.

Measuring Combat Exposure

The S-235 survey asks respondents' about their combat exposure in a nuanced way. The survey distinguishes respondents exposed to combat, exposed to enemy fire but not combat, or exposed to neither.[23] We refer to these, respectively, as combat, near-combat, and non-combat. Combat veterans experienced front-line exchanges of fire with Axis troops. By contrast, near-combat veterans faced hostile fire from enemy artillery or aircraft, but were not exposed to close-range, direct engagements. For the most part, near-combat veterans would have been operating somewhat behind the front-lines, and would not have had opportunities to fire upon enemy forces—at least not within the line-of-sight.[24] Non-combat veterans were never exposed to combat or hostile fire. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of respondents in our sample with each level of combat experience across services. Roughly equal proportions of troops in the Air and Ground Forces were near or in combat (68.2% vs. 67.9% respectively), but about 9 percentage points more soldiers from the Ground Forces were combat veterans, reflecting the greater fighting burden borne by infantrymen. In the full sample, about 32% of respondents experienced no combat, 43% were near combat, and 25% were in combat. These levels of exposure accord with official estimates that 15-35% of troops saw combat and 60.3% were in a combat zone.

Our independent variable is an indicator for respondents who reported that had been in combat. We focus on ground combat (as opposed to aerial combat) in our main estimations because ground operations were the dominant form of fighting during WWII. Ground combat is also theoretically interesting since, unlike aerial combat, it involves direct, face-to-face contact with the

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[23]In response to the question "Have you ever been in actual combat or under enemy fire in this war?" the following response options were given: (1) "I have been in actual combat with the enemy"; (2) "I have not been in actual combat, but I have been under some kind of enemy fire (ground or air)"; and (3) "No, I have not been in combat nor under any kind of enemy fire from the ground or air".

[24]Some near-combat veterans likely did engage enemy forces via indirect fire, for example if they served in a field artillery unit or bomber crew.

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Table 2: Dependent Variables and Theoretical Expectations

Concept	Coding (=1)	Militarism		Military Conservatism	
		Expectation:	Logic:	Expectation:	Logic:
Support for Isolationism					
Which do you think would be the best way for the United States to try to keep out of war in the future?	Stay out of world affairs.	↓	Favors active, belligerent posture	↑	Favors caution and fears new commitments
Support for Deterrence					
Which should be the most important peace aim for the United States?	To see that the United States is so strong that no nations would dare attack us.				
Support for Democracy Promotion					
Which should be the most important peace aim for the United States?	To see that the people in all countries have the right to govern themselves.				
Support for Postwar Aid to Allies					
After the war, some of our allies will need help in feeding their people. Do you think the United States should send food to these countries even if it meant that we would have to keep on rationing food in our own country for a while to do it?	We should send food after the war, even if we have to keep on rationing food in the US in order to do it.				
After the war, some of our allies will need money and materials to help them get back on their feet. Do you think we should let them have money and materials to help them get back on their feet, even if it meant we should have to pay higher taxes to do it?	We should help them with money and materials after the war, even if it means higher taxes for us.				
Support for the United Nations					
After the war do you think the different countries (like the United States, Russia, England, China, France, etc.) should set up a permanent organization of nations to try to settle quarrels between countries and try to prevent war?	Should be set up.				
After the war do you think there should be a special force of soldiers from the Armies of a number of these countries that could be sent any place the international organization decided they were needed?	Yes, there should be an international army of that kind.				
Which do you think would be the best way for the United States to try to keep out of war in the future?	Join a strong permanent organization of nations.				
Do you think the United States should join a strong permanent organization of nations, even if it means that this organization would have some say about how the United States deals with other countries?	Yes, I think the U.S. should join.				
Which should be the most important peace aim for the United States?	To see that the nations organize to prevent wars in the future.				
Support for Imposing a Punitive Peace					
Do you think that the American Military Government is too tough or not tough enough on the ordinary Germans?	Not tough enough.				
Do you think the United Nations should keep an occupation force in Germany for some years after the war, even if it means the U.S. will have to furnish a considerable number of troops in order to do it?	Yes.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not break Germany up into smaller states?	Should.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not prevent the Germans from rebuilding their steel, chemical, and automotive industries?	Should.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not make German labor rebuild devastated areas in other countries at the wages usually paid prisoners of war?	Should.				
Do you think that the ordinary German people are to blame for starting the war, or do you think that it is really just the group of Nazi militaristic leaders who are to blame?	Almost all of the ordinary German people are to blame as well as their leaders.				

Table 2, continued: Dependent Variables and Theoretical Expectations

Concept	Coding (=1)	Militarism Expectation:	Logic:	Military Conservatism Expectation:	Logic:
Support for Nazi Justice					
Do you think the United Nations should or should not kill or put in prison for life all the bigshot Nazi leaders?	Should.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not kill or put in prison for life all the little Nazi leaders who held lower positions?	Should.				
Support for Postwar Reconciliation					
About how many of the German people do you think can be educated away from Nazism and taught to really think and act like democratic people?	Almost all of them.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not give emergency relief in such things as food, clothing, fuel, medical aid, where the Germans cannot supply these things themselves?	Should.				
Do you think the United Nations should or should not closely supervise and inspect the German schools and colleges for years to come?	Should.				
Do you think that the ordinary German people are to blame for starting the war, or do you think that it is really just the group of Nazi militaristic leaders who are to blame?	Almost none of the ordinary German people are to blame, it was just their leaders.				
Do you think Germany will ever again be a nation we can trust and treat as an equal?	Yes.				
Out-Group Animosity					
Do you think Germany will ever again be a nation we can trust and treat as an equal?	No.				
What sort of opinion do you have of the German people?	Very unfavorable.				
How you feel toward German soldiers?	I have a strong hatred towards German soldiers.				
How you feel toward German common people?	I have a strong hatred towards German common people.				
Do you think that the ordinary German people are to blame for starting the war, or do you think that it is really just the group of Nazi militaristic leaders who are to blame?	Almost all of the ordinary German people are to blame as well as their leaders.				

Figure 2: Observed Combat Experience by Service

Note: The plot shows the percentage of respondents in the S-235 sample with each level of combat experience across each service (Air Forces vs. Ground Forces).

enemy (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015, p. 988). Hence, our focal independent variable takes a value of 1 for individuals who served in the Army Ground Forces and self-reported combat exposure, and 0 otherwise.[25]

One potential concern with our combat measure is that it is based on self-reports. The S-235 survey was fielded immediately after news of the Japanese surrender, and in the context of victory, some soldiers who did not see combat may have reported exposure in order to appear valorous or to increase their chances of being demobilized quickly.[26] Because the survey was anonymous, and observed combat exposure matches official estimates, we are sanguine about the accuracy of self-reports. However, if glory-seeking non-combat troops wanted to appear tough by self-reporting combat exposure, that would bias against finding evidence for military conservatism. Individuals who misrepresented their combat experience were typically more aggressive, and glamorized the use of force (Mauldin, 1945, p. 14).

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[25]We control for service branch (Army Air Forces vs. Army Ground Forces) in all specifications. Results are substantively similar if we instead study an indicator for combat exposure irrespective of service branch.
[26]Soldiers were demobilized on the basis of a points system, and the system gave more points to individuals with combat decorations.

Covariates

The S-235 survey provides an array of demographic and other covariates. Our core models include fixed effects for the following categorical variables: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, and job importance. We also include indicators for service in the Army Ground Forces (versus Air Forces), and service in Britain ever, France ever, Germany before V-E Day, and Germany after V-E Day. In additional specifications, we control for other factors that could affect combat exposure and attitudes. To account for individual differences in bravery, which could drive selection into combat, we include an indicator for individuals decorated for valor.[27] To account for unit cohesion, we include indicators for the self-reported frequency with which each respondent's unit discussed the war. Because accessing the latest news on the front-lines was logistically difficult, we control for how hard each respondent's unit worked to keep men informed. These covariates ensure differences in the effect of combat do not merely reflect combat soldiers' poorer access to information. Table A.4 presents summary statistics.

Results

General Postwar Orientations

In Table 3 we assess how combat exposure affects views on isolationism (panel A), deterrence (panel B), and democracy promotion (panel C). In column 1 we estimate the unconditional effect of combat exposure. In column 2 we introduce our baseline specification, which adds a large set of fixed effects to control for core demographic characteristics and other aspects of respondents' military service. In column 3 we use entropy reweighting to balance our sample with demographics of American WWII servicemembers (Table 1) on age, education, and marital status. In column 4 we scale estimates by inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW), which up-weight respon-

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[27]No questions ask directly about decorations, so we construct this measure by triangulation. For each respondent we observe their Adjusted Service Rating Score (ASRS). ASRS were based on how long an individual was in the military, how long they were overseas, their dependency/parenthood status, and their decorations. We observe the former three components of the ASRS, and reconstruct a predicted score on the basis of these factors. Subtracting each troop's actual ASRS from their predicted ASRS minus decorations gives the approximate contribution of decorations to their overall ASRS. We define probable winners of medals for valor as individuals for whom the difference between actual and predicted ASRS is greater than the median difference. Substantively identical results emerge if we define medal winners as individuals in the top quartile or decile of the difference.

dents less likely to see combat on the basis of observed traits.[28] Columns 5 through 7, respectively, add controls for respondents decorated for valor, for the frequency with which respondents' units discussed the causes and progress of the war, and for respondents' access to the latest news; column 8 includes all of these measures in addition to the core fixed effects. We report Oster (2019)'s δs for all statistically significant results.

The results in panel A reveal a robust, positive effect of combat exposure on support for isolationism. Estimates from our baseline specification in column 2 reveal combat exposure increases support for isolationism by 5.8%. Across all specifications, combat increases isolationist sentiment by 4.2 to 8.3%. Given the large number of combat veterans after WWII, and their over-representation in governmental positions, these effects are electorally and politically significant. Oster's bounds reveal that omitted variables would have to account for nearly three times as much variation as existing covariates to attenuate the effect of combat exposure. Together, these results offer strong support for an implication of the military conservatism perspective, that wartime service breeds foreign policy restraint (Huntington, 1957; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004).

Turning to panel B, we find no evidence that combat significantly increases support for post-war arming in order to deter future aggressors. The estimates are positive but small and imprecise. In contrast, results in panel C reveal that combat veterans are more likely to view the US's main peace aim as promoting democracy abroad. In our baseline specification, combat increases support for ensuring that "people in all countries have the right to govern themselves" by 6.4%. Values of δ in panel C are mostly negative, indicating that controls strengthen the estimated effect of combat on support for democracy promotion relative to a model without controls. Negative δs suggest that results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables.

The results in panels B and C contradict prominent expectations of the militarism school, which would suggest that combat should make the military mind even more likely to support building military strength as opposed to supporting diplomatic and non-military solutions. Instead, findings in Table 3 show that combat veterans are no more supportive of investments to ensure deterrence, and favor democracy promotion, a politico-economic peace aim rather than a distinctly military one.

The positive effect of combat on democracy promotion might appear somewhat difficult

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[28]See Section A.3 for details on IPTW.

Table 3: Combat Exposure and Foreign Policy Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A:	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism	Isolationism
Combat Exposure	0.083***	0.058***	0.060**	0.042**	0.060***	0.056***	0.055***	0.058***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Constant	0.069***	0.074***	0.094***	0.080***	0.071***	0.075***	0.075***	0.071***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Oster's δ	—	2.893	2.313	2.984	3.173	2.733	2.701	2.933
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1790	1790	1770	1790	1761	1790	1790	1761
Clusters	1172	1172	1163	1172	1163	1172	1172	1163
AIC	501.936	347.854	628.629	408.055	302.217	343.491	338.267	296.343
Log-Likelihood	-248.968	-171.927	-312.315	-202.027	-149.108	-169.746	-167.134	-146.172
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B:	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence
Combat Exposure	0.021	0.023	0.007	0.026	0.034	0.025	0.019	0.033
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Constant	0.252***	0.251***	0.279***	0.251***	0.248***	0.251***	0.252***	0.248***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1663	1663	1644	1663	1637	1663	1663	1637
Clusters	1125	1125	1115	1125	1116	1125	1125	1116
AIC	1963.904	1832.756	1846.608	1722.763	1801.150	1820.965	1822.792	1785.923
Log-Likelihood	-979.952	-914.378	-921.304	-859.381	-898.575	-908.483	-909.396	-890.961
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel C:	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion	Democracy Promotion
Combat Exposure	0.029	0.064*	0.072*	0.083**	0.061*	0.064*	0.066**	0.061*
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Constant	0.269***	0.262***	0.251***	0.255***	0.260***	0.262***	0.261***	0.260***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Oster's δ	—	-8.098	-14.132	7.831	-6.599	-8.343	-7.850	-6.835
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1663	1663	1644	1663	1636	1663	1663	1636
Clusters	1122	1122	1112	1122	1112	1122	1122	1112
AIC	2039.576	1955.737	1869.995	1925.108	1916.254	1954.170	1953.251	1912.922
Log-Likelihood	-1017.788	-975.869	-932.998	-960.554	-956.127	-975.085	-974.625	-954.461
PARAMETERS								
Core FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Weights			Yes					
IPTW				Yes				
Decorations for Valor					Yes			Yes
Unit Discusses War FE						Yes		Yes
News Access FE							Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day). Oster's δs are based on a maximum R^2 of $1.3\times$ observed R^2. Isolationism has a mean of 0.087 and a standard deviation of 0.281. Deterrence has a mean of 0.256 and a standard deviation of 0.437. Democracy Promotion has a mean of 0.275 and a standard deviation of 0.447.

to reconcile with the military conservatism perspective. Gelpi and Feaver (2002) show veterans reserve the use of force for realpolitik issues, and oppose interventionist missions like regime change. However, particularities of our case are pertinent. During WWII, ensuring the right to

self-government was an important Allied goal after the Atlantic Charter, and US policymakers propagandized America's role as an "arsenal of democracy." Promoting democracy became synonymous with anti-Nazism in Allied parlance (Borgwardt, 2005). Combat veterans' support for promoting democracy as a postwar peace aim, then, is best understood as reflecting a more general anti-fascist sentiment, and a specific desire to inhibit Nazi resurgence by promoting US (democratic) values in liberated areas. We corroborate this interpretation in Table A.5, where we show that combat veterans are also more likely to say the US entered WWII "to destroy Nazism and fascism." To the extent, democracy promotion reflects a broader desire of combat veterans to ensure enduring Nazi defeat, it is consistent with tactical escalation, a corollary of military conservatism which implies a military preference for *decisive* victories when force is used (Betts, 1991).

Specific Postwar Policies

We turn now from the effect of combat on more abstract foreign policy attitudes (e.g. isolationism) to the effect of combat on support for specific foreign policies. In the immediate aftermath of Allied victory, four of the most pressing issues were aiding Europe's physical and economic recovery, forming an international organization for peace, imposing a punitive peace on the Axis powers, and bringing Nazi leaders to justice. We study soldiers' attitudes toward these specific policies in Table 4. The survey asked multiple questions to measure views on each policy, and we aggregate these into standardized summary indices using inverse-covariance weighting. As such, all outcomes are interpretable as shifts in standard deviations. Prior to index construction we used principal component analysis to verify constituent items loaded on a common factor. Although we focus on index outcomes in Table 4, we present results in Figure A.6 for an alternate, additive index, and for each index sub-component.

In panel A, we examine the effect of combat on support for Marshall Plan-style humanitarian aid to postwar Allies. Across models, combat exposure significantly reduces support for aid by one-tenth to one-fifth of a standard deviation. Oster's δs suggest omitted variables would have to account for 2.4 to 12 times as much variation as included covariates to reduce the effect of combat exposure on support for postwar aid to Allies to 0. Results in Figure A.6 reveal that the overall negative effect on aid is specifically driven by combat veterans' opposition to giving food aid to European countries if it means rationing must continue in the US. Wartime destruction in Europe was severe,

Table 4: Combat Exposure and Attitudes Toward Postwar Foreign Policies

Panel A:	(1) Marshall Plan	(2) Marshall Plan	(3) Marshall Plan	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) Marshall Plan	(6) Marshall Plan	(7) Marshall Plan	(8) Marshall Plan
Combat Exposure	-0.206***	-0.148**	-0.203***	-0.128*	-0.140**	-0.141**	-0.150**	-0.133*
	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Constant	0.043	0.031	0.003	0.035	0.036	0.030	0.032	0.035
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Oster's δ	—	3.001	2.472	11.907	2.634	2.744	3.061	2.398
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1805	1805	1782	1805	1776	1805	1805	1776
Clusters	1180	1180	1169	1180	1170	1180	1180	1170
AIC	5112.633	4957.935	4817.893	4884.749	4870.758	4951.528	4957.636	4862.860
Log-Likelihood	-2554.316	-2476.967	-2406.947	-2440.375	-2433.379	-2473.764	-2476.818	-2429.430

Panel B:	(1) United Nations	(2) United Nations	(3) United Nations	(4) United Nations	(5) United Nations	(6) United Nations	(7) United Nations	(8) United Nations
Combat Exposure	-0.166***	-0.131**	-0.153*	-0.109	-0.132**	-0.132**	-0.118*	-0.123*
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Constant	0.035	0.028	-0.038	0.017	0.042	0.028	0.025	0.040
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Oster's δ	—	4.437	2.798	—	4.901	4.472	3.570	4.064
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1817	1817	1794	1817	1787	1817	1817	1787
Clusters	1183	1183	1172	1183	1173	1183	1183	1173
AIC	5143.493	4978.368	5003.668	4892.361	4872.483	4959.745	4951.149	4842.747
Log-Likelihood	-2569.746	-2487.184	-2499.834	-2444.181	-2434.242	-2477.872	-2473.574	-2419.373

Panel C:	(1) Punitive Peace	(2) Punitive Peace	(3) Punitive Peace	(4) Punitive Peace	(5) Punitive Peace	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Punitive Peace	(8) Punitive Peace
Combat Exposure	0.123**	0.196***	0.142*	0.190***	0.206***	0.190***	0.190***	0.199***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Constant	-0.026	-0.041	-0.057	-0.037	-0.045	-0.040	-0.040	-0.044
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Oster's δ	—	-16.623	-3.681	-10.002	-12.562	-22.313	-21.472	-16.473
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1824	1824	1801	1824	1792	1824	1824	1792
Clusters	1185	1185	1174	1185	1174	1185	1185	1174
AIC	5171.928	5062.754	5082.096	4978.610	4969.004	5051.801	5053.092	4953.171
Log-Likelihood	-2583.964	-2529.377	-2539.048	-2487.305	-2482.502	-2523.900	-2524.546	-2474.586

Panel D:	(1) Nazi Justice	(2) Nazi Justice	(3) Nazi Justice	(4) Nazi Justice	(5) Nazi Justice	(6) Nazi Justice	(7) Nazi Justice	(8) Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure	0.075	0.082	0.082	0.069	0.078	0.088	0.086	0.078
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Constant	-0.016	-0.017	-0.098**	-0.012	-0.011	-0.018	-0.018	-0.011
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1793	1793	1771	1793	1766	1793	1793	1766
Clusters	1171	1171	1160	1171	1162	1171	1171	1162
AIC	5084.355	4973.698	5242.750	4787.048	4881.967	4968.890	4966.389	4872.752
Log-Likelihood	-2540.178	-2484.849	-2619.375	-2391.524	-2438.983	-2482.445	-2481.195	-2434.376
PARAMETERS								
Core FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Weights			Yes					
IPTW				Yes				
Decorations for Valor					Yes			Yes
Unit Discusses War FE						Yes		Yes
News Access FE							Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day). Oster's δs are based on a maximum R^2 of $1.3\times$ observed R^2. All outcomes are standardized indices with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

and in the immediate postwar period, the US exported roughly one-sixth of its food supply to Allied countries. Combat veteran's hesitancy about large aid donations, in tandem with their increased

isolationist sentiment, suggests combat fostered greater reluctance to support expanding foreign policy commitments directly after the war, even if the beneficiaries of those commitments were wartime allies. In general, this evidence comports with the military conservatism school, which views combat as fostering foreign policy caution.

How did combat exposure affect preferences over forming the United Nations? For America's civilian leaders, and especially President Roosevelt, establishing an international organization for dispute resolution and peace management represented a critical postwar goal (Borgwardt, 2005). The breakdown of the League of Nations in the run-up to WWII convinced America's civilian leadership that an organization was needed to manage interstate hostilities in the future. Over the course of the war, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Allied diplomats crafted a plan to create the United Nations. In contrast, US military officials consistently advocated to moderate or retract various wartime agreements pertaining to US involvement in the UN (Schlesinger, 2009).

The quantitative evidence in panel B comports with qualitative accounts of military skepticism. Combat exposure has a modest, consistently negative effect on support for formation of the UN. Effect sizes range from 0.1 to 0.17 standard deviations, and all estimates are precise or nearly so (two-sided p = 0.107 in column 4). Estimates in Figure A.6 reveal that combat veterans' opposition to the UN is driven by skepticism that the US could avoid future wars by joining a strong international organization, and by skepticism that establishing the UN should be a main peace aim. There is no effect of combat on attitudes about an international military force established under UN auspices to keep the peace. These results are informative about whether combat's effect on attitudes toward the UN reflect militarism or military conservatism. Both perspectives anticipate military skepticism about internationalist and diplomatic initiatives. However, the militarism perspective would anticipate military support for an international military force in which the US played a major role. Instead, we find that combat has a *negative* but statistically insignificant effect on support for such a force. These results suggest that a more general aversion to international obligations that could draw the US into future conflicts drives combat veterans' opposition to the UN.

In panel C we study attitudes toward imposing a punitive peace on Nazi Germany. This was a particularly contentious issue during WWII because stiff reparations levied on Germany after World War I laid the groundwork for the rise of the Nazis in the Interwar period (Borgwardt, 2005). Allied officials proposed various schemes for permanently crippling Germany's war-making

capacity. For instance, the Morgenthau Plan advocated splitting Germany into small, agricultural states, and severely limiting its industrial production. The Soviet Union also sought a punitive peace against Germany, and especially compensation for the massive destruction wrought on the Eastern Front. We find that combat veterans are significantly more supportive of imposing a punitive peace on Germany, with effect sizes of nearly one-fifth of a standard deviation. Negative δs give no evidence of omitted variables bias. The effects of combat exposure on support for a military occupation of Germany, and support for the view that the US military government is not tough enough on Germany drive the overall results. These findings accord closely with the notion of tactical escalation (Betts, 1991; Gelpi and Feaver, 2002), which holds that servicemembers eschew force in general, but prefer large-scale, unrestrained operations when force is used. Support for imposing a punitive peace reflects a desire to ensure the durability of the hard-won Allied victory.

The militarism perspective also anticipates a military preference for using force (Sechser, 2004). To disentangle the theoretical underpinnings of the punitive peace findings, we estimate a series of additional models in Table A.7. In particular, we study combat veterans' attitudes about demobilization and service in occupation roles. If combat increases support for a punitive peace because veterans are inherently hawkish or want additional opportunities to fight, as the militarism school anticipates, we should observe a positive effect of combat on willingness to serve on occupation duty, and a negative effect of combat on desire to demobilize. Instead, we find that combat veterans are less willing to serve in occupation roles, and more resentful of soldiers who have already been demobilized. Thus,these results are more consistent with military conservatism.

Finally, in panel D of Table 4 we explore the effect of combat on attitudes about bringing Nazi leaders to justice. Although effects on combat exposure are positive, estimates are small and imprecise. The issue of whether and how to prosecute Nazi officials for crimes against humanity during WWII was uncontroversial, with high support among the Allies. In the S-235 survey, 96% of respondents supported killing or imprisoning for life top Nazi leaders, and 75% of respondents supported killing or imprisoning for life lesser Nazi leaders. As a result, null effects of combat exposure should not be interpreted as evidence that combat veterans were unsupportive of punishing Nazi leaders; rather, there is simply little variation in the outcome. Indeed, when we disaggregate the Nazi Justice index, we find that combat exposure increases support for punishing top Nazi leaders by 2% (two-sided p = 0.082).

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Out-Group Animosity

An alternative explanation for our finding that combat veterans are more supportive of imposing a punitive peace on Germany is that combat hardens attitudes toward adversaries (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). A large literature in comparative politics and behavioral economics finds that violence exposure induces negative sentiment directed at out-groups (Bauer et al., 2016). On the other hand, it is also possible that combat yields post-traumatic growth, making those exposed more conciliatory and pro-social (Blattman, 2009). We explore these explanations in Table A.8. We find no evidence that combat veterans exhibit either more out-group hostility or more conciliatory views toward former adversaries. These null effects are more consistent with the Hungtingtonian view of the professional military mind as measured, rational, and unemotional.

Robustness and Extensions

Our core results show that combat exposure in WWII had a number of important effects on foreign policy attitudes. Here, we address a number of empirical issues and extensions that could present challenges to the results presented above.

Ground Versus Aerial Combat

In our main estimations we study the effect of ground combat, since this was the dominant form of fighting in WWII, and entails face-to-face contact between adversaries. Nevertheless, all of our core results are robust to pooling combat veterans in the Army Ground and Air Forces (Table A.9). In Table A.10 we probe for differences between ground and air combat veterans. Most of our focal effects are larger in magnitude for ground than air combat; the effect of combat on isolationism is significantly greater for ground combatants (two-sided p = 0.070).[29] Exploring differences between the effects of ground and air combat is a ripe avenue for future work, but these differences suggest physical proximity to the adversary on the battlefield is consequential for attitudes. To the extent infantrymen in World War II were more keenly aware of war's horrors than pilots because of their proximity to battlefield violence, these results accord with Huntington

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[29]Statistical power to identify these differences is limited given the small number of combat veterans from the Army Air Forces.

([1957](#))'s notion that physical experiences of war's costs reduce support for future force.[30]

Combat Versus Near-Combat

Table 5: Combat Exposure Versus Near-Combat Exposure

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1) Isolationism	(2) Deterrence	(3) Democracy	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) United Nations	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure vs. Near-Combat Exposure	0.065*** (0.022)	0.026 (0.034)	0.088** (0.036)	-0.095 (0.074)	-0.140* (0.073)	0.204*** (0.072)	0.022 (0.066)
Combat Exposure vs. Baseline	0.047** (0.024)	0.020 (0.036)	0.031 (0.038)	-0.222*** (0.079)	-0.118 (0.075)	0.184** (0.078)	0.167** (0.074)
Near-Combat Exposure vs. Baseline	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.031)	-0.057* (0.032)	-0.126* (0.069)	0.023 (0.067)	-0.019 (0.069)	0.146** (0.069)
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. Near-combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground violence (e.g. artillery) but not combat. Baseline captures all respondents in the Army Army Air Forces and members of the Army Ground Forces neither exposed to combat nor near-combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

In our main models, we compare combat veterans to all other servicemembers. However, wartime experiences of violence are diverse. In Table 5 we explore whether our core effects hold when we compare combat veterans to near-combat veterans.[31] Combat and near-combat veterans represent a close comparison group since both were deployed within range of the front-lines and experienced hostile fire. Encouragingly, we find that combat veterans remain more isolationist, more supportive of democracy promotion, less supportive of UN formation, and more supportive of imposing a punitive peace than near-combat veterans. Significant differences between combat and near-combat veterans suggest that mere exposure to risk from hostile fire is insufficient to account for the effects of combat. Our results point to the importance of three factors: unlike soldiers near-combat, combatants (1) are in direct contact with hostile forces; (2) are more systematically engaged in perpetrating violence; and (3) are more persistently exposed to battlefield casualties. Future work should explore these specific mechanisms to isolate combat's effects.

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[30]We use gendered language here given the gendered character of access to military service in the United States in World War II.

[31]Estimates are calculated from a model with separate indicators for combat and near-combat exposure. Both exposure measures are specific to ground combat. For completeness, we also provide estimates of effects versus the baseline, excluded category, which includes non-combat veterans of the Army Ground Forces and all respondents from the Army Air Forces. Substantively identical results emerge when we compare all combat exposed respondents to all near-combat exposed respondents (Table A.11).

Outfit Fixed Effects

During WWII, combat conditions varied across operations, campaigns, and localities. We attempt to account for differences in deployments in our main analyses by controlling for whether respondents were ever stationed in Britain, France, Germany prior to V-E Day, or Germany after V-E Day. Still, the experience of combat varied across fronts (McManus, 1998; MacDonald, 1997). To more fully account for differences in campaign history and the type of combat respondents faced, we re-estimate our models with outfit fixed effects.[32] This test only leverages within-outfit variation in exposure to combat, and entails comparing longer-serving soldiers with newer replacement troops in the same unit. This test is demanding because we only observe multiple respondents from a given unit for 41% of outfits (483 of 1185) in our sample, and we only observe within-unit variation in combat exposure for 28% of outfits (330 of 1185) in our sample. Three of the effects survive the inclusion of outfit fixed effects. Combat veterans remain more isolationist (β = 0.077, two-sided p = 0.012), less supportive of the UN (β = -0.201, two-sided p = 0.043), and more supportive of imposing a punitive peace (β = 0.165, two-sided p = 0.136).[33]

Intensive Margin of Combat Exposure

Our main estimates exploit variation on the extensive margin of combat. Implicitly, we treat all combat veterans as similar, regardless of the extent of their exposure. However, a relatively small number of units were repeatedly deployed in the most costly and difficult battles during WWII (Mauldin, 1945). Soldiers exposed to more persistent combat may hold distinct attitudes about postwar foreign policy. To test this dynamic, we replace our indicator for combat exposure with a categorical measure from the survey, which records the number of days of combat each respondent saw.[34] These models leverage variation on the intensive margin of exposure. As reflected in Table A.13, our core findings hold, though estimates on support for the UN are modestly less precise.

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[32]Archivists did not preserve details on which outfits were sampled. The standard sampling unit in the ASWW2 family was the company, so outfit fixed effects are more than likely company fixed effects.

[33]Full estimates are reported in Figure A.12.

[34]The five categories are: 0 days, 1-27 days, 28-55 days, 56-111 days, and 112-335 days. Only respondents from the Army Ground Forces were asked the intensity of their exposure, so these models exclude respondents from the Army Air Forces.

Matching

To further address concerns about observable differences between combat and non-combat veterans, we test the robustness of our results to matching. First, we use coarsened exact matching to match all combat and non-combat soldiers on the key, observable predictors of exposure.[35] Second, we repeat the matching procedure, focusing solely on matching combat and near-combat respondents. Both matching procedures yield substantively similar results, corroborating our core estimates (Table A.14).

Accounting for Draft Status

A main threat to inference in our framework is non-random selection into military service. Individuals who volunteer for military service (Erikson and Stoker, 2011; Stadelmann, Portmann and Eichenberger, 2015), and especially combat missions (Cockerham and Cohen, 1981), differ in key ways from conscripts. In particular, volunteers are likely to be more hawkish and aggressive (Jost, Meshkin and Schub, 2019; Endicott, 2020). A sizeable minority (39%) of all US service-members in WWII were volunteers. Unfortunately, we cannot directly account for respondents' draft status (i.e. volunteer versus conscript) because we do not observe this information in the S-235 survey. Still, our results accord with the military conservatism perspective. To the extent military volunteers hold more hawkish preferences—and are more likely to select into combat missions—their presence in our sample should bias against our findings.

To more fully account for differences in the effect of combat stemming from draft status, we draw on an additional survey from the same group of surveys entitled "Reactions to the Enemy and Further Duty – Form A," also known as the S-211A survey. The S-211A survey was fielded in June 1945 on 2,052 white and Black enlisted men across three Army Air Forces and seven Army Ground/Service Forces Redistribution Centers in the continental US. Respondents were returning from deployments across all nine major theaters of the war. The survey contains questions on several of the pertinent foreign policy questions we study, including Marshall Plan aid, punitive peace imposition, and Nazi justice.[36] In Table A.16 we estimate the effect of combat exposure on attitudes toward these foreign policies while controlling for respondents' draft status. In these

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[35] We match on service branch, age, education, time deployed overseas, time in unit, ever deployed in Britain, and deployed in Germany before V-E Day.

[36] See section A.15 of the appendix for details.

models, we replicate the negative effect of combat on support for Marshall Plan aid (β = -0.119, two-sided p = 0.130), and the positive effect of combat on support for imposing a punitive peace (β = 0.128, two-sided p = 0.074). Although results from the S-235 and S-211A surveys are not directly comparable given differences in when, where, and who was surveyed, consistency between findings helps build confidence. Evidence from the S-211A survey also suggests our main findings are likely to generalize beyond the European theater.

Conclusion

The question of how military service influences future attitudes, including foreign policy attitudes, is an important one for international relations, and political science in general. There are two major competing schools of thought about the impact of military service. The militarism school argues that military service selects for and/or accentuates biases in favor of the use of military force and aggression. The conservatism school argues that exposure to the costs of war, in contrast, leads to hesitancy about the initiation of conflict in the future, though determination once conflict occurs. We intervene in this debate with a unique contribution - an analysis of survey data of US military service members at the end of World War II. This is the first major micro-level study of how military service influenced foreign policy attitudes for soldiers that served in one of the most consequential wars in world history. It therefore provides novel leverage on these broader questions, especially given the depth of the data, which allows us to account for a number of confounding factors that would represent challenges to inference.

The results provide new micro-level empirical support for some of the expectations of the military conservatism perspective, though not those involving support for arming. Soldiers exposed to combat, in comparison to those nearly exposed to combat and those not exposed at all, were more cautious about foreign policy in general, but more strongly supported decisive action to ensure victory.

Finally, we offer evidence that also contributes to ongoing debates about how exposure to combat influences political attitudes more broadly, especially out-group hatred and otherization. In contrast to micro-level findings drawn almost exclusively from irregular conflicts and civil wars, we show that combat exposure for US soldiers in World War II did not lead to markedly higher in-group hostility.

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Supplementary Materials for Baptized by Fire: Combat Exposure and Attitudes of World War II Veterans

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Section A.1: Background on the ASWW2 Surveys

The American Soldier in World War II project was a major survey research effort undertaken by the War Department during WWII. In total, the effort produced more than 200 surveys covering over 500,000 soldiers, or about 3% of all wartime US servicemembers. Background information described below comes from Stouffer et al. (1949) and Ryan (2013).

The ASWW2 surveys were fielded by the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division of the Army Service Forces. The Information and Education Division was formed in March 1941 as the Morale Division (later briefly known as the Special Services Division), and was commanded by Brigadier General Frederick Henry Osborn, a businessman, member of the Social Science Research Council, and friend of President Franklin Roosevelt. The Division included four sub-units: the Research Branch, the Information Branch, the Education Branch, and the Orientation Branch; the latter three were responsible for implementing recommendations based on findings from the Research Branch.

The Research Branch was led by Dr. Samuel A. Stouffer, and civilian technical advisor and sociologist, alongside a military chief. By war's end, the Research Branch included more than 55 military and 68 civilian staff, with research units in nine theaters and commands outside the continental US. In general, Army officers oversaw administration, while civilians and enlisted men served as technicians, clerks, or social scientific advisors. Sub-units of the Research Branch included the Survey, Experimental, Overseas, Statistical, Developmental, Field Study, Production, Editorial, and Overseas Analysis Sections. The overall aim of the Branch was to help the military understand and address issues of morale and combat motivation. As Stouffer described the mission of the Branch as one of social engineering to improve military effectiveness. Empirically, however, he sought an academic-military bridge that would leverage theory so that "hypotheses can be tested by crucial controlled experiments, with the aid of new quantitative tools."

The idea of conducting survey research in the military was initially contentious, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson prohibited research, fearing that allowing soldiers to express their opinions would be destructive to military organization and hierarchy. More generally, officers and commanders initially opposed surveys, preferring to believe military dogma and tradition rather than statistical results, and fearing surveys would interfere with training and operations. Nevertheless, survey research under the ASWW2 project began on December 8, 1941 with the support of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, who was convinced of the merits of the project.

The ASWW2 initiative quickly gained broader support as survey findings impacted military policy, helping resolve key issues. Findings were disseminated in a monthly report, called "What the Soldier Thinks," down to commanders at the company-level. In the report, commanders read that the purpose was "bringing to officers concerned information of practical value in maintaining the morale and the fighting efficiency of troops under their command." Skeptical commanders were ordered to allow research, and were told that "Studies of soldier attitudes ... based on the statistical analysis of replies made anonymously to questions asked of thousands of soldiers ... is more representative—and therefore more generally applicable—than the personal impressions of even the most experienced and able officer-observers." By 1944, Major Charles Dollard, the head of the Research Branch in Europe, reported "no substantial resistance to research work anywhere in the theater." Over the course of the war, findings from the ASWW2 project resulted in concrete changes in pay scales, creation of the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Expert Infantryman's Badge, modifications to training regimens to reduce fear of German weapons, and changes to publicity efforts like Capra's "Why We Fight," among others.

Table A.2: Correlates of Combat Exposure

We model the demographic and service-related correlates of combat exposure in Table A.2. Estimates from column 1 are depicted in Figure 1.

Table A.2: Predicting Combat Exposure

	Combat Exposed (=1)	
	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	OLS	Probit
Army Ground Forces	-0.003	-0.029
	(0.024)	(0.094)
Rank/Grade	-0.001	-0.011
	(0.013)	(0.045)
Age	-0.010***	-0.033**
	(0.004)	(0.013)
Education	-0.022***	-0.080***
	(0.007)	(0.025)
Single, No Children	0.017	0.065
	(0.022)	(0.078)
Time Deployed Overseas	-0.043***	-0.150***
	(0.008)	(0.026)
Time in Present Outfit	-0.050***	-0.175***
	(0.008)	(0.024)
Ever Deployed in Britain	-0.071**	-0.224***
	(0.030)	(0.087)
Ever Deployed in France	-0.057	-0.190
	(0.036)	(0.122)
Deployed in Germany Pre V-E Day	0.200***	0.621***
	(0.030)	(0.088)
Deployed in Germany Post V-E Day	0.021	0.086
	(0.020)	(0.082)
Constant	0.802***	1.172***
	(0.071)	(0.241)
MODEL STATISTICS		
Observations	1824	1824
Clusters	1185	1185
AIC	1865.699	1807.109
Log-Likelihood	-920.850	-891.554

Section A.3: Constructing IPTW

In some models we scale estimates using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW). Following Hernán and Robins (2020), we construct these by: (1) estimating a probit model of combat exposure as seen in column 2 of Table A.2; (2) predicting the conditional probability of combat exposure for each respondent; and (3) generating IPTW such that

$$\text{IPTW} = \begin{cases} Pr(Combat = 1 | Covariates), & \text{if } Combat = 1 \\ 1 - Pr(Combat = 1 | Covariates), & \text{if } Combat = 0 \end{cases}$$

IPTW are well-behaved, with a mean and median around 1 (mean = 1.947, median = 1.293).

Table A.4: Summary Statistics

Table A.4: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables and Covariates

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.		Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Combat Status						**Rank/Grade**					
Ground Combat Veteran (=1)	1,824	0.211	0.408	0	1	Rank: Non-Response	1,824	0.011	0.104	0	1
Near Ground Combat Veteran (=1)	1,824	0.318	0.466	0	1	Private/Private First Class	1,824	0.417	0.493	0	1
Combat Veteran (=1)	1,824	0.251	0.434	0	1	Corporal/Technician 5th Grade	1,824	0.232	0.423	0	1
Near Combat Veteran (=1)	1,824	0.428	0.495	0	1	Sergeant/Technician 3rd/4th Grade	1,824	0.339	0.474	0	1
Age						**Time in Military**					
Age: Non-Response	1,824	0.010	0.102	0	1	Time in: Non-Response	1,824	0.009	0.096	0	1
19 or Less	1,824	0.050	0.218	0	1	6 Months or Less	1,824	0.001	0.033	0	1
20	1,824	0.073	0.261	0	1	6 to 12 Months	1,824	0.035	0.183	0	1
21	1,824	0.082	0.274	0	1	12 to 18 Months	1,824	0.081	0.273	0	1
22	1,824	0.069	0.254	0	1	18 to 24 Months	1,824	0.080	0.271	0	1
23	1,824	0.081	0.272	0	1	24 to 30 Months	1,824	0.167	0.373	0	1
24	1,824	0.087	0.281	0	1	30 to 36 Months	1,824	0.297	0.457	0	1
25	1,824	0.075	0.263	0	1	36 to 42 Months	1,824	0.145	0.352	0	1
26-29	1,824	0.217	0.412	0	1	42+ Months	1,824	0.185	0.388	0	1
30-34	1,824	0.158	0.365	0	1						
35-37	1,824	0.064	0.244	0	1	**Time Deployed Overseas**					
38 or More	1,824	0.035	0.184	0	1	Time Deployed: Non-Response	1,824	0.010	0.099	0	1
						6 Months or Less	1,824	0.062	0.241	0	1
Education						6 to 12 Months	1,824	0.237	0.425	0	1
Education: Non-Response	1,824	0.004	0.066	0	1	12 to 18 Months	1,824	0.200	0.400	0	1
Less than 6 Grade	1,824	0.024	0.152	0	1	18 to 24 Months	1,824	0.290	0.454	0	1
6 Grade	1,824	0.027	0.163	0	1	24 to 30 Months	1,824	0.112	0.315	0	1
7 Grade	1,824	0.052	0.222	0	1	30 to 36 Months	1,824	0.056	0.231	0	1
8 Grade	1,824	0.133	0.340	0	1	36+ Months	1,824	0.033	0.178	0	1
Some High School	1,824	0.279	0.448	0	1						
Completed High School	1,824	0.330	0.470	0	1	**Time in Current Outfit**					
Some College	1,824	0.123	0.328	0	1	Time in Outfit: Non-Response	1,824	0.014	0.116	0	1
Completed College	1,824	0.028	0.165	0	1	Less than 1 Month	1,824	0.082	0.274	0	1
						1-2 Months	1,824	0.170	0.376	0	1
Marital/Parenthood Status						3-5 Months	1,824	0.129	0.336	0	1
Marital/Parenthood: Non-Response	1,824	0.004	0.066	0	1	6-11 Months	1,824	0.140	0.347	0	1
Single, No Children	1,824	0.582	0.493	0	1	12+ Months	1,824	0.465	0.499	0	1
Divorced/Separated	1,824	0.018	0.131	0	1						
Widowed	1,824	0.003	0.052	0	1	**Morale**					
Married, No Children	1,824	0.209	0.407	0	1	Morale: Non-Response	1,824	0.004	0.066	0	1
Married, 1 Child	1,824	0.135	0.342	0	1	Usually in Good Spirits	1,824	0.254	0.435	0	1
Married, 2 Children	1,824	0.034	0.181	0	1	Sometimes Good, Sometimes Low Spirits	1,824	0.578	0.494	0	1
Married, 3 or More Children	1,824	0.015	0.121	0	1	Usually in Low Spirits	1,824	0.163	0.370	0	1
Physical Condition						**Service Branch**					
Condition: Non-Response	1,824	0.008	0.087	0	1	Army Ground Forces	1,824	0.780	0.415	0	1
Very Good	1,824	0.159	0.366	0	1	Army Air Forces					
Good	1,824	0.362	0.481	0	1						
Fair	1,824	0.402	0.490	0	1	**Deployments**					
Poor	1,824	0.056	0.230	0	1	Ever in Britain	1824	0.779	0.415	0	1
Very Poor	1,824	0.013	0.114	0	1	Ever in France	1824	0.901	0.298	0	1
						In Germany Before V-E Day	1824	0.229	0.420	0	1
Perceived Job Importance						In Germany After V-E Day	1824	0.637	0.481	0	1
Job Importance: Non-Response	1,824	0.026	0.160	0	1						
As Important as Any Other Job	1,824	0.431	0.495	0	1	**Unit Discusses War**					
Fairly Important but Not Most Important	1,824	0.234	0.423	0	1	Discussion: Non-Response	1824	0.069	0.254	0	1
Hardly Important at All	1,824	0.309	0.462	0	1	Once a Week	1824	0.351	0.477	0	1
						2 to 3 Times a Month	1824	0.130	0.336	0	1
Keeping Men Informed About News						Once a Month	1824	0.122	0.328	0	1
News: Non-Response	1824	0.039	0.193	0	1	Less Than Once a Month	1824	0.163	0.370	0	1
As Much as Possible	1824	0.391	0.488	0	1	Never	1824	0.164	0.371	0	1
Quite a Bit, but More Could be Done	1824	0.258	0.438	0	1						
A Lot More Could be Done	1824	0.312	0.463	0	1						
Decorations											
Probable Medal Winner	1792	0.262	0.440	0	1						

Table A.5: Combat Veterans and Anti-Fascism/Anti-Nazism

We find that combat exposure increases support for democracy promotion as the US's main postwar peace aim. We interpret this effect as a more general indicator of combat veterans' desire to eradicate Nazism, given that wartime policymakers framed democracy as antonymous with fascism/Nazism. Consistent with our interpretation, we also find that combat veterans are more likely to respond that "we got into this war to destroy Nazism and fascism" when asked "[which] is the more important reason why we got into the war?" All results are significant or nearly so. Two-sided p-values equal 0.117 in column 1, 0.100 in column 2, 0.294 in column 3, and 0.100 in column 6.

Table A.5: Combat Exposure and Attitudes About Why the US Fought in WWII

	(1) Anti-Fascism	(2) Anti-Fascism	(3) Anti-Fascism	(4) Anti-Fascism	(5) Anti-Fascism	(6) Anti-Fascism	(7) Anti-Fascism	(8) Anti-Fascism
Combat Exposure	0.048	0.061	0.045	0.070*	0.079**	0.061	0.062*	0.086**
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Constant	0.414***	0.412***	0.401***	0.417***	0.409***	0.412***	0.412***	0.407***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1533	1533	1512	1533	1506	1533	1533	1506
Clusters	1065	1065	1054	1065	1055	1065	1065	1055
AIC	2190.281	2115.268	2035.370	2077.591	2076.289	2104.317	2107.460	2056.908
Log-Likelihood	-1093.140	-1055.634	-1015.685	-1036.796	-1036.144	-1050.158	-1051.730	-1026.454
PARAMETERS								
Core FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Weights			Yes					
IPTW				Yes				
Decorations for Valor					Yes			Yes
Unit Discusses War FE						Yes		Yes
News Access FE							Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day). Anti-Fascism has a mean of 0.424 and a standard deviation of 0.494.

Figure A.6: Specific Postwar Policies Results

In Table 4 we study the effects of combat exposure on four index outcomes representing specific postwar foreign policies: Marshall Plan Aid to Allies, formation of the United Nations, imposing a punitive peace on Germany, and bringing Nazi leaders to justice. The outcomes we study are inverse-covariance weighted summary indices comprised of multiple items. In Figure A.6 we show that our results are robust to index construction, and explore effects on the constituent components of each index. First, we present estimates ("ICW Index," black circles) corresponding to column 2 of Table 4 for reference. Second, we present estimates ("EW Index," white circles) using an alternate index, which aggregates sub-components using an equally-weighted, additive procedure, rather than by inverse-covariance weighting. Third, we present results for each individual sub-component/item of the relevant index (gray squares). Point estimates are labelled in the figure.

Figure A.6: Attitudes Toward Specific Postwar Policies: Alternate Index and Index Sub-Components

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. Core model parameters follow column 2 of Table 4 for reference. Black circles denote our core estimates from Table 4 for reference. White circles denote estimates using an equally-weighted, additive index rather than an inverse-covariance weighted index. Gray squares denote sub-components of the respective index.

Table A.7: Combat Exposure and Demobilization

We find that combat exposure increases support for imposing a punitive peace, and interpret this effect as reflecting a desire to ensure Nazi Germany was decisively defeated, not reflecting a general military predisposition toward using force. Consistent with our interpretation, we also find that combat veterans are more likely to respond that "I feel I have already done my share and should be ED [eligible for discharge]" when asked "[a]lthough the war is over, there is still a big job for the Army to do in occupying the defeated countries and in completing the job of demobilization. How do you feel about further service on these jobs?" In addition, we find that combat veterans are more likely to report that they are "very resentful" when asked "[h]ow resentful do you yourself feel about troops who have jobs in the United States." All results are significant or nearly so. Two-sided p-values equal 0.131 in column 4 of panel B.

Table A.7: Combat Exposure and Attitudes Toward Occupation Duty and Demobilization

Panel A:	(1) Oppose Occupation Duty	(2) Oppose Occupation Duty	(3) Oppose Occupation Duty	(4) Oppose Occupation Duty	(5) Oppose Occupation Duty	(6) Oppose Occupation Duty	(7) Oppose Occupation Duty	(8) Oppose Occupation Duty
Combat Exposure	0.048**	0.070***	0.071***	0.066***	0.070***	0.071***	0.072***	0.073***
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.784***	0.779***	0.791***	0.768***	0.780***	0.779***	0.779***	0.780***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1791	1791	1768	1791	1763	1791	1791	1763
Clusters	1174	1174	1163	1174	1165	1174	1174	1165
AIC	1838.718	1478.620	1332.817	1418.936	1446.144	1473.380	1475.215	1434.393
Log-Likelihood	-917.359	-737.310	-664.409	-707.468	-721.072	-734.690	-735.607	-715.197

Panel B:	(1) Resent Troops in US	(2) Resent Troops in US	(3) Resent Troops in US	(4) Resent Troops in US	(5) Resent Troops in US	(6) Resent Troops in US	(7) Resent Troops in US	(8) Resent Troops in US
Combat Exposure	0.053**	0.052**	0.062**	0.038	0.055**	0.054**	0.054**	0.058**
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.135***	0.135***	0.139***	0.130***	0.135***	0.134***	0.134***	0.134***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1779	1779	1757	1779	1751	1779	1779	1751
Clusters	1168	1168	1157	1168	1158	1168	1168	1158
AIC	1337.812	1239.929	1245.709	1181.450	1222.834	1233.541	1238.051	1214.972
Log-Likelihood	-666.906	-617.965	-620.855	-588.725	-609.417	-614.771	-617.026	-605.486
PARAMETERS								
Core FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Weights			Yes					
IPTW				Yes				
Decorations for Valor					Yes			Yes
Unit Discusses War FE						Yes		Yes
News Access FE							Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day). Oppose Occupation Duty has a mean of 0.793 and a standard deviation of 0.405. Resent Troops in US has a mean of 0.146 and a standard deviation of 0.353.

Table A.8: Combat Exposure and Out-Group Attitudes

We find that combat exposure increases support for imposing a punitive peace. This could result because combat hardens attitudes toward adversaries. Alternatively, some work suggests combat makes those exposed more prosocial. We explore these below. Panel A studies the effect of combat on anti-German animosity, and panel B studies the effect of combat on pro-German reconciliation.

Table A.8: Combat Exposure and Attitudes Toward Occupation Duty and Demobilization

Panel A:	(1) Anti-German Animosity	(2) Anti-German Animosity	(3) Anti-German Animosity	(4) Anti-German Animosity	(5) Anti-German Animosity	(6) Anti-German Animosity	(7) Anti-German Animosity	(8) Anti-German Animosity
Combat Exposure	-0.095*	-0.037	-0.010	-0.017	-0.037	-0.042	-0.027	-0.031
	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Constant	0.020	0.008	0.017	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.006	0.007
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1816	1816	1793	1816	1785	1816	1816	1785
Clusters	1182	1182	1171	1182	1171	1182	1182	1171
AIC	5152.551	5025.339	5014.212	4971.936	4944.276	5020.252	5015.892	4928.191
Log-Likelihood	-2574.275	-2510.670	-2505.106	-2483.968	-2470.138	-2508.126	-2505.946	-2462.096

Panel B:	(1) Pro-German Reconciliation	(2) Pro-German Reconciliation	(3) Pro-German Reconciliation	(4) Pro-German Reconciliation	(5) Pro-German Reconciliation	(6) Pro-German Reconciliation	(7) Pro-German Reconciliation	(8) Pro-German Reconciliation
Combat Exposure	-0.007	0.045	-0.035	0.025	0.041	0.052	0.040	0.049
	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Constant	0.001	-0.010	-0.015	-0.012	-0.007	-0.011	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
MODEL STATISTICS								
Observations	1809	1809	1786	1809	1779	1809	1809	1779
Clusters	1178	1178	1167	1178	1167	1178	1178	1167
AIC	5129.985	5048.055	5190.505	5032.902	4939.662	5041.274	5044.194	4929.284
Log-Likelihood	-2562.993	-2522.028	-2593.253	-2514.451	-2467.831	-2518.637	-2520.097	-2462.642
PARAMETERS								
Core FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Weights		Yes						
IPTW				Yes				
Decorations for Valor					Yes			Yes
Unit Discusses War FE						Yes		Yes
News Access FE							Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

Table A.9: Ground and Aerial Combat Exposure

In our main estimates we focus on the effect of ground combat—that is, combat exposure among the Army Ground Forces. Ground combat was the dominant form of fighting in WWII, and entails direct face-to-face fighting. However, our core results hold when we consider an indicator for combat exposure pooling combat exposed respondents from the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces.

Table A.9: Assessing a Broader Measure of Combat Exposure

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1) Isolationism	(2) Deterrence	(3) Democracy Promotion	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) United Nations	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Nazi Justice
Ground and Air Combat Exposure	0.044**	0.006	0.057*	-0.110*	-0.117*	0.166***	0.050
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Constant	0.075***	0.255***	0.261***	0.028	0.029	-0.042	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
MODEL STATISTICS							
Observations	1790	1663	1663	1805	1817	1824	1793
Clusters	1172	1125	1122	1180	1183	1185	1171
AIC	350.718	1833.283	1955.931	4959.597	4978.567	5063.966	4974.513
Log-Likelihood	-173.359	-914.641	-975.966	-2477.799	-2487.283	-2529.983	-2485.256
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

Table A.10: Differences in Ground Versus Aerial Combat

To probe for differences in the effects of ground versus air combat, we repeat our core regressions with separate indicators for ground and aerial combat exposure.

Table A.10: Differences Between Ground and Aerial Combat

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1) Isolationism	(2) Deterrence	(3) Democracy Promotion	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) United Nations	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Nazi Justice
Ground Combat vs. Baseline	0.057***	0.022	0.065*	-0.146**	-0.132**	0.196***	0.080
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Air Combat vs. Baseline	-0.013	-0.059	0.024	0.051	-0.048	0.030	-0.081
	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.136)	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.142)
Ground Combat vs. Air Combat	0.071*	0.081	0.040	-0.197	-0.084	0.167	0.161
	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.153)	(0.141)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Constant	0.075***	0.254***	0.260***	0.029	0.030	-0.043	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
MODEL STATISTICS							
Observations	1790	1663	1663	1805	1817	1824	1793
Clusters	1172	1125	1122	1180	1183	1185	1171
AIC	349.724	1833.787	1957.587	4959.792	4980.238	5064.707	4975.340
Log-Likelihood	-171.862	-913.894	-975.793	-2476.896	-2487.119	-2529.353	-2484.670
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day). Ground combat vs. air combat reports the difference in the effect of ground combat - air combat. Baseline captures all respondents who did not report combat exposure.

Table A.11: Disaggregating Violence Exposure

In Table 5 we explore differences between combat and non-combat veterans' attitudes, focusing on ground combat versus ground near-combat. This choice is inconsequential for results, which hold when we compare all respondents reporting combat exposure versus all respondents reporting near-combat exposure.

Table A.11: Combat Veterans Versus Near- and Non-Combat Veterans

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1) Isolationism	(2) Deterrence	(3) Democracy	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) United Nations	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure vs. Near-Combat Exposure	0.052***	0.012	0.075**	-0.069	-0.127*	0.153**	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Combat Exposure vs. Baseline	0.034	-0.002	0.033	-0.167**	-0.103	0.184***	0.134*
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Near-Combat Exposure vs. Baseline	-0.018	-0.014	-0.042	-0.099	0.024	0.031	0.145**
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.060)
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to combat. Near-combat exposure is self-reported exposure to violence (e.g. artillery, aerial bombardment) but not combat. Non-combat exposure captures all respondents neither exposed to combat nor near-combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

Figure A.12: Outfit Fixed Effects

A number of results survive the inclusion of outfit fixed effects, which only leverage within-unit variation in combat exposure. This test is quite demanding, as we observe multiple respondents for just 41% of outfits in our sample, and within-unit variation in combat exposure for just 28% of outfits in our sample.

Figure A.12: Results Leveraging Within-Outfit Variation in Combat Exposure

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals respectively. Parameters follow column 2 of Table.

Table A.13: Intensive Margin of Combat

Our main estimates study a binary indicator of combat exposure. Here, we replace our indicator with a categorical variable measuring the number of days of combat a respondent saw. Results on isolationism are nearly significant (two-sided p = 0.134).

Table A.13: The Intensity of Combat Exposure

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1) Isolationism	(2) Deterrence	(3) Democracy	(4) Marshall Plan	(5) United Nations	(6) Punitive Peace	(7) Nazi Justice
Days of Combat Exposure	0.014	-0.006	0.031**	-0.080***	-0.026	0.062**	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Constant	0.082***	0.258***	0.264***	0.028	0.009	-0.022	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
MODEL STATISTICS							
Observations	1790	1663	1663	1805	1817	1824	1793
Clusters	1172	1125	1122	1180	1183	1185	1171
AIC	355.785	1831.128	1954.799	4954.975	4981.416	5061.220	4979.713
Log-Likelihood	-175.893	-913.564	-975.399	-2475.487	-2488.708	-2528.610	-2487.857
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Days of combat is a five-category variable with the following categories: 0 days, 1-27 days, 28-55 days, 56-111 days, and 112-335 days. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

Table A.14: Coarsened Exact Matching

Following Iacus, King, and Porro (2012), we implement coarsened exact matching. In panel A we match all combat exposed and unexposed respondents on the key observable predictors of combat experience. In panel B we match combat exposed and near-combat exposed respondents on the key observable predictors of combat experience. The covariates we match on are: service branch, age, education, time deployed overseas, time in unit, ever deployed in Britain, and deployed in Germany before V-E Day.

Table A.14: Coarsened Exact Matching

	General Postwar Orientations			Specific Postwar Policies			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:	Isolationism	Deterrence	Democracy	Marshall Plan	United Nations	Punitive Peace	Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure	0.058***	0.023	0.064*	-0.148**	-0.131**	0.196***	0.082
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Constant	0.074***	0.251***	0.262***	0.031	0.028	-0.041	-0.017
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
MODEL STATISTICS							
Observations	1790	1663	1663	1805	1817	1824	1793
Clusters	1172	1125	1122	1180	1183	1185	1171
AIC	347.854	1832.756	1955.737	4957.935	4978.368	5062.754	4973.698
Log-Likelihood	-171.927	-914.378	-975.869	-2476.967	-2487.184	-2529.377	-2484.849
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel B:	Isolationism	Deterrence	Democracy	Marshall Plan	United Nations	Punitive Peace	Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure	0.059**	0.035	0.064*	-0.104	-0.134*	0.259***	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Constant	0.067***	0.241***	0.252***	-0.003	0.041	-0.067*	0.023
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)
MODEL STATISTICS							
Observations	1219	1127	1124	1229	1236	1239	1221
Clusters	891	841	838	897	900	901	892
AIC	194.497	1203.550	1273.904	3337.180	3376.590	3370.429	3270.742
Log-Likelihood	-95.249	-599.775	-634.952	-1666.590	-1686.295	-1683.214	-1633.371
PARAMETERS							
Core FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, outfit-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, time in present outfit, physical condition, morale, job importance, service branch, and deployment history (in Britain, France, Germany pre V-E Day, Germany post V-E Day).

Section A.15: The S-211A Survey

We do not observe draft status in the S-235 survey we use in our main analyses. However, volunteer soldiers differ from conscripts in important ways relevant for foreign policy attitudes. To address the concern that draft status is an omitted variable, we turn to another survey from the ASWW2 family. Specifically, we draw on the "Reactions to the Enemy and Further Duty – Form A" survey designated S-211A. This survey was fielded in June 1945 on a sample of 2,052 white and Black enlisted soldiers at ten Redistribution Centers in the continental US. Respondents in this survey were returning from deployments in nine theaters across the globe.

In the S-211A survey we observe draft status, as well as other important covariates from our main analyses, such as age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, physical condition, morale, service branch, and deployment history. Estimates from the S-211A survey are not directly comparable to estimates from the S-235 survey because question wording and response options differ slightly across surveys. However, we can reproduce substantially specifications.

The S-211A survey also includes questions related to three of the foreign policies we study in the main analyses. First, we can perfectly recreate the Marshall Plan aid index, which is comprised of the following two questions:

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not kill or put in prison for life all the bigshot Nazi leaders"

  – A: "Should."

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not kill or put in prison for life all the little Nazi leaders who held lower positions?"

  – A: "Should."

Second, we can perfectly recreate the Nazi justice index, which is comprised of the following two questions:

- Q: "After the war, some of our Allies will need help in feeding their people. Do you think the United States should send food to these countries even if it meant that we would have to keep on rationing food in our own country for a while to do it?"

  – A: "We should send food after the war, even if we have to keep on rationing food in the U.S. in order to do it."

- Q: "After the war, some of our Allies will need money and materials to help them get back on their feet. Do you think we should let them have money and materials to help them get back on their feet, even if it meant that we should have to pay higher taxes to do it?"

  – A: "We should help them with money and materials after the war, even if it means higher taxes for us."

Third, we can closely recreate the punitive peace index. There is not a perfect correspondence between questions we use in the S-235 survey to create the punitive peace index and questions in the S-211A survey, but principal component analyses suggest all questions load on a common factor. The S-211A survey includes five questions that perfectly match sub-items of the punitive peace index in the S-235 survey:

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should keep an occupation force in Germany for some years after the war, even if it means the U.S. will have to furnish a considerable number of troops in order to do it?"

  - A: "Yes."

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not break Germany up into smaller states?"

  - A: "Should."

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not prevent the Germans from rebuilding their steel, chemical, and automotive industries?"

  - A: "Should."

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not make German labor rebuild devastated areas in other countries at the wages usually paid prisoners of war?"

  - A: "Should."

- Q: "Do you think that the ordinary German people are to blame for starting the war, or do you think that it is really just the group of Nazi militaristic leaders who are to blame?"

  - A: "Almost all of the ordinary German people are to blame as well as their leaders."

In addition, the S-211A survey includes the following three questions that also load on the punitive peace index, but are not in the S-235 survey:

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not abolish the Nazi Party?"

  - A: "Should."

- Q: "Do you think the United Nations should or should not completely demobilize the German Army and keep them from having an army again?"

  - A: "Should."

- Q: "Some feel that Germany should be governed by an international force for some years to come, while others feel that Germany should be governed only until the Nazis are crushed and a new government is set up. With which do you agree?"

  - A: "Govern Germany with an occupation force for some years to come."

Table A.16: S-211A Survey Results

Using the S-211A survey, we study the effect of combat exposure on attitudes toward Marshall Plan aid, imposing a punitive peace, and Nazi justice. We add a control for draft status in these models.

Table A.16: S-211A Survey Results

	(1) Marshall Plan	(2) Marshall Plan	(3) Punitive Peace	(4) Punitive Peace	(5) Nazi Justice	(6) Nazi Justice
Combat Exposure	-0.038	-0.119	0.272***	0.128*	0.185**	0.077
	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.091)
Conscripted	-0.085*	-0.123**	-0.181***	-0.143***	-0.143***	-0.111**
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.046)
Constant	0.077*	0.150**	-0.047	0.015	-0.019	0.025
	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.059)
MODEL STATISTICS						
Observations	2022	2022	2039	2039	2052	2052
Clusters	10	10	10	10	10	10
AIC	5739.155	5439.258	5736.246	5366.871	5769.557	5329.090
Log-Likelihood	-2866.577	-2716.629	-2865.123	-2680.436	-2881.778	-2661.545
PARAMETERS						
Core FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust, redistribution center-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Combat exposure is self-reported exposure to ground combat in panel A and self-reported exposure to all combat in panel B. All models parameterize instrument non-response. Core fixed effects are for: age, education, marital/parenthood status, rank, time in military, time deployed overseas, physical condition, morale, psychoneurotic score, plans to continue serving, service branch, deployment history (in Germany), theater, and decorations for valor.

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