

SYLLABUS

Topics in the Economic History of Institutions

Master in Social Sciences

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The aim of this course is to advance your understanding of the evolution and functioning of formal and informal institutions supporting the operation of factor and goods markets and innovation using several case studies in early modern and modern economic history. Firstly, we will study the growth of market size via market integration and the determinants of smithian growth (division of labour and specialization). Secondly, we will study the operation of factor markets and institutions underpinning the mobilization of factors of production, land, labour and capital. Thirdly, we study the institutional determinants of innovation and schumpeterian development (innovation-induced growth). The course is structured around important debates in economic history: for example the Greif-Ogilvie-Goldberg debate on private-order enforcement and international trade in the Middle Ages, or the role of market integration in the Great Divergence between Western Europe and China in the 18th century, or the controversy around the role of guilds in fostering innovation in pre-industrial economies.

This is a course heavily geared towards intensive reading of academic debates and relevant related articles. Because this is a course aimed at students with an aspiration to become professional researchers, we will also put emphasis on issues related to the collection and presentation of evidence, research questions and hypotheses, and testing. Evaluation will be based on a class presentation on one of the articles and a 3,000 words essay.

1 Institutions and development

What is an institution?

Personal vs impersonal exchange

Slow- and fast-moving institutions

Theories of institutional change and persistence

Readings:

Blogger Pseudoerasmus: <https://pseudoerasmus.com/2015/10/03/henrich/>

[Roland, 2004]

[Temin, 2006]

[Clark, 2015]

2 The Social and Institutional Bases of Markets

Private order enforcement

[Alesina and Giuliano, 2013]

Case study. The Maghribi traders (11th-12th centuries):

[Greif, 1993]

[Edwards and Ogilvie, 2012]

[Greif, 2012]

[Greif, 2006]

[Goldberg, 2012]

Impersonal exchange and external enforcement. Markets and states

[Epstein, 2000]

Market integration and the Great Divergence

[Shiue and Keller, 2007]

[Li, 2000]

[STUDER, 2008]

3 Capital markets: Institutions and Financial Development

Debt and credit in absence of powerful states

[Hoffman et al., 1992]

[Hoffman et al., 1999]

[Botticini, 2000]

Debt and credit in Islamic societies: religion and financial development in the Ottoman Empire

[Kuran, 2004, Kuran, 2018]

[PAMUK, 2009]

4 Institutions and size and efficiency of the labour market

Pre-industrial labour markets:

[Ogilvie, 2014]

[Dell, 2010]

Human capital formation:

[Van der Beek, 2015]

[Minns and Wallis, 2013]

5 Property rights and the development of land markets

Property rights and agricultural development [Guirkinger and Aldashev, 2016]

[Nafziger, 2010]

The 19th century, liberalization of land markets, property rights, and investment

[Rosenthal, 1990]

[Markevich and Zhuravskaya, 2018]

[Heldring et al., 2015]

Land reform, property rights in Africa:

[Fenske, 2011]

[Boone, 2018]

6 The Social and Institutional Bases of Innovation

Innovation and guilds in medieval times

[Epstein, 1998]

Collective Invention

[Allen, 1983]

Intellectual property rights

[Burton and Nicholas, 2017]

[Moser, 2005]

[Khan, 2015]

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